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The Law of 180-Day Exclusivity*
ERIKA LIETZAN AND JULIA POST**

When Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman amendments to the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) in 1984, creating a statutory pathway for
abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs), it included an incentive for generic
applicants to challenge as invalid, or alternatively design around, patents claiming
the innovative drugs on which they based their abbreviated applications.' In brief,
the first generic applicant to file an ANDA asserting that such a patent was invalid or
not infringed would be awarded 180 days of generic market exclusivity. During this
exclusivity period, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) could not approve a
subsequent ANDA that challenged a patent claiming the same drug. Congress
amended the scheme substantially in 2003 as part of the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA), 2 and it made minor and
temporary changes in 2012 as part of the Food and Drug Administration Safety and
Innovation Act (FDASIA).
4
This is the fourth in a series of articles explaining the law of 180-day exclusivity.
Like the others, it takes a descriptive and doctrinal approach to the law that has
emerged from the statute, the agency's implementing materials (which range from
regulations to citizen petition responses and decisions to award or deny exclusivity),
and court decisions. Its scope is, however, slightly different. For many years, the two
schemes-the 1984 scheme and the amended 2003 scheme-operated in parallel.
One or the other would apply, depending on the date that the particular ANDA was
filed. Today there are few if any pending ANDAs to which the original provisions

*This is the fourth in a series that has been published regularly for more than a decade. The authors
assumed full responsibility for citations, the format of which conforms to the prior articles in the series
and not necessarily to the conventions of the Georgetown University Law Center's Student Editorial
Board.
** Erika Lietzan is an associate professor at the University of Missouri School of Law. Julia Post is
an associate at Covington & Burling LLP, and the views expressed in this article are hers and do not
reflect the views of her firm or any of its clients. The authors are grateful to David Kom and Laura Sim
for comments and guidance and to Jennifer Pelaia for research assistance.
I Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat.
1585 (1984).
2 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173,
117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
3 Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-144, 126 Stat. 993
(2012).
&

4 See David E. Kom, Erika Lietzan & Shaw Scott, A New History and Discussion of 180-Day
Exclusivity, 64 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 335 (2009) [hereinafter "2009 Exclusivity Article"]; Erika Lietzan
David E. Kom, Issues in the Interpretation of 180-Day Exclusivity, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 49 (2007)
[hereinafter "2007 Exclusivity Article"]; Erika King Lietzan, 2004 Update: 180-Day Exclusivity Under
the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the FederalFood, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
459 (2004); Erika King Lietzan, A Brief History of 180-Day Exclusivity under the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments to the FederalFood, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 287 (2004).
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apply. Moreover, although the original scheme gave rise to a substantial number of
interpretive disputes litigated before FDA and in the courts, those disputes have
largely been resolved.
We view the law of the 1984 scheme as worth describing, not only because the
scheme may be of historical interest to readers but also because the 2003
amendments made targeted changes and left much of the original statutory language
intact. But we have made the decision to truncate discussion of the older scheme. As
before, we proceed issue by issue. But as a general rule, for each issue we simply
identify the rule of law under the old scheme, generally referring the reader to the
pages of the 2009 article (or, if warranted, the 2007 article) that explain its
development and noting briefly developments subsequent to 2009 that are consistent
with earlier conclusions. This article therefore generally does not repeat the detailed
discussion of pre-2009 controversies that can be found in earlier articles. Instead it
focuses on new developments: new issues that have arisen relating more generally to
180-day exclusivity, such as premature notice of paragraph IV certification, as well
as the body of law emerging around the forfeiture provisions enacted in 2003.
Section I of this article provides the necessary background regarding the statutory
language as well as a high-level description of the steps FDA has taken to implement
the scheme. It defers discussion of the details of FDA's implementing regulations to
section II. Section II discusses the discrete interpretive issues, arranged in five
categories: which rules apply, earning exclusivity, forfeiture of exclusivity,
commencing the exclusivity term, and enjoyment (use) of the exclusivity term. This
section presents each issue as a question and then offers a short answer and a more
full discussion. In some cases, the issue is sufficiently discrete and the discussion
sufficiently brief that the article dispenses with a "short answer" altogether. Because
FDA has announced that it will release guidance on 180-day exclusivity sometime in
2016,6 section II flags open issues as well as apparent agency policies that could be
confirmed in guidance. We conclude in section III with a brief discussion of
lingering and renewed criticisms of the scheme, in the courts, academic literature,
and Congress. We note a variety of proposals, both in Congress and in the secondary
literature, to change the scheme yet again.

I.

BACKGROUND

A.

OriginalStatutory Language (1984 to 2003)

As originally enacted, the statute provided that if an ANDA "contains a
certification described in subclause (IV) of paragraph (2)(A)(vii) [otherwise known
as a "paragraph IV certification"] and is for a drug for which a previous application
has been submitted under this subsection continuing [sic "containing"] such a
certification, the application shall be made effective not earlier than one hundred and
eighty days after-(I) the date the Secretary receives notice from the applicant under
the previous application of the first commercial marketing of the drug under the

5 This article uses the phrase "old ANDAs" to refer to ANDAs governed by the 1984 scheme,
including the 1984 scheme as amended (retroactively) in 2003. It also refers to the 1984 scheme as the
"old scheme."
6 FDA, Guidance Agenda: New & Revised Draft Guidances CDER is Planning
to Publish During

CalendarYear 2016 (Jan. 22, 2016).
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previous application, or (II) the date of a decision of a court in an action described in
clause (iii) holding the patent which is the subject of the certification to be invalid or
not infringed, whichever is earlier." 7 Put another way, the first generic applicant to
file an ANDA containing a paragraph IV certification was to be awarded 180 days of
exclusivity, during which FDA could not approve a subsequent ANDA that
challenged a patent for the same drug product. The 180 days were calculated from
either the date of the first commercial marketing of the generic drug product by the
first applicant or the date of a court decision declaring the patent invalid or not
infringed, whichever was sooner.
FDA published a final regulation implementing the 180-day provision in October
1994. Section 314.107(c) stated that if an ANDA contained a paragraph IV
certification and was for a generic copy of the same listed drug "for which one or
more substantially complete abbreviated new drug applications were previously
submitted" containing a paragraph IV certification, and "the applicant submitting the
first application has successfully defended against a suit for patent infringement
brought within 45 days of the patent owner's receipt of notice," then approval of the
second ANDA would be made effective no sooner than the earlier of (1) the date the
first applicant "first commences commercial marketing of its drug product" or (2) the
date "of a decision of the court holding the relevant patent invalid, unenforceable, or
not infringed." The regulations explained that the "applicant submitting the first
application" was the applicant that submitted an application that both (1) was
substantially complete and (2) contained a paragraph IV certification, prior to the
submission of any other application for the same listed drug that both was
substantially complete and contained the same certification. In other words, the first
applicant to satisfy both requirements would earn exclusivity. According to the
regulation, a "substantially complete" application contained "the results of any
required bioequivalence studies, or, if applicable, a request for a waiver of such
studies." 9
B. Amended Statutory Language (2003 to present)
In 2003, as part of broader amendments to the Hatch-Waxman provisions
contained within the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA), Congress revised the
language that governs the earning and triggering of exclusivity, added a series of
forfeiture provisions, and included definitions for key terms. For the most part, the
amended language applies only to ANDAs filed after December 8, 2003, and only if

' 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (1984).
54 Fed. Reg. 28872 (July 10, 1989) (proposed rule); 59 Fed. Reg. 50338 (Oct. 3, 1994) (final rule).
9 In the preamble to the proposed regulation, FDA had added that a "required bioequivalence study
is one that meets any FDA guidance document or is otherwise reasonable in design and purports to show
that the drug product for which the applicant seeks exclusivity is bioequivalent to the listed drug." 54 Fed.
Reg. at 28895. Rejecting concerns that generic manufacturers engaged in "file first fix later" practices,
however, FDA declined to establish criteria to determine whether changes to an ANDA have been so
substantial that it can no longer be considered to have been the first filed. Instead, the agency would rely
on its decision in 1992 to no longer accept ANDAs lacking complete bioequivalence study data (if such
data are required for approval) and use a "case-by-case approach" to ANDA changes. 59 Fed. Reg. at
50354. FDA added, however, that "[a] decision by the agency after receipt of an application that the
bioequivalence information is inadequate for approval does not necessarily mean that the application was
not substantially complete at the time of submission." Id.
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there was no paragraph IV certification to the listed drug prior to December 8,
2003.10 Congress made two changes that were explicitly retroactive.' 1
Under the new scheme, if an ANDA "contains a [paragraph IV] certification and
is for a drug for which a first applicant has submitted an application containing such
a certification, the application shall be made effective on the date that is 180 days
after the date of the first commercial marketing of the drug (including the
commercial marketing of the listed drug) by any first applicant."1 2 As before, the
first generic applicant to file an ANDA containing a paragraph IV certification is
eligible for 180 days of exclusivity, during which FDA may not approve a
subsequently filed ANDA that challenged a patent for the same drug. Now, however,
the exclusivity period is calculated from the date of the first commercial marketing
of the drug product (including the listed drug product) by a first applicant. A court
decision does not by itself start the 180 days under the new scheme.
Congress also added a scheme for forfeiture of exclusivity." The 180-day
exclusivity period is forfeited by a first applicant that fails to market the drug by the
later of: (1) 75 days after the date on which approval of its application is effective, or
30 months after its application was submitted, whichever is earlier; or (2) 75 days
after the date on which, as to each patent that is the subject of a paragraph IV
certification by the first applicant (qualifying it for exclusivity), a court has found the
patent invalid or not infringed, a court signs a settlement order or consent decree
finding the patent invalid or not infringed, or the patent information is withdrawn by
the holder of the approved NDA. The first applicant also forfeits exclusivity if any of
the following occurs: (1) the first applicant withdraws its application or FDA
considers it withdrawn because it did not meet the requirements for approval; (2) the
first applicant amends or withdraws all of the paragraph IV certifications that
qualified it for exclusivity; (3) the first applicant fails to obtain tentative approval of
its application within 30 months after it was filed (unless the failure is caused by a
change in or review of the requirements for approval of the application imposed after
it was filed); (4) the first applicant enters into an agreement with another ANDA
applicant, the NDA holder, or a patent holder, and the FTC or a court has found that
the agreement violates the antitrust laws; or (5) all of the patents as to which the first
applicant filed a paragraph IV certification qualifying it for exclusivity have expired.
Forfeiture events are determined individually for each first applicant. If all first
applicants forfeit their 180-day exclusivity, any subsequent ANDA approval may be
made effective immediately; exclusivity does not roll over to a subsequent ANDA
applicant.
In 2003 Congress added definitions for terms in the provision, including "180-day
exclusivity period," "first applicant," "substantially complete application," and

10 Pub. L. No. 108-173,

§ 1102(a).

1 First, the provision requiring forfeiture of exclusivity if the first applicant enters into a settlement
agreement found to violate the antitrust laws, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(V), applies retroactively to old
ANDAs. See Pub. L. No. 108-173 § 1102(b). Second, Congress made a retroactive change to the "court
decision" trigger for exclusivity. See id; see also FDA, Draft Guidance for Industry, Listed Drugs, 30Month Stays, andApproval ofANDAs and 505(b) (2) Applications Under Hatch-Waxman, as Amended by
the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (October 2004),
withdrawn in 2013 (78 Fed. Reg. 48175 (Aug. 7, 2013)); also infra section 0.
12 21 U.S.C. § 355()(5)(B)(iv).
13 21 U.S.C. § 355()(5)(D).
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"tentative approval."' 4 The "180-day exclusivity period" is the "180-day period
ending on the day before the date on which an application submitted by an applicant
other than a first applicant could become effective" under the 180-day exclusivity
provision. A "first applicant" is "an applicant that, on the first day on which a
substantially complete application containing a [paragraph IV certification] is
submitted for approval of a drug, submits a substantially complete application that
5
contains and lawfully maintains a [paragraph IV certification] for the drug."' A
"substantially complete application" is "an application under this subsection that on
its face is sufficiently complete to permit a substantive review and contains all the
information required by [section 505(j)(2)(A)]." "Tentative approval" means
"notification to an applicant by the Secretary that an application under this
subsection meets the requirements of [section 505(j)(2)(A)], but cannot receive
effective approval because the application does not meet the requirements of this
subparagraph, there is a period of exclusivity for the listed drug under [section
505(j)(2)(F)] or section 505A, or there is a 7-year period of exclusivity for the listed
drug under section 527."
In early 2015, FDA proposed regulations implementing the 2003 amendments to
the Hatch-Waxman scheme, including a few regulations addressing 180-day
exclusivity.' 6 For instance, the agency proposed regulatory definitions that track the
new statutory definitions for "180-day exclusivity period," "first applicant," and
7
"substantially complete application."' The agency also proposed a new definition
8
for "commercial marketing"' and extensive revisions to sections 314.95 and
314.101 of its regulations to address the timing of notice of paragraph IV
certifications. The new notice regulations are discussed in section II.B.1 below.

14 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
15 "Lawfully maintains" was not defined in the statute; the phrase was added only when the Housepassed and Senate-passed bills were in conference committee. FDA generally takes the view that an
applicant cannot "lawfully maintain" a patent challenge if it loses the ensuing litigation. See, e.g., 21

C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12)(viii)(A) & Proposed21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12)(viii)(A).
16 80 Fed. Reg. 6802 (Feb. 6, 2015).
17 The "180-day exclusivity period" would be defined as the "I 80-day period beginning on the date
of the first commercial marketing of the drug (including commercial marketing of the reference listed

drug) by any first applicant. The 180-day period ends on the day before the date on which an ANDA
submitted by an applicant other than a first applicant could be approved." Proposed21 C.F.R. § 314.3(b).
A "first applicant" would be "an applicant that, on the first day on which a substantially complete ANDA
containing a paragraph IV certification is submitted for approval of a drug, submits a substantially

complete ANDA that contains, and for which the applicant lawfully maintains, a paragraph IV
certification for the drug." Id This would replace the definition of the "applicant submitting the first
application" in current 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(c)(2). A "substantially complete application" would be "an
ANDA that on its face is sufficiently complete to permit a substantive review and contains all the

information required under section 505(j)(2)(A) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and
§314.94."Id
18 "Commercial marketing" would mean "the introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate
commerce of a drug product described in an approved ANDA, outside the control of the ANDA holder,
except for investigational use under part 312 of this chapter, but does not include transfer of the drug
product for reasons other than sale to parties identified in the approved ANDA." Proposed 21 C.F.R.

§ 314.3(b). This proposed definition is based on the definition of the term in current section 314.107,
which in turn would be deleted, although the agency is rewording its treatment of transfers in order to
clarify that shipment to a party named in the ANDA for purposes described in the ANDA (e.g., contract
packaging) is not "commercial marketing" even though it arguably places the drug products outside of the
control of the manufacturer. See 80 Fed. Reg. at 6812.
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Finally, although the proposed regulations do not address the forfeiture provisions of
the 2003 amendments, the agency does propose deleting 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(c)(3),
which describes the potential consequences of a first applicant's failure to "actively
pursue" approval of its ANDA. 19 In FDA's view, this regulation has been superseded
by the statutory forfeiture provisions. 20 The agency otherwise noted that it is
implementing 180-day exclusivity "directly from the statute" and that it "will
determine if additional rulemaking is necessary in the future." 21 FDA noted that it
may open dockets for public comment on factual scenarios that raise novel issues
regarding forfeiture of exclusivity, as it has done in the past. 22

C. Food and DrugAdministration Safety and Innovation Act

(FDASIA)
In 2012, Congress modified the terms of one forfeiture provision.23 Under the
provision in question, as enacted in 2003, a first applicant forfeits exclusivity if it
fails to obtain tentative approval within 30 months of the date on which its
application was filed (unless the failure was caused by a change in or a review of the
requirements for approval of the application imposed after the date on which the
application was filed). Under changes made in 2012, this deadline is extended from
30 months to 40 months (during the period of July 9, 2012 to September 30, 2015)
and from 30 months to 36 months (during the period of October 1, 2015 to
September 30, 2016) for any ANDA submitted between January 9, 2010 and July 9,
2012 with a paragraph IV certification (and any ANDA amended during that time to
include its first paragraph IV certification). Further, for any ANDA submitted prior
to July 9, 2012 that is amended between July 10, 2012 and September 30, 2017 to
contain its first paragraph IV certification, the amendment date-rather than the
original ANDA submission date-starts the 30-month tentative approval forfeiture
period.

19 This regulation provides that if FDA concludes that the first applicant "is not actively
pursuing
approval of its abbreviated application, FDA will make the approval of subsequent abbreviated
applications immediately effective if they are otherwise eligible for an immediately effective approval."
21 C.F.R. § 314.107(c)(3).
20 80 Fed. Reg. at 6866.
21 80 Fed. Reg. at 6807.
22 80 Fed. Reg. at 6807. As noted supra, note 6, the agency plans to release guidance
in 2016 on
180-day exclusivity issues. The guidance docket should provide an opportunity for public comment.
23 Pub. L. No. 112-144 (2012). These changes were part of the Generic Drug
User Fee
Amendments of 2012, which provided the agency with additional resources in order to reduce its backlog
of pending ANDAs and reduce the average time required to review ANDAs.

2016
II.

FOOD AND DRUG LAW JOURNAL

333

INTERPRETIVE ISSUES

A.

Which Rules Apply
1.

Which scheme applies, ifsome ANDAs to the reference listed
drug were submitted before the MMA and others were
submitted after the MMA, and the firstparagraphIV
certification came after?

Short answer. In April 2009, FDA decided that the old scheme applies to every
ANDA in this situation.
Discussion. The "Effective Date" provision of the 2003 legislation states that the
changes to 180-day exclusivity are "effective only with respect to an [ANDA]
filed . .. after [December 8, 2003] for a listed drug for which no [paragraph IV
certification] was made before [December 8, 2003]."24 As FDA has noted, this is
straightforward to apply when either: (1) all ANDAs for a particular drug were
submitted after the MMA, or (2) at least one paragraph IV certification was
25
submitted before the MMA. In 2009, however, it was faced with the first of what it
predicted would be "a number" of cases where generic applications straddled the
December 8 cutoff (some before, some after), and the first paragraph IV certification
occurred after the cutoff.
The relevant case involved generic versions of Topamax@ (topiramate capsules)
Sprinkle Capsules. Barr Laboratories submitted an ANDA in July 2002, containing a
paragraph III certification to U.S. Patent No. 4,513,006. After enactment of the
MMA, Cobalt submitted an ANDA containing a paragraph IV certification to the
same patent. In 2006, the NDA holder listed U.S. Patent No. 7,125,560, and both
applicants submitted paragraph IV certifications. The agency concluded, first, that
26
and second, that it might lack
the same rules should apply to both ANDAs,
27
authority to apply the new rules to old ANDAs. Consequently, both Barr and
Cobalt would be subject to the old rules.

24

Pub. L. No. 108-173,

§ 1102(b)(1).

25 Letter from Gary Buehler, Director, Office of Generic Drugs (OGD), Center for Drug Evaluation

and Research (CDER), FDA, to ANDA Applicant (Apr. 15, 2009) (regarding ANDA 76-448 and ANDA
77-868, both for topiramate sprinkle capsules).
26 FDA reasoned that Congress likely intended the same exclusivity scheme to apply to ANDAs
with the same listed drug. The schemes are sufficiently different that conflicts might arise, the agency
concluded, and application of different schemes to applicants referencing the same drug could result in
disparate treatment of applicants. Id.
27 This is because the effective date provision states that the new scheme applies "only" to an

ANDA filed after December 8, 2003. Id. at 4. Further, applying the new scheme to pre-MMA ANDAs
would mean applying the forfeiture provisions-which include forfeiture for failure to obtain tentative

approval within a 30-month deadline. The agency noted that an ANDA applicant might therefore forfeit
exclusivity for failure to satisfy a criterion that did not exist at the time the ANDA was submitted or for
much of the time the ANDA was pending. This, it added, does not seem consistent with the general
principle that statutes are to be applied prospectively unless Congress signals otherwise. Id. Other
provisions of the MMA were expressly retroactive, the agency added. Id. at 4-5.
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B. EarningExclusivity
1.

Is an ANDA applicanteligiblefor 180-day exclusivity if it also
includeda paragraphIII certification to a later-expiring
patent, suggesting it has no real intent to market before expiry
of the patent to which it provided a paragraphIV certification?

Short Answer. Yes. This issue arises only under the new scheme, in which
exclusivity is awarded product by product-that is, to the first applicant (or
applicants) to submit a paragraph IV certification to a particular reference product.
FDA concluded in 2010 that the first applicant to submit a paragraph IV certification
to any patent listed for the reference listed drug is eligible for 180-day exclusivity,
even if that applicant also includes a paragraph III certification to a later-expiring
patent claiming the same drug.
Discussion. The controversy in 2010 involved generic copies of Combivir
(lamivudine and zidovudine) tablets. At issue were two listed patents: U.S. Patent
No. 5,859,021 (the '021 patent) and U.S. Patent No. 5,905,082 (the '082 patent),
expiring on May 15, 2012 and November 18, 2016, respectively. In June 2007, Teva
submitted an ANDA containing a paragraph IV certification to the earlier-expiring
'021 patent and a paragraph III certification to the later-expiring '082 patent. In
January 2008, Lupin submitted an ANDA containing paragraph IV certifications to
both. Later that year, Teva amended its ANDA to contain a paragraph IV
certification to the '082 patent. Lupin argued that Teva was not a "first applicant"
eligible for exclusivity. 28 It based this argument on Teva's paragraph III certification
to the '082 patent. It pointed out that a paragraph III certification to a patent expiring
in 2016 meant that, in fact, Teva was not really seeking permission to market before
expiry of the patent expiring in 2012. The paragraph IV certification to the '021
patent was "nothing more than a sham filing designed solely to attempt to secure
generic exclusivity."
FDA pointed out that in general the scheme makes it "advantageous for an
applicant to submit paragraph IV certifications to as many patents as it appropriately
can on that first day." 29 It added that, with this in mind, it was "not immediately
obvious" why Teva had challenged only the '021 patent in its initial application.
Nevertheless, FDA reasoned, under the statute an applicant that submits a paragraph
IV certification is a "first applicant . . . if on the first day any applicant submits a

substantially complete application containing a paragraph IV certification, the
applicant submits a substantially complete application that contains and lawfully
maintains a [paragraph IV certification]." 30 FDA denied Lupin's petition, finding the
statute requires "a" paragraph IV certification, not a paragraph IV certification to
each patent or a paragraph IV certification to the latest-expiring patent. Teva had
been the first to file a paragraph IV certification to a patent listed for Combivir and
otherwise met the statutory requirements, and the agency "need not second guess the
28 Lupin Limited, Citizen Petition, Docket No. FDA-2010-P-0549
(Oct. 18, 2010).
29 Letter from Janet Woodcock, M.D., Director, CDER, to William
A. Rakoczy, Esq. and Lara E.
FitzSimmons, Esq., Rakoczy Molino Mazzochi Siwik LLP, Docket No. FDA-2010-P-0549 (May 25,
2011).

30 Id. at 6 (citing FDCA § 505(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(bb) (emphasis added by FDA) (internal quotations
and citations omitted)).
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particular strategy Teva has employed in its patent challenge."
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Thus Teva was

eligible for 180-day exclusivity.
2.

When must an ANDA applicantsend notice of its paragraphIV
certificationto the innovator, in order to be eligiblefor 180-

day exclusivity?
Short answer. The answer is the same under the old scheme and the new scheme.
In the case of an original ANDA containing a paragraph IV certification, the first
applicant must send notice of the paragraph IV certification to the patent owner and
the NDA holder no later than 20 days after the date of the postmark on the notice
32
from FDA that the ANDA has been filed. In the case of an ANDA amendment (to
address a newly issued and listed patent), notice must be provided "when" the
33
generic applicant submits the amendment and certification in question. Further,
FDA has taken the position that the controlling dates for determination of first
applicant status are the certification date in the case of an original ANDA and the
notice date (which should be the same as the certification date) in the case of an
ANDA amendment. Moreover, if notice is provided after an amendment and
certification are filed, i.e., if notice is not timely, agency policy constructively moves
the certification's date (and therefore the controlling date for exclusivity eligibility)
to the date on which the applicant mailed the notice. Since the 2009 article, slightly
different timing questions have arisen: whether a generic applicant may provide
notice before submission or acceptance of the ANDA or ANDA amendment in
question, and (separately) whether it may provide notice before a newly issued patent
34
is listed in the Orange Book. As discussed below, FDA and the courts have
concluded that an applicant may not provide notice before the agency accepts the
application or amendment in question, and the agency has separately proposed that
notice be deemed invalid if sent before the first working day after the day the patent
is listed in the Orange Book.
Discussion. A first applicant must provide timely notice of its paragraph IV
certification to the NDA holder and patent owner. As originally enacted, section
505(j)(2)(B) of the statute required an ANDA applicant making a paragraph IV
certification to "include in the application" a statement that the applicant "will give"
notice to the patent owner and NDA holder. The statute did not explicitly address the
timing of that notice, but it added that if the ANDA was amended to include a
paragraph IV certification, the notice "shall be given when the amended application
is submitted." 35 Section 505(j)(5) in turn attached exclusivity to the first submitted
36
FDA's implementing regulations
ANDA with a paragraph IV certification.
was required to provide notice
ANDA
original
an
of
sponsor
the
that
explained
"when it receives from FDA an acknowledgment letter stating that its [ANDA] is

31 Id. at 6.
32 21 U.S.C.

§ 355(j)(2)(B)(ii)(II).

33 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(ii)(I).
34 References to the "Orange Book" in this article are to the relevant edition of FDA's Approved
Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, now in its 36th edition.

35 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(i), (iii) (1985).
36 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (1985).

336

FOOD AND DRUG LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 71

sufficiently complete to permit a substantive review."37 Further, if an ANDA was
amended to include a paragraph IV certification, the applicant was to "send the
notice . . . at the same time that the amendment to the abbreviated application is
submitted to FDA."3 8
Controversies arising under the initial statutory and regulatory scheme revolved
around the timing of notice in connection with paragraph IV certifications in ANDA
amendments. For instance, in litigation relating to generic versions of Neurontin@
(gabapentin), the D.C. Circuit allowed FDA to penalize Purepac for failure to
provide notice simultaneously with its amended ANDA by postponing the paragraph
IV certification's effective date (rather than by nullifying the certification, as a
competing generic applicant had urged).39 In another case involving Purepac and
generic versions of Glucophage@ (metformin), the agency reasoned that the
controlling dates for determination of first applicant status were the certification date
in the case of an original ANDA and the notice date in the case of an ANDA
amendment. The parties settled before the court could rule on this agency
interpretation. 4 0 These cases are discussed in more detail in the earlier articles, and
there have been no relevant developments since 2009 regarding the old scheme.
Congress amended the relevant provisions in 2003. Section 505(j)(2)(B) continues
to require a generic applicant to "include" in its application a statement that the
applicant "will give notice" as required under that section. But it addressed the
timing of the notice more precisely. Specifically, in the case of an original ANDA
the paragraph IV notice must be provided no later than 20 days after the date of the
postmark on the notice from FDA that the ANDA has been filed.41 The 2003
amendments did not change the statutory language stating that in the case of an
ANDA amendment, notice must be provided "when" the generic applicant submits
the amendment in question.42
The 2009 article discussed two citizen petitions arising under the new notice
language.43 In the more significant of the two, an ANDA was submitted for a drug
with no listed patents; after a patent was later listed, this initial generic applicant
filed a certification amendment and provided simultaneous notice, complying
therefore with the timing rules. In the interim, however, after the patent issued, a
competing generic applicant had filed its own original ANDA with a paragraph IV
certification. This subsequent applicant sent its notice after the initial applicant's
amendment, complying also with the timing rules. In other words, the initial
applicant was subject to the timing rules for amended ANDAs, and the second
applicant was subject to the timing rules for original ANDAs. Although each
21 C.F.R. § 314.95(b).
38 21 C.F.R. § 314.95(d).
39 Purepac Pharm. Co. v. Thompson, 354 F.3d 877 (D.C. Cir. 2004), aif'g TorPharm, Inc. v.
Thompson, 260 F. Supp. 2d 69 (D.D.C. 2003). See 2009 Exclusivity Article, supranote 4, at 341.
40 See IVAX, Purepac Settle Metformin 180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity Suit,
FDA WEEK (Dec.
5, 2003); Sue Sutter, Glucophage XR Settlement: Purepac, IVAX Split Generic Profitsfor 180 Days, 15

HEALTH NEWS DAILY 2 (Nov. 28, 2003). See 2009 Exclusivity Article, supra note 4, at 341 n.4.
41 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(ii)(l1).
42 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(ii)(1).
43 IVAX Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Citizen Petition, Docket No. 2004P-0520 (Nov. 19, 2004)
(withdrawn); Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Citizen Petition, Docket No. 2006P-0245 (June 12, 2006)
(withdrawn). See 2009 Exclusivity Article, supra note 4, at 342.
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complied with the timing rules applicable to its particular situation, the initial
applicant argued that the notice date in both cases (rather than the certification date
for original ANDAs) was the key date for determining eligibility for exclusivity.
FDA apparently disagreed because it awarded exclusivity to the subsequent
applicant, and the controversy was not litigated.44
More recently, the question has arisen whether a generic applicant may send
notice of its paragraph IV certification prior to FDA acceptance of its application for
review. Several courts have found that premature notices are improper, null, void,
and without legal effect.
One fairly typical case before the United States District Court for the District of
Delaware involved a generic application referencing Samsca@ (tolvaptan). FDA
approved Samsca on May 19, 2009, for the treatment of hyponatremia. Otsuka
Pharmaceutical, the NDA holder, has listed two patents, expiring in 2020 and 2026.
On or about October 10, 2013, Par Pharmaceutical sent Otsuka notice of paragraph
IV certifications to both patents, despite the fact that (as alleged by Otsuka) Par did
not have an ANDA accepted for review by FDA.45 Otsuka brought suit in November
2013, asking for a declaration that the notice letters were improper, null, void, and
without legal effect, and therefore also that the letters did not trigger the patent
litigation provisions of section 505(j) of the FDCA.4 6 The district court granted the
48
relief requested.4 7 Various other district courts have reached the same conclusion.
In another variation, the notice related to a patent listed long after the ANDA had
been submitted but before the ANDA had been accepted for review. The case
involved an ANDA referencing Allergan's Restasis@ (cyclosporine). FDA approved
Restasis in 2002 to increase tear production in patients experiencing ocular
inflammation associated with keratoconjunctivitis sicca. Actavis submitted its
ANDA in November 2011, and FDA responded in August 2013 that it refused to
receive the ANDA. Actavis amended the ANDA in October 2013, submitting
additional information. A patent issued in January 2014, at which point Actavis sent
Allergan a paragraph IV notice.49 Allergan sought a declaratory judgment that the
ANDA in question "cannot trigger infringement" under the Patent Act, meaning
44 See 2009 Exclusivity Article, supranote 4, at 342.
45 Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Par Pharm., Inc., C.A. No. 13-1979-RGA (D. Del. Nov. 26, 2013)
(Complaint), TT 24-26.
46 Id. 1 36. Otsuka reasoned that the notice provision uses the past tense when referring to filing of
the ANDA. Specifically, the statute stipulates that an ANDA applicant must provide the reference product
sponsor notice of a paragraph IV certification "not later than 20 days after the date of the postmark on the
notice with which the Secretary informs the applicant that the [ANDA] has been filed." 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(2)(B)(ii)(I) (emphasis added).

47 Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Par Pharm., Inc., C.A. No. 13-1979-RGA (D. Del. Mar. 10, 2014)
(Order).
48 E.g., SB Pharmco Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Mutual Pharm. Co., 552 F. Supp. 2d 500 (E.D. Pa. 2008)
(holding that a paragraph IV certification notice sent prior to FDA's receipt of an ANDA for filing was
premature and ineffective); Merck & Cie. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., C.A. No. 12-161-RGA (D. Del. Sept.
25, 2012) (Order) (noting that Watson's paragraph IV notice was sent "absent a received ANDA" and thus
"is of no legal effect under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) and 21 C.F.R. § 314.95(b)").
49 See Allergan v. Actavis, No. 2:14-CV-638, 2014 WL 7336692, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2014).
The court's opinion does not indicate whether Actavis actually amended the ANDA in January to coincide
with the notice. Moreover, although the record before the court did not indicate that FDA had responded
to the October amendment, the paragraph IV notice apparently stated that FDA had, in fact, "received" the
company's ANDA.
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section 271(e)(2) of that statute, which creates an artificial act of infringement for
purposes of district court jurisdiction where an ANDA contains a paragraph IV
certification.5 0 The court agreed, ruling that FDA receipt of the ANDA is necessary
to trigger section 271(e)(2).'
Of relevance here, Actavis had taken the position that its paragraph IV notice was
sufficient in itself to trigger jurisdiction. The district court agreed with Allergan and
FDA, however, that because FDA had not yet accepted the ANDA, the paragraph IV
notice was premature and improper under the FDCA and FDA's implementing
regulation. Further, although Actavis was amending its ANDA and the statute
requires notice "at the time at which the applicant submits the amendment," the
agency took the view that this provision applies only if the amendment is to an
ANDA that FDA has already accepted for filing. The court found this reading of the
statute persuasive. According to the court, "[t]o hold otherwise would invite generic
manufacturers to submit incomplete or otherwise deficient applications, in order to
secure their positions as the first-filed generic."
These companies could then
"attempt to remedy any deficiencies through an amendment to their premature
application, while claiming priority to the original application for purposes of
securing exclusive access to the market and other benefits." 5 4 This is somewhat
analogous to the "file first fix later" practices that were raised, but dismissed by
FDA, in the original Hatch-Waxman rulemaking.
Another case involved an ANDA referencing Suboxone@ (buprenorphine and
naloxone), which FDA approved in 2010 for maintenance treatment of opioid
dependence. In July 2013, the generic applicant (Par) sent the NDA holder (Reckitt
Benckiser) notice that it had submitted an ANDA with paragraph IV certifications to
two listed patents. Reckitt Benckiser brought timely patent litigation with respect to
this notice,56 i.e., within 45 days, which ordinarily triggers a 30-month stay. 7 In
February 2014, Par submitted a new paragraph IV notice (to a third patent), and
Reckitt Benckiser amended its complaint within 45 days to assert infringement of
this third patent. 8 Par, however, had sent both letters before receiving notice from
FDA that its ANDA had been accepted; thus, an ANDA was not in fact pending. In
March 2014, Par provided a third notice, which contained a paragraph IV
certification to each of the three patents and added that FDA had accepted the
ANDA for substantive review. Reckitt Benckiser consequently filed a second,
50 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2).
51 Allergan v. Aclavis, 2014 WL 7336692 at *9-12 (noting that 35 U.S.C.

§ 271(e)(2), which makes

it an act of infringement to "submit" an ANDA with a paragraph IV certification, requires that the ANDA
be received, not merely delivered).

52 Id. (citing 21 U.S.C.

§ 355(j)(2)(B)(ii)(I)

and 21 C.F.R.

§ 314.95(b)).

53 Id. at 11.
54 Id.
55 See supranote 9.

56 Reckitt Benckiser Pharm. Inc. v. ParPharm., C.A. No. 13-1461--RGA (D. Del.
Aug. 20, 2013)
(Complaint, regarding July 2013 notification of ANDA containing a paragraph IV certification to U.S.
Patent Nos. 8,475,832 and 8,017,150).
5 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
58 Reckitt Benckiser Pharms. Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc., C.A. No. 13-1461-RGA (D.
Del. Feb. 18,
2014) (Amended complaint, regarding February 2014 notification of a paragraph IV certification to U.S.
Patent No. 8,603,514).
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separate, lawsuit for patent infringement, and it included a request for declaratory
judgment that Par's earlier notices were premature and ineffective to trigger the
ANDA patent litigation process, including the 45-day deadline for filing an
infringement action that triggers the 30-month stay.59 It also sought to dimiss the
first litigation, without prejudice, arguing that the court had lacked subject matter
jurisdiction due to the ineffective notices Par had sent. 60 The motion to dismiss was
granted, over Par's objection, without comment.6 ' And although most of the pretrial
schedule from the dismissed first litigation was adopted by the court in the second
litigation, over Reckitt Benckiser's objections, the court made note of Par's
"dubious" conduct. 62 Par has conceded that the 45-day deadline for triggering the
30-month stay did not commence until receipt of the March 2014 notice, i.e., that the
initial notices had no effect.6 3
Although these disputes focus on whether early paragraph IV notices have legal
effect for purposes of triggering a window for patent litigation that will stay ANDA
approval, the agency's recent proposed rule also addresses whether an early
paragraph IV certification qualifies the applicant for first applicant status. FDA's
proposal specifies the date before which notice may not be given and the date by
which notice must be given.64
First, with respect to an original ANDA with a paragraph IV certification, the
applicant would be required to submit notice on or after the day it receives an
"acknowledgment letter" or a "paragraph IV acknowledgment letter" from FDA, but
no later than 20 days after the date of the postmark on the acknowledgment letter.6 5
Put another way, in FDA's view, a window for submitting notice opens on the day it
receives the acknowledgment letter and closes 20 days after the postmark on that
letter. Also, to ensure that notices are not sent prematurely, the ANDA applicant
would be required to include with the notice a statement that it has received the

59 Reckitt Benckiser Pharms. Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc., C.A. No. 14-422-RGA (D. Del. Apr. 4,
2014) (Complaint).
60 Reckitt Benckiser Pharms. Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc., C.A. No. 13-1461-RGA
(D. Del. Apr. 17,
2014) (Motion to dismiss the amended complaint and opening brief in support of motion to dismiss).
61 Reckitt Benckiser Pharms. Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc., C.A. No. 13-1461-RGA (D. Del. May 17,
2014) (Order granting plaintiffs motion to dismiss).
62 Reckitt Benckiser Pharms. Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc., C.A. No. 14-422-RGA (D. Del. May 28,
2014) (Order).
63 E.g., Reckitt Benckiser Pharms. Inc. v. ParPharm., Inc., C.A. No. 13-1461-RGA (D. Del.
May

4, 2014) (plaintiffs reply in support of motion to dismiss) ("Par acknowledges that the 30-month stay of
FDA marketing approval of Par's ANDA provided under the Hatch-Waxman Act was not triggered until

Par served its March 2014 Paragraph IV Notice.").
64 See generally 80 Fed. Reg. at 6831-6836; id. at 6832 (citing SB Pharmco Puerto Rico, 552 F.
Supp. 2d at 510, for the proposition that premature notice "could accelerate the timing provisions and
litigation process well beyond the framework that Congress intended").

65 Proposed 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.95(b)(1), (b)(2). An "acknowledgment letter" would be defined as "a
written, postmarked communication from FDA to an applicant stating that the Agency has determined that
a[n] ... ANDA is sufficiently complete to permit a substantive review. An acknowledgment letter
indicates that the .. . ANDA is regarded as received." A paragraph IV acknowledgment letter would be
defined as "a written, postmarked communication from FDA to an applicant stating that the Agency has
determined that a[n] ... ANDA containing a paragraph IV certification is sufficiently complete to permit
a substantive review. A paragraph IV acknowledgment letter indicates that . . . the ANDA is regarded as

received." Proposed21 C.F.R. § 314.3(b).
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acknowledgment letter in question. 66 This rule would also apply where the ANDA
applicant amended a not-yet-received application to contain a new paragraph IV
certification. That is, if the original ANDA had not yet been acknowledged (deemed
received) by FDA, notice at the time of amendment would be premature. 67 If instead
the original ANDA had been deemed received, and the applicant amended with a
paragraph IV certification, FDA would require the applicant to provide notice on the
day that it submitted the amendment in question. 68 This would be true only if the
patent were already listed in Orange Book; notice would also be premature if sent
before the first working day after the day the patent was listed in the Orange Book.
This last proposal is intended to "ensure that all ANDA applicants (irrespective of
time zone) have a reasonable opportunity to be a first applicant with respect to a
newly listed patent" and also to "eliminate the need for . .. burdensome serial
notifications," which result when an ANDA applicant is aware of a newly issued
patent but unsure when the patent will appear in the Orange Book.70 In all cases,
premature notice would be invalid. Thus it would not trigger the 45-day period
during which the NDA holder and patent owner may file suit and obtain a 30-month
stay; moreover, the applicant would need to resend notice at the appropriate time to
qualify for 180-day exclusivity.7 1
Second, in the case of an original ANDA, the relevant date for determining first
applicant status is the submission date. If the applicant sends late notice, i.e., after the
window, the ANDA submission date would be adjusted by the number of days
beyond the window that the applicant delayed in sending notice.72 In the case of an
amendment to an ANDA, the relevant date for determining first applicant status is
the date of submission of the amendment containing the certification in question
(assuming timely notice), not the date the original ANDA was submitted.73 In these
cases, the acknowledgment letter may state that the ANDA was received for
substantive review on the date on which the original ANDA was submitted, but this
will not be the controlling date for exclusivity purposes. The ANDA amendment date
will be the controlling date (assuming timely notice).7 4 If the amending applicant
sends late notice, the agency will constructively deem the amendment submission
date to be the notice date. This memorializes the policy approved by the D.C. Circuit
in the 2004 Purepac case.7 5 Whether an original ANDA or an ANDA amendment,

66 Proposed21 C.F.R. § 314.95(c)(3); see 80 Fed. Reg. at 6832.
67 See 80 Fed. Reg. at 6832, 6834.
68 Proposed 21 C.F.R. § 314.95(d)(1); see 80 Fed. Reg. at 6835. The agency also proposed
to
reiterate the statutory requirement that notice of a paragraph IV certification in an amendment must be
provided even if the applicant has already provided notice with respect to another paragraph IV
certification contained in the ANDA or an amendment or supplement to the ANDA. Proposed21 C.F.R.
§ 314.95(d)(1); see 80 Fed. Reg. at 6834.
69 80 Fed. Reg. at 6835. See also proposed 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.95(b)(2), 314.94(a)(12)(viii)(C)(1)(ii).

70 80 Fed. Reg. at 6836.
71 Id. at 6832.
72

Proposed21 C.F.R. § 314.101(b)(4); see 80 Fed. Reg. at 6840.

73 See 80 Fed. Reg. at 6832, 6835.
74 See id. at 6832.

75 See id. at 6835 (citing Purepac Pharm. Co. v. Thompson, 354 F.3d 877 (D.C. Cir. 2004),
discussed supra in text accompanying note 39).
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late notice results in adjustment of the date used to determine first applicant status.
Consequently, if there is a subsequent applicant with a paragraph IV certification,
late notice could cause the initial applicant to lose its eligibility for 180-day
exclusivity.7 6
Third, whether certifying in an original or amended ANDA, the applicant would
be required to amend its ANDA with documentation of the notice. Specifically, it
would need to provide documentation that its notice was timely sent and a dated
printout of the Orange Book entry showing the patent that is the subject of the
paragraph IV certification.n This amendment would be due within 30 days after the
last date on which notice was received by a person required to receive notice.78
3.

Is an applicant that submits a paragraphIV certificationbefore
patent expiry, but whose application is not acceptedfor review
until afterpatent expiry, a "firstapplicant"?

Short answer. This is a matter of first impression pending before the agency.
Discussion. This issue has arisen in connection with abbreviated applications
referencing Restasis, discussed in the preceding subsection. Allergan listed U.S.
Patent No. 5,474,979 (the '979 patent) in the Orange Book. InnoPharma submitted
an ANDA on January 13, 2014, with a paragraph IV certification to the '979 patent,
which was the only patent listed in the Orange Book at the time. InnoPharma was
the first to file a paragraph IV to the '979 patent, but the patent expired on May 27,
2014, before FDA issued an acknowledgment letter to the company and therefore
before the company sent notice to Allergan. One day after InnoPharma submitted its
application, Allergan listed another patent-U.S. Patent No. 8,629,111 (the '111
patent). It appears from docket filings that Akorn was the first (or one of the first) to
file a paragraph IV certification to the '111 patent.80 InnoPharma may not have been.
FDA has opened a docket asking, in part, whether InnoPharma (who is not identified
in its notice) is a "first applicant" for purposes of exclusivity.8 ' InnoPharma has
argued that it qualifies, noting that the acknowledgement letter from the agency,
received by InnoPharma on July 21, 2015, "expressly stated that the date the
application was deemed to have been received and acceptable for review (i.e.,
'substantially complete')" was, in fact, January 13, 2014.82 Akorn has argued that
InnoPharma does not qualify, because it did not "perfect" its certification with valid

76 See id. at 6840.

77 Proposed21 C.F.R. § 314.95(e); see 80 Fed. Reg. at 6836, 6838.
78 See 80 Fed. Reg. at 6840.
7 See Comments of John Minogue, Senior Director, InnoPharma, Docket No. FDA-2015-N-2713
(Aug. 26, 2015) [hereinafter InnoPharma Comments].
80 FDA noted that "one or more applicants" submitted paragraph IV certifications to the '111 patent

when it was listed in January. See Letter from Johnny Young, Director (Acting), Division of Filing
Review, OGD, CDER, FDA to Cyclosporine Ophthalmic Emulsion ANDA Applicant, Docket No. FDA2015-N-2713. Akorn self-identified as one. See Comments of Kurt R. Karst, Counsel to Akorn
Pharmaceuticals, Hyman, Phelps & McNamara, P.C., Docket No. FDA-2015-N-2713 (Sept. 28, 2015)
[hereinafter Akom Comments].

8 See Letter from Johnny Young, Director (Acting), Division of Filing Review, OGD, CDER,
FDA, to Cyclosporine Ophthalmic Emulsion ANDA Applicant, Docket No. FDA-2015-N-2713.
82 InnoPharma Comments, supra note 79, at 3.
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notice before patent expiry. 83 This matter was still pending at the time this Article
was written.
4.

Must the ANDA applicant have been suedfor patent
infringement, and must it have prevailedin that litigation, in
order to enjoy the benefit of 180-day exclusivity?

Short answer. This issue arose with respect to old ANDAs, and the answer is that
there is no suit or "successful defense" requirement. By way of contrast, if the first
applicant is sued and loses the patent litigation, it is no longer eligible for
exclusivity. There have been no meaningful developments with respect to this issue
since the earlier articles.84
Discussion. As a reminder, under the original statutory scheme, approval of a
subsequent ANDA could not take effect until the earlier of 180 days after: (1) the
date FDA receives notice of the first commercial marketing of the first applicant's
drug, or (2) the date of a court decision of invalidity or non-infringement with
respect to the patent that was the subject of the paragraph IV certification. In the
early years, FDA took the position that a first applicant was entitled to exclusivity
only if it had been sued for patent infringement and it had prevailed. In 1998,
however, the D.C. Circuit ruled in Mova Pharmaceutical v. Shalala that the
"successful defense" requirement was "gravely inconsistent with the text and
structure of the statute."86 FDA responded by issuing guidance confirming that the
first applicant to submit a substantially complete abbreviated application with a
paragraph IV certification was eligible for 180 days of exclusivity even though it had
not been sued for patent infringement, and it removed the successful defense
requirement from its regulations.8 8 That said, although the first applicant need not be
sued, let alone prevail, to enjoy its 180-day exclusivity, if it is sued and loses (or for
any other reason changes its certification from a paragraph IV to a paragraph III), it
will no longer be eligible for exclusivity.89 This is true today for new ANDAs as
well.

83 See Akom Comments, supra note
80.

84 See 2009 Exclusivity Article, supranote 4, at 349-52.
85 E.g., 54 Fed. Reg. at 28894 (proposed regulations); 59 Fed. Reg. at 50353 (final regulations).
86 Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1069 (D.C.Cir. 1998); see also InwoodLabs., Inc.
v. Young, 723 F. Supp. 1523, 1526 (D.D.C. 1989), vacated as moot, No. 89-5209 (D.C. Cir., Nov. 13,
1989) (finding that the statute does not permit FDA "to read into it a requirement of a lawsuit which is
simply not there"); Granutec, Inc. v. Shalala, 139 F.3d 889 (4th Cir. 1998) (unpublished) (finding that the
statute did not require successful defense against a patent infringement suit).
87 See FDA, Guidance for Industry, 180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity Under the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments to the FederalFood, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (June 1998).
88 63 Fed. Reg. 59710 (Nov. 5, 1998). See Purepac Pharm. Co. v. Friedman, 162 F.3d 1201 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (finding that FDA's "revised system for granting exclusivity" was consistent with the statute
and Mova decision).
89 FDA's regulations implementing the scheme have always provided that following a "final"
judgment of infringement, a generic applicant must amend its paragraph IV certification to be a paragraph
III certification, and that the application in question would no longer be considered one containing a
paragraph IV certification. See 21 C.F.R. §314.94(a)(12)(viii)(A) (1995). Accordingly, it would no longer
be eligible for 180-day exclusivity. The courts have agreed. In a dispute involving an ANDA referencing
Novaldex@ (tamoxifen), marketed by Zeneca for treatment of breast cancer, the innovator and first
applicant settled their patent litigation, and the first applicant amended its ANDA to change the
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Does 180-day exclusivity "roll over" to a second ANDA
applicantin the event that thefirst does not perfect its rights?

Answer. No. FDA's 1994 regulations implied as much, when they indicated that if
the first applicant was "not actively pursuing approval" of its ANDA, FDA would
make approval of subsequent ANDAs immediately effective. 90 In August 1999 draft
regulations, the agency confirmed that exclusivity would not roll over to a second
applicant, even if the first applicant withdrew its ANDA. 9' Although these
regulations were not finalized, this has been FDA's policy since the proposal issued.
The new statutory language requires this result as well,92 and there have been no
meaningful developments since the prior articles. In some situations, however, the
first applicant may waive its exclusivity in favor of a second applicant, as discussed
in subsection II.B.7. To the outside observer, this may appear as a rollover.
6.

Can more than one ANDA applicant hold exclusivity at the
same time for copies of the same innovatorproduct?

Short answer. Yes. For old ANDAs, FDA follows a policy of awarding
exclusivity on a "patent-by-patent" basis, which can create multiple exclusivity
periods for different first applicants for a single reference product. The agency has
recently decided that although reissued patents may give rise to new paragraph IV
certifications, those paragraph IV certifications do not give rise to new periods of
exclusivity under the old scheme. Instead, if the original patent was the basis for the
certification that gave rise to eligibility for exclusivity, a new paragraph IV
certification is necessary to remain eligible for exclusivity. For new ANDAs, the
statute provides that exclusivity will be "product by product," rather than "patent by
patent." In other words, it provides for a single 180-day exclusivity period per
reference product. But, if multiple applicants file substantially complete ANDAs
with paragraph IV certifications on the same day as the first to do so, those
applicants can share exclusivity. Under both the new scheme and the old scheme,
FDA treats different dosage forms and strengths of the reference product as distinct
products for which different (or the same) applicants may be first applicants.
a)

Multiple Patentsfor a Single Reference Product

As discussed in the earlier articles, FDA developed the patent-by-patent approach
to 180-day exclusivity for old ANDAs after judicial invalidation of the successful
defense requirement. That policy had held that a generic applicant must prevail in
patent litigation in order to receive exclusivity, and it effectively precluded more
than one applicant from earning exclusivity. With the elimination of this rule

certification from a paragraph IV to a paragraph III. The district court held that the ANDA in question was
no longer considered to have "contained" a paragraph IV certification and that the generic applicant had
thereby waived its eligibility for 180-day exclusivity. Mylan Pharm. v. Henney, 94 F. Supp. 2d 36
(D.D.C. 2000), vacated and dismissed as moot, 276 F.3d 627 (D.C. Cir. 2002). See also supra note 15
(one cannot "lawfully maintain" a paragraph IV certification under the post-MMA statutory language if
one loses the resulting patent litigation).
90 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(c)(4); 59 Fed. Reg. at 50367-50368.
91 64 Fed. Reg. 42873, 42875 (Aug. 6, 1999).
92 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(iii) (if all first applicants forfeit exclusivity, "no applicant shall be
eligible").
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following Mova Pharmaceutical v. Shalala,93 multiple eligible first applicants
became a possibility. In a 1999 response to citizen petitions filed by American
Pharmaceutical Partners (APP) and Pharmachemie, which involved paragraph IV
certifications to different patents on different days, the agency concluded that
94
"eligibility for exclusivity is to be determined on a patent-by-patent basis." In that
case and the others cited in footnote 94, the subsequent ANDA applicants sharing in
exclusivity were the first to file with respect to different patents and, in particular, the
first to submit a paragraph IV certification to later listed patents.
In 2003, the agency issued guidance reaching the same conclusion-shared
exclusivity-with respect to certifications (whether to one or multiple patents)
submitted on the same day. This was in large part an effort to address-as FDA put
it-the "number of cases in which multiple ANDA applicants or their representatives
have sought to be the first to submit a patent challenge by lining up outside, and
literally camping out adjacent to, an FDA building for periods ranging from 1 day to
more than 3 weeks."95 Thus, when, on the same day, more than one applicant
submits an ANDA for the same drug containing a paragraph IV certification to a
listed patent, and no such certification was submitted previously, all the applicants
share exclusivity. 96 In a case involving ANDAs referencing AstraZeneca's Prilosec@
(omeprazole), a federal district court found the statute ambiguous with respect to
how many exclusivity periods may arise in connection with a single drug product,
found FDA's approach "not entirely irrational," and granted the agency's motion for
98
summary judgment.9 7 The D.C. Circuit affirmed.
More recent cases have involved situations where a second company was the first
to file a paragraph IV certification to a patent that had been listed all along. The first
dispute involved generic applications referencing Aricept@ (donepezil hydrochloride
tablets). Ranbaxy filed an ANDA in the summer of 2003 and was the first to submit
paragraph IV certifications to four listed patents. It included a paragraph III
certification to a fifth patent, U.S. Patent No. 4,895,841 (the '841 patent), which was
slated to expire first, in November 2010. Subsequent ANDA filers, including Teva,
Apotex, and Eisai, did the same thing. In October 2005, however, Teva converted its
paragraph III certification to a paragraph IV certification, meaning that it was the
first applicant to submit a paragraph IV certification to the '841 patent. Although
Ranbaxy's ANDA remained unapproved, on account of the paragraph III

93

Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see suprasection 0.

94 Letter from Janet Woodcock, M.D., Director, CDER, to Robert F. Green, Esq. and Steven H.
Sklar, Esq. Leydig, Voit & Mayer, Ltd. and Kate C. Beardsley, Esq. Buc & Beardsley, Docket No. 99P1271 (Aug. 2, 1999). The earlier articles discussed two other controversies involving paragraph IV
certifications to different patents on different days, one relating to ANDAs referencing Paxil8
(paroxetine) and the other relating to ANDAs referencing Neurontin@ (gabapentin). In both cases, the
sharing applicant had been the first to file a paragraph IV certification to a later listed patent. See 2007
Exclusivity Article, supranote 4, at 57-58.

95 FDA, Guidance for Industry, 180-Day Exclusivity When Multiple ANDAs Are Submitted on the
Same Day (July 2003), at 4.
96 Exclusivity would be triggered for all first applicants for a specific listed patent when one of them
began to market its product (or on the date of any court decision finding that patent invalid, unenforceable,
or not infringed, if earlier). The commercial marketing trigger would begin the 180-day period as to all
listed patents; a relevant court decision would trigger it only as to patents addressed in the decision. Id.

97 Apotex Inc. v. FDA, 414 F. Supp. 2d 61, 74, 76 (D.D.C. 2006).
98 Apotex Inc. v. FDA, 226 F. App'x 4 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (unpublished).
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certification, FDA granted final approval to Teva in April 2008. (The agency was not
aware that a court had preliminarily enjoined Teva from launching its product. 99
Apotex filed an emergency petition arguing that approval was erroneous because
Teva was not entitled to share in the exclusivity, and Eisai submitted a citizen
petition in 2010 asking (among other things) that the final approval be revoked.' 00 In
September 2010, FDA converted Teva's final approval to tentative approval,
concluding that Teva's application was in fact blocked by Ranbaxy's 180-day
exclusivity.' 0 ' Further, it explained that its "shared exclusivity" policy did not apply.
The agency explained that it invokes shared exclusivity when two applicants would
otherwise block each other, as happens if both file paragraph IV certifications to
every patent but each is first with respect to a different patent (for instance, because
one patent was later listed). Shared exclusivity does not apply, however, in situations
where one applicant (in this case, Ranbaxy) was first to file a paragraph IV
certification to one patent and filed a paragraph III certification to another patent, to
which another applicant (in this case, Teva) filed a paragraph IV certification.' 02
FDA approved the Ranbaxy ANDA in November 2010, awarding it alone 180-day

exclusivity. 103
The second case involved ANDA amendments converting section viii statements
to paragraph IV certifications.1 04 In 2003, Watson filed an ANDA referencing Actos
(pioglitazone) on the first day that ANDAs could be filed, and it included paragraph
IV certifications to all ten patents listed in the Orange Book. Eight patents had only
method-of-use claims, and the remaining two had both drug composition and
method-of-use claims. All of the method-of-use claims related to combination
therapy, however, and Watson was not seeking approval for combination therapy.
Following discussions with the agency, Watson amended the paragraph IV
certifications relating to those patents and claims to section viii statements. In 2012,
after reaching an agreement with the innovator pursuant to which it would receive a
license to the use patents and claims, Watson amended the section viii statements
back to paragraph IV certifications. Mylan had submitted an ANDA on the same day
as Watson, with paragraph IV certifications to the composition claims, but from the

99 Letter from Keith 0. Webber, Deputy Director, Office of Pharmaceutical Science (OPS), CDER,
FDA, to William B. Shultz, Esq., Zuckerman Spaeder LLP and Robert A. Dormer, Esq. and Kurt R. Karst,

Esq., Hyman Phelps & McNamara P.C. (Sept. 17, 2010), at 1.
1oo Apotex Inc., Emergency Petition for Stay of Action, Docket No. FDA-2009-P-0326 (July 14,
2009); Eisai Inc., Citizen Petition, Docket No. FDA-2010-P-0430 (Aug. 12, 2010).
101 Letter from Webber, supra note 99.
102

Id.

103 FDA also responded to the Apotex and Eisai petitions. The agency denied, as moot, the request
to convert Teva's final approval to tentative approval. It also confirmed that Ranbaxy was the sole
applicant eligible for 180-day exclusivity. Letter from Janet Woodcock, M.D., Director, CDER, to

Shashank Upadhye, Esq., Apotex, Inc. and David M. Fox, Esq., Hogan Lovells US LLP, Docket Nos.
FDA-2009-P-0326 and FDA-2010-P-0430 (Nov. 26, 2010). In the intervening years, two federal courts
had stated, without ruling on the issue, that Ranbaxy and Teva shared exclusivity, because Teva had been
the first to submit a paragraph IV certification to the '841 patent. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Eisai Co., Ltd.,

C.A. No. 08-2344-GEB (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2009) (Memorandum Opinion) (noting that the companies held
"shared 180-day exclusivity"); Apotex Inc. v. Eisai Inc., C.A. No. 1:09-cv-00477-JAB-LPA (M.D.N.C.
Aug. 27, 2010) (stating that "Teva thus became eligible to share in Ranbaxy's 180-day marketing
exclusivity period").

104 See 21 U.S.C.

§ 355(j)(2)(A)(viii)

(permitting an ANDA applicant to file a statement that a

method of use patent does not claim a use for which the applicant is seeking approval).
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outset it had included section viii statements to the method-of-use patents and
claims. It amended its ANDA converting those to paragraph IV certifications,
however, in 201 0-two years before Watson amended its own section viii statements
back to paragraph IV certifications.
In short, both companies were first filers with respect to the composition claims,
but Mylan amended with paragraph IV certifications to the use patents and claims
before Watson did. FDA took the view that Watson's original ANDA was defective
because it included paragraph IV certifications to patents claiming uses that it sought
to carve out.105 Under the patent-by-patent approach applicable to old ANDAs, FDA

determined that Mylan was the first to file with respect to the use patents and
claims-through its earlier-filed ANDA amendment-and that its resulting
exclusivity would block approval of Watson's ANDA.' 0 6 The district court
disagreed, holding that when Watson eventually amended its ANDA to include a
paragraph IV certification to the use patents, the relevant date for first applicant
status (as to those patents) was the date its original ANDA had been submitted. This,
according to the court, made it a first applicant entitled to share exclusivity with
Mylan. o7 As noted above (subsection II.B.2), FDA has proposed regulations
consistent with its position in this litigation: the relevant date for determining first
applicant status is the date of submission of the amendment containing the
certification in question (as long as notice is timely), not the date the original ANDA
was submitted.
b)

Reissue Patentsfor a Single Reference Product

In the last few years, the question has arisen how FDA will handle paragraph IV
certifications to reissued patents under the old ANDA patent-by-patent scheme. The
Patent and Trademark Office will reissue a patent that was "through error, deemed
wholly or partly inoperative or invalid, by reason of a defective specification or
drawing, or by reason of the patentee claiming more or less than he had the right to
claim." 0 8 When a patent reissues, the patentee surrenders the original patent; a new
patent issues, with a new patent number, and it lasts for the unexpired part of the
term of the original patent.
FDA's recent proposal indicates that although the original patent is technically
surrendered upon patent reissuance, the agency will treat the original and reissued
patent as a "single bundle" of patent rights for purposes of patent certification
requirements and 180-day exclusivity.1 09 Accordingly, in order to lawfully maintain
its paragraph IV certification for purposes of eligibility for 180-day exclusivity
(unless that original patent was untimely filed), a first applicant would need to
amend its pending ANDA to certify to a reissued patent within 30 days of the date of

105 Watson Labs., Inc. v. Sebelius, C.A. No. 12-1344 (ABJ) (D.D.C. Oct. 22, 2012) (Memorandum

Opinion) at 9.
106 Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
107 FDA appealed that decision to the DC Circuit. The case was mooted in June 2013 due to the
expiration of the 180-day exclusivity period, and the district court was ordered to vacate its opinion.

Watson Labs., Inc. v. Sebelius, C.A. Nos. 12-5332 & 12-5342(D.C. Cir. June 10, 2013) (Per Curiam
Order).
108 35 U.S.C.

§ 251.

109 80 Fed. Reg. at 6821.
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listing of the reissued patent in the Orange Book.1 10 The original patent qualifying
the first applicant for exclusivity will remain listed in the Orange Book until FDA
determines that any 180-day exclusivity was extinguished."' If no applicant had
submitted a paragraph IV certification to the original patent, the first ANDA
applicant to submit a paragraph IV certification to the reissued patent could be
eligible for 180-day exclusivity, "if no other applicant already has qualified as a
first applicant based on an earlier paragraph IV certification to another listed
patent."' 12 By implication, an applicant could not receive 180-day exclusivity for its
paragraph IV certification to a reissued patent if the original patent already was the
subject of a paragraph IV certification submitted by a different applicant.
This appears to be the approach that FDA took in 2008 and 2012 with respect to
reissued patents covering Ultracet® (tramadol hydrochloride and acetaminophen)
and Adderall XR® (dextroamphetamine mixed salts), respectively, although there do
not appear to be any formal agency statements tied to those decisions. With respect
to Ultracet, the agency approved an ANDA from Kali Laboratories in 2005, granting
the company 180-day exclusivity stemming from its paragraph IV certification to
U.S. Patent No. 5,336,691 (the '691 patent).1 3 Three years later, when FDA
approved an ANDA from Mylan with the first paragraph IV certification to U.S.
Patent No. RE39,221 patent (the '221 patent), it did not grant exclusivity-even
though the ANDAs in question were old ANDAs subject to the patent-by-patent
scheme.1 4 This would be consistent with having deemed the reissue patent (the '221
patent) the same as the parent patent (the '691 patent) for purposes of exclusivity. It
appears that FDA took the same approach with an Actavis ANDA for a generic
version of Adderall XR@, after Actavis was the first to submit a paragraph IV
certification to a patent that was a reissue of another patent that previously had been
the subject of another company's paragraph IV certification. The approval letter does
not indicate that Actavis was eligible for 180-day exclusivity.'' 5
There is, however, a contrary December 2014 ruling from the Fourth Circuit in a
controversy involving generic applications referencing Celebrex@ (celecoxib). Teva
was the first to file an ANDA with paragraph IV certifications, including to U.S.
Patent No. 5,760,068. After the Federal Circuit found that many of the claims in the
patent were invalid, Pfizer obtained a reissue of the patent, U.S. Patent No.
RE44048. Several companies-Teva, Mylan, and Watson (Actavis)-filed
paragraph IV certifications to the reissued patent on the same day. In a letter to the
ANDA applicants, the agency addressed "whether a paragraph IV certification to a
reissued patent gives rise to a new opportunity for 180-day exclusivity when one or
more paragraph IV certifications to the original patent gave rise to the opportunity

110 Proposed21 C.F.R.

§ 314.94(A)(12)(viii)(B).

111 Id.

80 Fed. Reg. at 6846 (emphasis added).
Letter from Gary Buehler, Director, OGD, CDER, FDA, to W. Scott Groner, Kali Laboratories,
Inc., approving ANDA 76-475 (Apr. 21, 2005).
114 Letter from Gary Buehler, Director, OGD, CDER, FDA to Ronald T, Groman,
Director,
Regulatory Affairs, Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., U.S. Agent for Alphapharm Pty Ltd approving ANDA
77-858 (Sept. 26, 2008).
112
113

115 See Letter from Keith Webber, Ph.D. Deputy Director, OPS, CDER, FDA, to Janak Jadeja,
Director, Regulatory Affairs, Actavis Elizabeth LLC, approving ANDA 077302 (June 22, 2012); see also
Actavis Elizabeth LLC, Citizen Petition, Docket No. FDA-2010-P-0188 (Apr. 6, 2010) (withdrawn).
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for 180-day exclusivity, a final court decision has issued determining that the
original patent is invalid or not infringed, but subsequent to that decision, and prior
to (a) any commercial marketing by a first applicant to the original patent, and (b)
the agency needing to make a decision regarding 180-day exclusivity, the Patent and
Trademark Office issues a reissued patent that references the original patent." 16
FDA concluded that the original and reissued patent represent a "single bundle of
patent rights." Thus, paragraph IV certifications to the reissued patent by subsequent
ANDA filers cannot be the basis for separate periods of 180-day exclusivity.
Further, "eligibility for 180-day exclusivity is only available to the applicant that
first filed a paragraph IV certification to the original patent, and that applicant must
make a timely submission of a paragraph IV certification to the reissued patent to
remain eligible for 180-day exclusivity."" 8 Although not relevant to the issue at
hand, the agency also stated that the court decision invalidating the original patentwhich did not address the reissued patent-did not trigger the first applicant's
exclusivity. Thus, Teva, who had been the first to file a paragraph IV certification to
the original patent and who had also filed a paragraph IV certification to the reissued
patent, was the sole first applicant eligible for 180-day exclusivity.
Mylan, Lupin, and Watson brought suit arguing, among other things, that they
were entitled to share 180-day exclusivity, as a result of their paragraph IV
certifications to the reissued patent." 9 Although the district court granted Mylan's
motion for judgment in favor of the FDA and dismissed the case,1 20 the Fourth
Circuit reversed and remanded. In a non-binding and unpublished but unanimous
opinion, the court of appeals wrote that "the plain language of the statute indicates
that each patent that is the subject of a certification may trigger exclusivity." FDA's
interpretation of an original patent and reissued patent as a single bundle of rights,
resulting in only a single 180-day exclusivity period, "violated plain statutory
language."' 21 FDA's recent proposed rule, which post-dates this decision, takes a
contrary position, and there may therefore be more litigation ahead.
In the 2003 amendments, Congress effectively took a product-by-product
approach to 180-day exclusivity for new ANDAs, by making exclusivity available
only with respect to paragraph IV certifications made on the first day that any
paragraph IV certification is made. Specifically, the statute now precludes approval
for 180 days after first commercial marketing by "any" first applicant and precludes

116 Letter from Kathleen Uhl, Acting Director, OGD, CDER, FDA, to Celecoxib ANDA Applicants
(April 24, 2014), at 1.
117 FDA noted that it had taken this approach with respect to 180-day exclusivity for ANDAs
referencing Mircette@ (desogestrel/ethinyl estradiol and ethinyl estradiol), Ultracet@ (tramadol
hydrochloride/acetaminophen), and Adderall XR@ (amphetamine/dextroamphetamine). Id. at 7-8.

I' Id. at 11.
119 See, e.g., Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, C.A. No. 1:14-CV-00075-IMK (N.D. W.Va. Apr. 25,
2014) (Complaint); Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, C.A. No. 1:14-CV-00075-IMK (N.D. W.Va. May 2,
2014) (Motion to Intervene and Complaint-in-Intervention by Lupin Pharmaceuticals, Inc.).
120 Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, C.A. No. 1:14-CV-40075-IMK (N.D. W.Va. June 16, 2014)
(Order).
121

Id. at 15-17.
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rollover if "all first applicants" forfeit their exclusivity.122 Accordingly, there is one
180-day exclusivity period per reference product.1 23
c)

Different Reference Listed Drugs

Since at least 1990, FDA has taken the position that different strengths of the
reference product constitute different products for purposes of 180-day
exclusivity-permitting a separate 180-day exclusivity period.1 24 (This will be true
under either scheme; it has nothing to do with the old scheme being patent by
patent.) A federal district court found this permissible in a 1999 court decision
involving generic applications referencing Zantac@ (ranitidine), even where the
differing strengths were covered by the same patent.1 2 5 The court's holding was later
cited for the proposition that the same rule would pertain in the case of differing
dosage forms.1 26 FDA's recently proposed regulations take the same approach by
providing that an applicant that amends or supplements its ANDA, in order to seek
approval for a different strength, must provide notice of any paragraph IV
certification.1 27 "Unlike other amendments and supplements," the agency explains,
"an amendment or supplement seeking approval of a different strength may refer to a
different listed drug." 28 Elsewhere FDA explains the connection to 180-day
exclusivity, citing the Zantac litigation: "different strengths of a drug product
constitute different drug products" and thus, "different ANDA applicants seeking

122 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(bb)(defining "first applicant" to mean "an applicant that, on the
first day on which a substantially complete application containing a [paragraph IV certification] is
submitted for approval of a drug, submits a substantially complete application that contains and lawfully

maintains a [paragraph IV certification] for the drug."); see also 149 Cong. Rec. 31783 (Nov. 25, 2003)
(Senator Kennedy) ("and the exclusivity is available to more than one generic applicant, if they all

challenge patents on the same day"); 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(iii) (if all first applicants forfeit exclusivity,
"no applicant shall be eligible").
123 See also 149 Cong. Rec. 31783 (Nov. 25, 2003) (Senator Kennedy) ("The Hatch-Waxman
provisions in this bill also make the exclusivity available only with respect to the patent or patents
challenged on the first day generic applicants challenge brand drug patents, which makes the exclusivity a
product-by-product exclusivity rather than a patent-by-patent exclusivity.")

124 See Apotex, Inc. v. Shalala, 53 F. Supp. 2d 454, 456 n.3 (D.D.C. 1999) (quoting FDA response to
TorPharm citizen petition, in which the agency wrote: "In 1990, FDA determined that Purepac
Pharmaceutical was not barred from final approval of its 20 mg nifedipine product by the 180-day market
exclusivity the Agency had already awarded to Chase Laboratories for its 10 mg nifedipine product.
Because each strength of the drug was a different drug product, exclusivity for the 10 mg product did not
block approval of the 20 mg product. As a result, each strength was separately eligible for exclusivity.").
125 See id at 463 (permitting Novopharm exclusivity for ANDA for 75-mg tablet, after Genpharm
had enjoyed exclusivity for 150 and 300 mg tablets). In other words, exclusivity for old ANDAs was
effectively both product-by-product and patent-by-patent; the first applicant (with a paragraph IV
certification) to either a new product or a new patent would be eligible.

126 See, e.g., Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Shalala, 81 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35 n.8 (D.D.C. 2000) ("The tablet
and capsule forms of the drug, however, are distinct products for FDA purposes and are thus each eligible
for their own exclusivity."); see also Susan Levine, Regulatory Counsel, OGD, CDER, FDA and
Christopher Sorenson, Merchant & Gould P.C., Forfeitureof 180-Day Exclusivity, Presentation at GPhA

Fall 2010 Technical Conference (2010), at slide 2,
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/NewsEvents/UCM237479.pdf ("There can be more than one 'first
applicant' IF ANDAs are submitted on the same day, OR on different days for different dosage forms and
different strengths.").

127 Proposed 21 C.F.R. § 314.52(d)(3).
128 80 Fed. Reg. at 6835.
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approval for different strengths of a drug product approved in a single NDA may
each be first applicants with respect to a different strength of the drug product, if
other applicable statutory and regulatory requirements are met."I 29
7.

Are 180-day exclusivity rights waivable and/or transferable?

Short answer. Yes. The first generic may relinquish its exclusivity altogether at
any time and may waive its 180-day exclusivity rights in favor of another specific
generic applicant after the exclusivity is triggered. This policy was developed under
the old scheme, but it appears to remain true under the new scheme.
Discussion. Although the statute is silent on the issue, FDA has consistently
permitted both waiver of exclusivity (meaning the decision to abandon exclusivity
and permit FDA to approve any and all eligible subsequent applicants) and transfers
of exclusivity (meaning the decision to sell the exclusivity term to a specific
subsequent applicant). The terminology in FDA approval letters, decision letters, and
policy statements, and the court decisions, can be a bit confusing; waiver is also
called relinquishment, transfer is also called selective waiver, and the agency
sometimes uses relinquishment when referring to an agreement between two
companies.1 30 However they are labeled, the distinction between the two types of
decision is important, as the agency has developed differing policies. Specifically, in
the late 1990s, the agency developed a policy that although the first generic could
relinquish exclusivity at any time, it could transfer the exclusivity to another
company only after the exclusivity had been triggered.' 3 ' (Under the scheme at the
time, exclusivity would be triggered by commercial marketing or a court decision of
invalidity or non-infringement.) In 2004, the agency explained its reasoning for the
distinction: if the first applicant could transfer its exclusivity at any time, a "market"
for 180-day exclusivity might develop, leading to the submission of ANDAs "solely
to claim exclusivity."' 32
The courts have declined to intervene where FDA has permitted transfers of
exclusivity. For instance, in 1997, a federal district court declined to "undo" a
transfer of 180-day exclusivity for consideration, finding the agency's interpretation
of the- statute neither impermissible nor arbitrary and capricious.1 33 In that case, the
agency also pointed out that it approves waivers and transfers of five-year and three-

129 Id. at 6813(citing Apotex, Inc. v. Shalala, 53 F. Supp. 2d 454 (D.D.C. 1999), aff'd, 1999 U.S.
App. LEXIS 29571 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 8, 1999)). As a result, an amendment seeking approval for a different
strength may have a later "submission date" (than the ANDA it amended) for purposes of determining
eligibility for 180-day exclusivity relating to the (separate) reference product and for purposes of
calculating forfeiture for failure to obtain timely tentative approval. See id.
130 E.g., Letter from Gary Buehler, Director, OGD, CDER, FDA, to Mark C. Shaw, Vice President,
Regulatory Affairs and Compliance, Impax Laboratories, Inc. regarding ANDA 77-415 (Dec. 15, 2006)
("[W]e note that IMPAX and its marketing partner, TEVA Pharmaceuticals, have entered into an
agreement with Anchem regarding the relinquishment or selective waiver of exclusivity for the 300 mg
strength.").

131 E.g., 64 Fed. Reg. 42873, 42881 (Aug. 6, 1999) (proposed regulation).
132 Letter from William K. Hubbard, Associate Commissioner for Policy and Planning, FDA, to
Bert W. Rein and William A. McGrath, Wiley Rein & Fielding LLP, Docket No. 2004P-0227 (July 2,
2004).
1 Boehringer Ingelheim Corp. v. Shalala, 993 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1997); see also Mylan Pharm.,
Inc. v. Shalala, 81 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (confirming that "(e]xclusivity periods are a transferable
commodity which can be waived in favor of another generic manufacturer for a substantial price").
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year exclusivity under the Hatch-Waxman amendments.1 34 Further, it appears that
FDA continues to permit transfers of exclusivity under the new scheme. Anchen
Pharmaceuticals was the first ANDA applicant to submit a substantially complete
ANDA with paragraph IV certifications to two patents listed by GlaxoSmithKline
with respect to Wellbutrin@ XL (bupropion hydrochloride, extended release, 150 mg
and 300 mg tablets). FDA approved the ANDA on December 14, 2006, after a
federal court ruled that one patent was not infringed and dismissed the infringement
case with respect to the second patent. The approval letter indicated that Anchen
would enjoy 180-day exclusivity. 135 One day later, the agency issued final approval
to another generic applicant, IMPAX Laboratories, with respect to the 300 mg
tablets, noting that Anchen had been the first applicant entitled to exclusivity and
that the companies had entered into an agreement regarding "relinquishment or
selective waiver of exclusivity for the 300 mg strength."l 36
It also appears that, for old ANDAs where exclusivity is earned on a patent-bypatent basis, relinquishment is also patent by patent. This is manifest in FDA's
March 2014 decision to approve Teva's ANDA referencing Evista@ (raloxifene
hydrochloride), as follows. 137 FDA approved Evista® in 1997, and Lilly has listed a
variety of patents in connection with the drug. The only patents relevant here are
those that expired in March 2014 and the four expiring in March 2017. An
unidentified applicant filed an ANDA prior to December 8, 2003, and was the first to
challenge three patents then listed by Lilly and slated to expire in March 2017. Teva
filed its ANDA in 2006. In 2011 Lilly listed a fourth patent that would expire in
March 2017. The unidentified applicant and Teva amended their pending ANDAs on
the same day and were therefore both first applicants with respect to the fourth
patent. The unidentified applicant proceeded to relinquish its entitlement to
exclusivity with respect to the first three patents, leaving only the fourth-as to
which it shared first applicant status with Teva. On March 4, 2014, two days after the
last of the other patents listed by Lilly in the Orange Book expired, FDA approved
Teva's application.
FDA has also permitted applicants to transfer their exclusivity without the
permission of other ANDA applicants with whom they share exclusivity. So far it
appears to have done so only with respect to ANDAs under the old scheme. To give
an example, as already noted, there were ten patents listed for Actos (pioglitazone
hydrochloride), and ANDAs were subject to the old patent-by-patent exclusivity
scheme.' 3 8 And, as already noted, exclusivity was shared by Watson and Mylan. A
1

34

BoehringerIngelheim Corp. v. Shalala, 993 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1997).

135 See Letter from Gary Buehler, Director, OGD, CDER, FDA,

to Margaret L. Choy, Vice

President, Regulatory Affairs, Anchen Pharmaceuticals Inc. approving ANDA 77-284 (Dec. 14, 2006).
136 Letter from Gary Buehler, Director, OGD, CDER, FDA, to Mark C. Shaw, Vice
President,
Regulatory Affairs & Compliance, Impax Laboratories, Inc. approving ANDA 77-415 (Dec. 16, 2006).
The same letter issued a tentative approval with respect to the 150 mg strength, because litigation had
been brought with respect to that patent within the statutory 45-day window, triggering a 30-month stay
of approval. Litigation on the patent tied to the 300 mg strength was brought outside the 45-day window.

Id.
137 The facts that follow derive from the Teva approval letter and a review of historical Orange

Books. See Letter from Kathleen Uhl, M.D., Acting Director, OGD, CDER, FDA, to Scott D. Tomsky,
Vice President, N.A. Generics Regulatory Affairs, Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, approving ANDA 078193
(Mar. 4, 2014).
138 See supra 0.
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third generic applicant, Ranbaxy, also shared in that exclusivity.1 39 This exclusivity
was triggered on August 17, 2012, when Ranbaxy launched an authorized generic of
all three strengths of the drug. On February 6, 2013, roughly one week before the
exclusivity expired, FDA approved another ANDA. The approval letter indicates that
exclusivity had been selectively waived (transferred)-presumably by Ranbaxy. (At
the time, FDA was appealing a district court decision that Watson was entitled to
share exclusivity with the other first applicants. See discussion in subsection II.B.6.)

C. ForfeitingExclusivity
This subsection explores four of the six grounds for forfeiture of exclusivity added
by Congress in 2003 and codified in section 505(j)(5)(D)(i) of the FDCA: failure to
market within certain deadlines, amendment of the underlying paragraph IV
certification(s), failure to obtain tentative approval within 30 months, and patent
expiry. This subsection also considers analogous ways that a first applicant might
have lost its exclusivity under the old scheme. For instance, when considering
whether and how patent delisting may lead to forfeiture under the 2003 provisions, it
notes the impact of delisting the qualifying patent under the old scheme. This
subsection concludes with additional questions about losing exclusivity that are not
tied to specific statutory forfeiture provisions.
This section of our article does not take up the forfeiture provisions relating to
withdrawal of the generic application in question, or patent settlements found to
violate the antitrust laws. It appears that these forfeiture provisions have not given
rise to significant interpretive issues or disputes. Section III of our article, however,
does take up recent developments relating to the application of antitrust law to patent
settlements.
Failure to Market
With respect to old ANDAs, generally speaking, there is no effect if the first
applicant fails to market its product within 30 months of submitting its ANDA
application. For new ANDAs, the first ground for forfeiture in the statute is failure to
market within 30 months of submission. Although this provision-section
505(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)-refers to submission of the ANDA, and another forfeiture
provision (failure to obtain timely tentative approval) refers to filing of the ANDA,
the agency interprets the words interchangeably in this context; the date in question
is the date on which the agency determines the ANDA to be substantially complete
to permit substantive review.1 40 The failure to market provision requires two triggers
for forfeiture: the (aa) trigger relating to submission or approval of the first
applicant's ANDA, and the (bb) trigger relating to the patents as to which the first
applicant's paragraph IV certifications resulted in its eligibility for exclusivity. In
short, if the (bb) trigger is satisfied-specifically if 75 days have elapsed since an
appellate court entered a final decision in an infringement or declaratory judgment

139 See Letter from Gregory P. Geba, M.D., M.P.H., to Andrej Gasperlin, President, AB
Pharmaceuticals LLC U.S. Agent for Macleods Pharmaceuticals Limited approving ANDA 202467 (Feb.
6, 2013) ("Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited (Ranbaxy) was a first ANDA applicant to submit a substantially
complete ANDA with a paragraph IV certification to the listed patents. Therefore, Ranbaxy is eligible for
180-day exclusivity for Pioglitazone Tablets USP, 15 mg, 30 mg, and 45 mg.").

140 See Letter from Gary Buehler, Director, OGD, CDER, FDA, to William A. Rakoczy, Esq.,
Rakoczy, Molino, Mazzochi & Siwik, LLP, Docket No. FDA-2007-N-0445 (May 7, 2008), at 10 n. 15.
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action that the last patent qualifying the first applicant for exclusivity is invalid or
not infringed, a court signed a settlement order or consent decree finding this patent
invalid or not infringed, or this patent was delisted-then the first applicant will
forfeit exclusivity if it fails to market by the date that is 30 months after submission
of its application. 141
Both triggers, however, must be satisfied. For instance, as discussed in the 2009
article, FDA declined to find forfeiture simply because 30 months had passed since
Teva submitted its ANDA referencing Kytril@ (granisetron hydrochloride).' 42 No
claim of infringement on the patent at issue had been brought against Teva or any
subsequent applicant, nor had any ANDA applicant brought a declaratory judgment
action regarding the patent. Consequently, no court had entered a final judgment of
invalidity or non-infringement, and no court had signed a settlement order or consent
decree entering final judgment of invalidity or non-infringement. Further, Roche, the
holder of the NDA for Kytril, had not requested the patent be withdrawn from the
Orange Book. As none of these three events had occurred-a court decision, a court
order, or delisting-the agency reasoned there had been no forfeiture and granted
Teva's generic granisetron hydrochloride product 180-day exclusivity.1 43 The fact
that none of these events ever could occur was irrelevant. 144
The agency has found forfeiture under this provision at least twice. 45 Several
interpretive issues have arisen, as follows.
1.

Will delisting the underlyingpatent cause the first applicantto
lose 180-day exclusivity under the old scheme or the new
scheme'sfailure-to-marketprovision?

Short answer. With respect to old ANDAs, as a general rule FDA will not remove
a patent from the Orange Book if it is the subject of a paragraph IV certification
giving rise to 180-day exclusivity. With respect to new ANDAs, delisting of the
patent(s) giving rise to exclusivity satisfies the (bb) trigger for forfeiture, and the
applicant will therefore forfeit exclusivity if the (aa) trigger is also met. A court has,
however, ruled that a delisting will not give rise to forfeiture unless it results from
141 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I).
142 Letter from Gary J. Buehler, Director, OGD, CDER, FDA, to Marc A.
Goshko, Executive
Director, Teva North America, Teva Parenteral Medicines regarding Granisetron Hydrochloride Injection

and 180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity, Docket No. 2007N-0389 (Docket No. FDA-2007-N-0269) (Jan.
17, 2008) [hereinafter Buehler Letter to Teva Parenteral Medicines].
143 Id.
144 Critics of this decision alleged that it "removes teeth" from the forfeiture provision. See, e.g.,
Chad Landmon, FDA Removes Teeth From Exclusivity Forfeiture, IP LAW 360 (Jan. 24, 2008); In re

Nexium (Esomeprazole)Antitrust Litig., 309 F.R.D. 107, 139 (D. Mass. 2015) ("Critics have pointed out
that loopholes in the MMA allow first-filers to "park" their 180-day exclusivity by entering into delayed
entry settlement agreements. This also reveals the shortcomings of the FDA in enforcing their own
regulations on generic drugs") (citing Landmon piece and granisetron decision for proposition that "Teva
did not have to forfeit exclusivity even though it failed to come to market within thirty months of filing its

ANDA").
145 Letter from Gary Buehler, Director, OGD, CDER, FDA, to William A. Rakoczy, Esq., Rakoczy,
Molino, Mazzochi & Siwik, LLP regarding Acarbose Tablets and 180-Day Exclusivity, Docket No.
2007N-0417 (Docket No. FDA-2007-N-0445) (May 8, 2008) (finding forfeiture for failure to market
within 30 months plus delisting of the patent); Letter from Gary Buehler, Director, OGD, CDER, FDA, to
ANDA applicant regarding, Dorzolamide Hydrochloride/Timolol Maleate Tablets and 180-Day
Exclusivity, Docket No. FDA-2008-N-0483 (Oct. 28, 2008) (same).
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the innovator's loss (or unfavorable settlement) in court. Further, FDA will not
actually delist the patent unless it has determined that the applicant has forfeited (or
used) its exclusivity.
Discussion. With respect to old ANDAs, generally speaking, if a patent is
removed from the Orange Book, ANDA applicants must delete their paragraph IV
certifications. FDA's policy creating an exception if a first ANDA applicant was
sued by the patent owner was found inconsistent with the statute. The case in
question, involving generic simvastatin and usually referred to as the "Ranbaxy
46
case," was discussed in the 2009 article.1 The court indicated that FDA could adopt
a delisting rule, but not one that favored sued ANDA applicants over not-sued
ANDA applicants.1 47 FDA subsequently adopted the practice of noting delist
requests in the Orange Book but retaining the listings where the patents gave rise to
180-day exclusivity. There have been no significant developments since the 2009
article, apart from cases assessing whether federal courts have jurisdiction to hear
requests for declaratory relief with respect to disclaimed patents that are the subject
of delisting requests.148
With respect to new ANDAs, delisting can lead to forfeiture of exclusivity.
Specifically, the first applicant will forfeit exclusivity if: (1) 75 days have elapsed
since approval of its ANDA or 30 months have elapsed since the ANDA was
submitted, and (2) 75 days have elapsed since all (and the last) of the patents
qualifying it for exclusivity have been found invalid or not infringed or have been
delisted.1 49
The D.C. Circuit ruled in 2010 that the delisting in question must result from an
adverse ruling or settlement and cannot be prompted simply by unilateral request of
the NDA holder. The case involved generic applications referencing Merck's
potassium(losartan
Hyzaar@
and
potassium)
(losartan
Cozaar@
both
covering
Book
the
Orange
patents
in
three
listed
Merck
hydrochlorothiazide).
a
substantially
to
submit
first
applicant
was
the
Teva
each
product,
As
to
products.
complete ANDA including a paragraph IV certification-to U.S. Patent No.
5,608,075 (the '075 patent). It was therefore eligible for 180-day exclusivity with
respect to both ANDAs.1 5 0 These applications also included paragraph III
certifications, which meant that approval of the ANDAs could take effect no earlier

146 See Ranbaxy Labs., Ltd. v. Leavitt, 459 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2006), aff'd, 469 F.3d 120 (D.C.
Cir. 2006); see 2009 Exclusivity Article, supra note 4, at 365-66.

147 Id, Glenmark Generics Ltd. v. Ferring B. V., No. 3:14CV422-HEH, 2014 WL 5162097, at *4
(E.D. Va. Oct. 14, 2014) (regarding a patent that remained in the Orange Book with a "Patent Delist
Request Flag").
148 See, e.g., Glenmark Generics Ltd v. FerringB. V., No. 3:14CV422-HEH, 2014 WL 5162097, at
*4 (E.D. Va. Oct. 14, 2014) (finding jurisdiction to hear a declaratory judgment action brought by a
subsequent applicant because continued listing of disclaimed patent caused injury by obstructing FDA
approval of subsequent applicant's ANDA); Apotex, Inc. v. Daiichi Sankyo, 781 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir.
2015), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 481 (2015) (finding jurisdiction in challenge of disclaimed patent because
the parties had adverse concrete interests in the truncation-or preservation-of Mylan's exclusivity
eligibility).
149 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(1)(bb)(CC).
150 Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sebelius, 595 F.3d 1303, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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than April 2010."' Merck did not bring a patent infringement action against Teva
with respect to the single challenged patent and instead, in March 2005, asked FDA
15 2
to delist the patent from the Orange Book.
Decision letters that had been issued by FDA in 2008-relating to generic
applications referencing Precose@ (acarbose) and Cosopt@ (dorzolamide
hydrochloride/timolol maleate)-suggested that Merck's delisting of the '075 patent
would cause Teva to forfeit its exclusivity. FDA had concluded in these letters that
an NDA holder's unilateral request to withdraw patent information from the Orange
Book satisfies the delisting trigger. FDA noted that forfeiture results if the delisted
patent in question is the last of the patents qualifying the product for exclusivity and
the first applicant fails to market within 75 days (assuming 75 days have elapsed
since approval of the first applicant's ANDA was made effective or 30 months have
53
elapsed since the first applicant's ANDA was submitted).1 Under these decision
letters, Teva would forfeit exclusivity because the patent in question was the only
one qualifying it for 180-day exclusivity and more than 30 months had passed since
54
it submitted its ANDAs.1
FDA delisted the '075 patent at Merck's request and, expecting that the agency
would deem its exclusivity forfeit, Teva brought suit seeking an order that FDA
instead grant it exclusivity. On appeal from a ruling in the agency's favor, the D.C.
Circuit held that no forfeiture can occur unless: (1) the NDA holder sues and (2)
delisting results because the NDA holder either loses on the merits or enters an
"unfavorable settlement.""' The reasoning in the earlier Ranbaxy ruling
controlled. 156 In that case, the court had rejected FDA's policy with respect to
delisting requests under the old scheme. The Ranbaxy court found that removing
patent listings at the NDA holder's request-the agency's policy under the old
scheme, unless the generic applicant had been sued-would deprive the generic
applicant of exclusivity that it had earned, undermining the statutory incentive to
challenge patents. 157 Here, the new failure-to-market forfeiture provision explicitly
requires, with respect to every challenged patent, suit by the NDA holder and either a
58
loss on the merits or an unfavorable settlement, or delisting (at issue here).' In other
words, the subsections other than the delisting subsection do not "permit a brand

151 Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sebelius, C.A. No. 09-01111 (RMC) (D.D.C. July 1, 2009)
(Consolidated Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and in Opposition to Plaintiffs
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction).
152

id

153 See 2009 Exclusivity Article, supra note 4, at 368-71.
154 As of June 19, 2006, 30 months had passed from the date Teva submitted its ANDA referencing

Cozaar, and as of November 25, 2006, 30 months had passed from the date Teva submitted its ANDA
referencing Hyzaar. These dates thus triggered the first prong of the failure to market provision. The
second prong was triggered 75 days after Merck withdrew the patent, i.e., March 2005. Teva Pharms.

USA, Inc. v. Sebelius, Nos. 09-5281, 09-5308, 2009 WL 6155282 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 16, 2009) (Brief of
Appellant Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.).
155 Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sebelius, 595 F.3d 1303, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
156 See Ranbaxy Labs., Ltd. v. Leavitt, 459 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2006), aff'd, 469 F.3d 120 (D.C.
Cir. 2006).
157 Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 595 F.3d at 1316. It also functionally eliminated the commercial
marketing trigger, by allowing NDA holders to restrict exclusivity to first filers who had been sued. Id

158 Id. at 1317.
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manufacturer to vitiate a generic's exclusivity without the generic manufacturer's
having had some say in the matter." 15 9 The same basic principle, it concluded, should
apply to the delisting provision. To hold otherwise would allow NDA holders to
"deprive[] generic companies of the period of marketing exclusivity they otherwise
deserve."' 6 0
Following this ruling, FDA adopted the policy of not removing a patent from the
Orange Book if the patent is the basis of a paragraph IV certification giving rise to
eligibility for 180-day exclusivity. The issue that has since arisen is whether a
subsequent applicant can persuade a federal court to take jurisdiction over a
declaratory judgment action challenging a disclaimed-but still listed-patent. The
Federal Circuit has reasoned that the subsequent applicant has a justiciable case or
controversy in these situations.
The dispute among Daiichi Sankyo, Apotex, and Mylan regarding their
applications referencing Benicar@ (omesartan medoxomil) is illustrative. Daiichi
listed two patents covering Benicar: U.S. Patent No. 5,616,599 (the '599 patent) and
U.S. Patent No. 6,878,703 (the '703 patent). Mylan was the first to file paragraph IV
certifications to both patents. Daiichi sued Mylan for infringing the '599 patent and
disclaimed all claims of the '703 patent. The district court upheld (and the Federal
Circuit subsequently affirmed) the validity of the '599 patent and entered judgment
of infringement against Mylan. Apotex later filed an ANDA with a paragraph IV
certification as to the '703 patent. Consistent with Teva Pharm. v. Sebelius (just
discussed), FDA did not remove the '703 patent from the Orange Book, despite
Daiichi's request that it do so, because the patent was the subject of a paragraph IV
certification by first applicant Mylan. Apotex then sued Daiichi for a declaratory
judgment on this patent, which had been disclaimed but remained listed. Although
the district court found no case or controversy, the Federal Circuit reversed.1 6 ' The
court reasoned that the continued listing of the patent supported Mylan's exclusivity,
with the consequence of preventing FDA approval of Apotex's application. A ruling
on the patent would redress Apotex's injury by activating the court decision trigger.
Therefore, the parties had adverse concrete interests in the truncation-or
preservation-ofMylan's exclusivity eligibility.1 62
In its recent proposed rule, FDA has proposed to require an NDA holder to submit
a copy of the court order requiring withdrawal of patent information; it will then
remove the patent from the Orange Book if there is no first applicant for 180-day

5

1 9 Id.

160 Id. at 1318. On remand, the district court found that Teva had not forfeited
its exclusivity period.
Mary Anne Pazanowski, D.C. CircuitRejects Generic Firms' Challenge to Denial of Injunction Against
Competitor, PHARM. LAW & INDUS. REP. (July 9, 2010). Following this decision, it was discovered that
the delisted patent had expired due to Merck's failure to pay maintenance fees. This, however, did not
result in a forfeiture. See infra subsection 0. The agency set Teva's exclusivity to begin in April 2010.
Apotex, a subsequent ANDA applicant, filed suit challenging the award of exclusivity to Teva, but this

was rejected by the courts. Apotex v. Sebelius, 700 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D.D.C. 2010), aff'd, 384 F. App'x 4
(D.C. Cir. 2010).
161 See generally Apotex Inc. v. Daiichi Sankyo, 781 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2015),
cert. denied, 136
S.Ct. 481 (2015).
162 On January 8, 2016, a federal district court granted Apotex a
declaratory judgment of noninfringement with respect to the '703 patent. Apotex Inc. v. Daiichi Sankyo Inc., Nos. 12-cv-9295, 15-cv-

3695, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2126 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2016). A final judgment that is affirmed on appeal, or
not appealed, should activate the 75-day window for Mylan to launch or forfeit exclusivity.
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exclusivity or upon expiration of the 180-day exclusivity period. 63 The agency
would indicate a delisting request in the Orange Book and note that the patent
164
remains listed to preserve a first applicant's eligibility for exclusivity.
2.

Can a subsequent applicantthat obtains afinal court decision

in its favor trigger the (bb) forfeiture clock if it does not yet
have tentative approval?
Short answer. Although it appears that FDA has not yet weighed in on this
question, the Federal Circuit has found that a favorable court decision involving a
subsequent applicant was sufficient for purposes of the forfeiture clock, even though
the subsequent applicant lacked tentative approval. The 75-day clock would not
begin to run, however, until this applicant obtained tentative approval.
Discussion. As noted, the failure-to-market forfeiture provision requires two
triggering events. The second triggering event involves each of the patents as to
which the first applicant submitted and lawfully maintained a paragraph IV
certification qualifying it for exclusivity. As to each, one of three events must occur,
"with respect to the first applicant or any other applicant(which other applicant has
received tentative approval)": a court decision that the patent is invalid or not
infringed, a settlement order or consent decree finding the patent invalid or not
1 65
infringed, or withdrawal of the patent from the Orange Book by the NDA holder.
The emphasized words make it clear that a subsequent applicant can trigger
forfeiture with a court decision or settlement, but the question is whether the
parenthetical requires it to obtain tentative approval of its ANDA first-or if instead
forfeiture simply happens once both are true (i.e., there is a court decision and the
applicant has tentative approval).
The Federal Circuit addressed this question in the case involving generic
applications referencing Benicar@, discussed in the immediately preceding
subsection (II.C.1). As already discussed, Mylan was eligible for exclusivity as the
first applicant with respect to the'703 patent, which the innovator subsequently
disclaimed. Apotex sought a declaratory judgment with respect to the disclaimed
patent. To support jurisdiction, it argued that a declaratory judgment of noninfringement would cause Mylan to forfeit its 180-day exclusivity eligibility,
assuming Mylan did not market its drug within 75 days after appeal rights were
66
Mylan
exhausted (certiorari aside) and Apotex had obtained tentative approval.
responded that a subsequent applicant needs tentative approval before it initiates the
declaratory judgment action, which Apotex did not have.
When the Federal Circuit ruled that the district court had jurisdiction to entertain
the declaratory judgment action, it rejected Mylan's argument about tentative
approval. The first applicant forfeits its exclusivity if it has not entered the market 75
days after two things have happened: a court has entered a final decision of non-

163 Proposed21 C.F.R. § 314.53(f)(2); see 80 Fed. Reg. at 6829, 6844-45.
164 Id. The agency also proposed to amend 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50(i)(6)(ii) and 314.94(a)(12)(viii)(B)
regarding amended patent certifications after an NDA holder has requested delisting.

165 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb) (emphasis added).
166 Mylan had submitted its ANDA in early 2006, so the first prong of the failure to market
provision had been satisfied; more than 30 months had elapsed since submission of the ANDA. See

Apotex, Inc. v. DaiichiSankyo, 781 F.3d at 1359 (noting date of ANDA submission).
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infringement that is no longer appealable, and the second (or later) filer has tentative
approval.1 67 The 75-day clock does not begin until both have happened, but the order
does not matter. From a policy perspective, the court wrote, tentative approval is
needed "because exclusivity should not be lost unless the second filer is on the verge
of having an approved product to deliver the benefits of competition."06 In other
words, "the purpose of requiring tentative approval has nothing to do with Apotex's
approval status at the time it brought the declaratory judgment action, and it has
everything to do with its approval status when forfeiture is triggered." 69 The lower
70
court, on remand, has now issued a declaratory judgment of non-infringement.o

'

Amendment of Certification
The third ground for forfeiture in the statute is amendment of the paragraph IV
certification. Specifically, exclusivity is forfeited under section 505(j)(5)(D)(i)(III) if
the first applicant "amends or withdraws the certification for all of the patents with
respect to which that applicant submitted" a paragraph IV certification qualifying it
for exclusivity.1 7
3.

IfFDA requiresafirst applicantto re-certify to the patent that

gave rise to exclusivity eligibility, in connection with a
formulation change, is this an "amendment" or "withdrawal"
of the originalcertificationgiving rise to forfeiture under

subparagraph(D) (i) (II)?
Short answer. No. FDA takes the position that a new paragraph IV certification
required by the agency in order to accept an ANDA amendment (for example, for a
reformulated product) relates back to the original paragraph IV certification that
formed the basis for a claim to 180-day exclusivity. Re-certification is not
amendment of the original certification, nor does it withdraw the original
certification.
Discussion. This issue arose in connection with generic applications referencing
Genzyme's Hectorol@ (doxercalciferol injection, 2 mcg/mL). FDA approved
Genzyme's NDA for Hectorol@ in an ampule presentation. In October 2007, Cobrek
was the first to submit an ANDA containing a paragraph IV certification to three
patents claiming Hectorol, including U.S. Patent No. 5,602,116 (the '116 patent).
Genzyme brought a patent infringement suit on the '116 patent.1 72 In December
2008, FDA approved Genzyme's supplemental NDA for a new injectable
formulation (and packaging configuration) of Hectorol in a vial presentation.
Genzyme indicated that the original ampule formulation was no longer being

167 Id.

168 Id. at 1370.
169

Id

170 See supra note
162.

17' 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(III).
172 The other patents were U.S. Patent Nos. 5,707,980 (expiring in 2010) and 6,903,083
(expiring in
2021). ORANGE BOOK (27th ed. 2007), at ADA 37. Cobrek included paragraph IV certifications to both,
but Genzyme later requested that FDA delist both from the Orange Book. Letter from Janet Woodcock,

M.D., Director, CDER, FDA, to Gerald F. Masoudi, Covington & Burling LLP, Docket No. FDA-2010P-0223 (Oct. 19, 2010), at 3 n.7.
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manufactured and that it planned to discontinue the product once inventory was
exhausted.1 73 Genzyme submitted information again for the '116 patent and listed a
new formulation patent, U.S. Patent No. 7,148,211 (the '211 patent). Cobrek
amended its pending application to include a paragraph IV certification to the '211
patent.1 74 Genzyme did not bring suit, apparently concluding that Cobrek's ampule
formulation would not infringe the vial formulation.' 7 5 Shortly afterwards, FDA
informed Cobrek that it could not approve the ANDA because the proposed ampule
formulation was not quantitatively and qualitatively the same as the new vial
176
Cobrek
formulation, and it recommended Cobrek reformulate its generic.
reformulated its product, switched from an ampule presentation to a vial
presentation, and amended its ANDA. FDA then refused to accept the ANDA
amendment without new certifications to both patents, so in November 2009 Cobrek
77
certified to the two patents in its ANDA amendment.1
Again, section 505(j)(5)(D)(i)(III) requires forfeiture of exclusivity if the first
applicant "amends or withdraws" the certification for all of the patents with respect
to which that applicant submitted a certification qualifying the applicant for 180-day
exclusivity. Sandoz, which had pending ANDAs for both presentations, filed a
8
citizen petition asserting that Cobrek had forfeited its exclusivity."' It cited two
reasons, one of which was that Cobrek's certification in November 2009 to the '116
patent constituted either an "amendment" or a "withdrawal" of the original October
2007 certification to the same patent. FDA regulations, it pointed out, require
applicants to "amend" certifications that are no "longer accurate," and they also
provide that once an amendment is submitted, "the application will no longer be
79
If FDA required Cobrek to submit a
considered to contain the prior certification."
new certification to the '116 patent, it must have concluded the original certification
was "no longer accurate" (because it related to Cobrek's original ampule
formulation, for which the company was no longer seeking approval). Thus, Cobrek
had "amended" its certification, triggering forfeiture.
FDA denied Sandoz's citizen petition, explaining that "resubmission of patent
certifications" after reformulation-to respond to a change in formulation of the
listed drug--does not constitute an amendment or withdrawal that would lead to loss
of exclusivity.' 8 0 Indeed, the agency noted, this had arisen in the late 1990s under the

&

173 Letter from Janet Woodcock, M.D., Director, CDER, FDA, to Gerald F. Masoudi, Covington
Burling LLP, Docket No. FDA-2010-P-0223 (Oct. 19, 2010), at 2.
74

1 Id. at 2-3.
175 Id. at 3 ("Genzyme did not initiate patent litigation against Cobrek based on this paragraph iv
certification as it believed that Cobrek's ampule formulation for which it was seeking approval at the time
would not infringe the '211 patent claims.").
176

Id.

177

Id. at 3-4, 6.
178 Sandoz Inc., Citizen Petition, DocketNo. FDA-2010-P-0632 (Dec. 8, 2010).
179 Id., at 7-8 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12)(viii)).
180 Letter from Janet Woodcock, M.D., Director, CDER, FDA, to Stephen Auten, Vice President,
Legal-Intellectual Property, Sandoz Inc., Docket No. 2010-P-0632 (Sept. 20, 2011). FDA explained that
when a change in formulation for a reference listed drug requires an ANDA applicant to respond--either
by seeking approval for a change in formulation or by seeking a determination that the old formulation
was not withdrawn for safety reasons and a waiver-the agency will consider this a "change in or review
of the requirements for approval" within the meaning of section 505(j)(5)(D)(i)(IV). Id. at 9. For further
discussion, see infra subsection 0.
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old scheme. Genpharm had reformulated its generic ranitidine product after making
paragraph IV certifications and had resubmitted those patent certifications; the
agency had not found that the company "amended" its certification resulting in loss
of exclusivity, and the Fourth Circuit had agreed.' 8' The recertification requirement
in these cases is "based on the premise that the patent holder should have notice
relating to the formulation that is before FDA for approval," but it would be "unfair"
to ANDA applicants if this were interpreted to constitute amendment or withdrawal
leading to forfeiture. 182
In the preamble to its February 2015 proposed rule, the agency addressed
forfeiture under subparagraph (D)(i)(III), but did not explicitly address recertification
in connection with reformulation. Specifically, as already mentioned, FDA noted that
if an ANDA applicant is eligible for exclusivity based on a paragraph IV certification
and the patent is reissued, the applicant would be required to submit a paragraph IV
certification to the reissued patent within 30 days to be considered to have lawfully
maintained the certification for purposes of the new definition of "first applicant"
and the forfeiture provision in subparagraph (D)(i)(III)."' If the ANDA applicant
were to submit a paragraph III certification or section viii statement, however, it
would be considered to have amended or withdrawn the original certification.1 84 The
agency also wrote that a first applicant would be considered to have "lawfully
maintained" its certification to a patent, for purposes of 180-day exclusivity, if the
amendment or supplement is accompanied by another paragraph IV certification to
that patent (and notice is sent as required)."18 5 Further, "an amendment to a
substantially complete ANDA does not mean that the ANDA is no longer
substantially complete or that a first applicant has not lawfully maintained its
paragraph IV certification (unless the amendment requires a new patent certification
and the amended patent certification is not a paragraph IV certification)." 86

181 Although this case predated the forfeiture provisions, FDA's regulations then
(as now) indicated
that once an amendment is submitted, the application will no longer be considered to contain the prior
certification. Consequently, FDA explained to Sandoz, had Genpharm's recertification constituted
amendment, the company could have lost exclusivity. See id at 7 n.10 (citing Granutec, Inc. v. Shalala,
139 F.3d 889 (Table) n.1 (4th Cir. 1998) ("We reject Geneva's argument that Genpharm lost its place in
line as the first ANDA applicant, and thus the only ANDA applicant, eligible for exclusivity. FDA
maintains that, although Genpharm did not make the Paragraph IV certification relevant to these
proceedings until 1996, Genpharm qualifies as the first ANDA applicant for purposes of the exclusivity
because the certification relates back to the date of its ANDA application. This interpretation does not
clearly confict with either the regulations or the statute, and thus we find no reason to substitute a contrary
judgment on this matter for that of FDA.")).
182 Id at 8.
183 80 Fed. Reg. at 6846. The forfeiture provision in section
505(j)(5)(D)(i)(ItI) does not explicitly
mention lawfully maintaining the paragraph IV certification. The definition of "first applicant" does. An
applicant that does not "lawfully maintain" its certification is not a "first applicant" under the statute. 21
U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(bb).
184 80 Fed. Reg. at 6846.
18 Id at 6850.
186 Id at 6814.
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Does a settlement agreement result in "amendment" of the
certificationand thus give rise to forfeiture under
subparagraph(D)(i) (I)?

Short Answer: Only if it includes a finding of infringement. This will require the
first applicant to amend its paragraph IV certification to a paragraph III certification,
giving rise to forfeiture under section 505(j)(5)(D)(i)(III).
Discussion. Prior to the passage of the MMA in 2003, FDA had concluded that a
settlement agreement ending patent infringement litigation effectively turned a
paragraph IV certification into a paragraph III certification. A federal court in West
8
Virginia found the agency's decision on this issue unreasonable.1 1 In 2003,
Congress added a provision relating to settlements finding the patent invalid or not
infringed,' 8 8 and it added a provision relating to settlements found to violate the
antitrust laws.' 8 9 It did not address any other type of settlement, and as a result, in
cases under the new rules, the agency has declined to find forfeiture-or to require
90
certification amendment-where settlement agreements are silent.1 In its recent
proposed rule, the agency stood by its long-standing view that an ANDA applicant
must amend its certification in the event of a court decision, settlement order, or
consent decree that includes a finding that the patent is infringed.'9' FDA noted that
changing the paragraph IV certification that qualified an applicant for 180-day
exclusivity to a paragraph III certification or a statement under section viii "has
implications for continuing eligibility for 180-day exclusivity," and it cited section
505(j)(5)(D)(i)(III).192 The agency added that if a settlement is reached without a
finding of patent infringement or invalidity, a paragraph IV certification may
continue to be appropriate.193

187 Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 207 F. Supp. 2d 476, 487 (N.D. W.Va. 2001); see 2009
Exclusivity Article, supra note 4, at 374.

&

188 As noted above in subsections 0 and 0, the (bb) trigger for failure-to-market forfeiture requires
each patent giving rise to exclusivity to be the subject of an adverse court ruling, withdrawal from the
Orange Book, or settlement that includes a finding of invalidity or non-infringement. 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I).
189 The first applicant forfeits exclusivity if there is a final decision of the FTC or a court (from
which no appeal other than a petition for certiorari has been or can be taken) that the settlement agreement
violated antitrust law. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(V).
9 E.g., Letter from Gary Buehler, Director, OGD, CDER, FDA, to Carmen M. Shepard, Esq.,
Kate C. Beardsley, Esq., Buc & Beardsley, Docket No. 2007N-0382 (Jan. 29, 2008) (rejecting argument
that Cobalt's paragraph IV certification was inaccurate because the settlement meant Cobalt was no longer
asserting the patent was invalid).

191 80 Fed. Reg. at 6843-44; proposed 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12)(viii)(A). If the decision, order, or
decree also includes a finding that the patent is invalid (in addition to infringed), an amended certification
is not required. Id.
192 80 Fed. Reg. at 6844.
193 Id. ("For example, if the ...
ANDA applicant is granted a patent license such that the applicant
would be permitted to obtain approval and commence marketing prior to patent expiration, the . .. ANDA
applicant would maintain its paragraph IV certification with respect to the patent at issue and should
submit an amendment pursuant to proposed § ... 314.94(a)(12)(v) to advise the Agency of the patent
licensing agreement.").
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Failure to Obtain Tentative Approval
The fourth ground for forfeiture in the statute-section 505(j)(5)(D)(i)(IV)-is
failure to obtain tentative approval. Specifically, the first applicant will forfeit
exclusivity if it "fails to obtain tentative approval of the application within 30 months
after the date on which the application is filed, unless the failure is caused by a
change in or a review of the requirements for approval of the application imposed
after the date on which the application is filed." Separately, under section 505(q) of
the statute, if approval was delayed because of a citizen petition, the 30-month
period is "deemed to be extended by a period of time equal to the period beginning
on the date on which the Secretary received the petition and ending on the date of
final agency action on the petition (inclusive of such beginning and ending
dates)."' 94 Uncodified provisions of FDASIA temporarily modify the length of the
forfeiture clock.' 95 For first applicants whose original applications (with qualifying
paragraph IV certifications) or amendments (with qualifying paragraph IV
certifications) were filed in the 30 months preceding its enactment (July 9, 2012), the
30-month period is amended to 40 months until September 30, 2015, and thereafter
to 36 months, until September 30, 2016.

5.

When is the relevant "date ofsubmission" if the paragraphIV
certificationappears in an ANDA amendment, rather than the

originalANDA?
ShortAnswer. The relevant date is the date of submission of the amendment.
Discussion. Although subparagraph (D)(i)(IV) refers to filing of the ANDA,
whereas subparagraph (D)(i)(I) (failure to market) refers to submission of the
ANDA, FDA interprets the words interchangeably for purposes of 180-day
exclusivity; the date in question is the date on which the agency determined an
ANDA to be substantially complete to permit substantive review. 1 96 Ordinarily, a
first applicant's original ANDA contains paragraph IV certifications giving rise to
exclusivity eligibility, and the 30 months for purposes of forfeiture under
subparagraph (D)(i)(IV) are calculated from the date that FDA determines the
original application substantially complete.
The question has arisen what start date would apply if the ANDA applicant
amended its application to include a paragraph IV certification. In 2011, the agency
resolved this in a matter involving generic applications referencing Doryx@
(doxycycline hyclate delayed-release tablets), calculating the forfeiture clock from
submission of the original ANDA. Understanding this dispute requires a brief
digression into the rules governing old antibiotics. Doxycycline has been marketed in
the United States for decades.1 97 Prior to 1997, FDA approved antibiotics under
section 507 of the FDCA, and many aspects of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments did
not apply to them-including patent listing and 180-day exclusivity for first
applicants. In 1997, Congress moved antibiotics to section 505 and the full HatchWaxman scheme, but it partially exempted "old" antibiotics-meaning new

194 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(G).
195 Pub. L. No. 112-144, 126 Stat. 993 § 1133 (2012).
196 See Letter from Gary Buehler, Director, OGD, CDER, FDA, to William
A. Rakoczy, Esq.,
Rakoczy, Molino, Mazzochi & Siwik, LLP, Docket No. FDA-2007-N-0445 (May 7, 2008), at 10 n. 15.
197 E.g., ORANGE BOOK (1st ed. 1980), at 47.
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applications that contained old antibiotic ingredients.' 98 FDA approved Mayne
Pharma's NDA for Doryx in 2005, and as a result of this history, there were no listed
patents when Impax submitted its ANDA on March 18, 2008.
In October 2008, Congress amended the FDCA to further address the application
of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to old antibiotics.' 99 Transitional rules that were
not codified effectively required Mayne to list its patents within 60 days of
enactment. 200 Further, as to any patent so listed, any generic applicant that
amended-within 120 days of enactment-its "substantially complete application"
to contain a paragraph IV certification would be "deemed" a first applicant for
purposes of 180-day exclusivity. 20' Impax amended its ANDA to contain a
paragraph IV certification to the patent listed by Mayne. FDA issued final approval
to Impax's ANDA on December 28, 2010, roughly 33 months after the ANDA was
submitted, and noted that Impax had not obtained tentative approval within 30
202
months of submission, which would ordinarily lead to forfeiture. In this case, there
203
was no forfeiture because one of the exceptions applied. One curious result of the
agency's decision to begin the clock with submission of the original ANDA even if
the qualifying paragraph IV certification appears in an ANDA amendment, as Kurt
Karst has noted, is that a company could become eligible for-and forfeitexclusivity on the same day.204
Congress addressed the issue in FDASIA, enacted in July 2012.205 For
applications filed on or before this statute's enactment date that are amended until
and including September 30, 2017 to contain a first paragraph IV certification, the

198 More precisely, the exemption applied if the application contained an antibiotic drug that was the
subject of an application received by FDA under section 507 prior to enactment of the Food and Drug

Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA) (i.e., November 21, 1997). FDAMA, Pub. L. No.
105-115, § 125(d)(2), Ill Stat. 2296, 2327 (1997).
199 QI Program Supplemental Funding Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-379, 122 Stat. 4080 (adding 21
U.S.C. § 355(v)).
200 Pub. L. No. 110-379, § 4(b)(1).
201 Pub. L. No. 110-379, § 4(b)(3).
202 Impax never obtained "tentative" approval; its application was simply approved. Although
Mayne brought suit following the paragraph IV certification, FDA takes the position that no 30-month
stay of approval applies to an ANDA referencing an old antibiotic when the ANDA contains a paragraph
IV certification to a newly listed patent and the NDA holder or patent owner has sued the ANDA
applicant for patent infringement as a result of notice of the paragraph IV certification. See Letter from

Keith Webber, Ph.D., Deputy Director, OPS, CDER, FDA, to Michelle P. Wong, Senior Director,
Regulatory Affairs, Impax Laboratories, Inc. approving ANDA 090505 (Dec. 28, 2010) [hereinafter
Impax Approval Letter], at 4 n.1; see also Letter from Janet Woodcock to Michael S. Labson, Covington

& Burling, et al., Docket Nos. FDA-2009-P-0038, FDA-2009-P-0081, FDA-2009-P-0103, FDA2009-P-0120 (Mar. 17, 2009) (explaining the agency's reasoning, the previous year, with respect to
ANDAs pending when the patent was submitted).
203 See Impax Approval Letter, supra note 202, at 3 (footnote omitted) ("Nevertheless, the agency
has determined that the failure to obtain tentative within the 30-month period was caused by a change in
or a review of the requirements for approval of the application imposed after the date on which the
application was filed. We therefore conclude that the 180-day exclusivity period described in section

505(j)(5)(B)(iv) of the Act was not forfeited by Impax, and that with this approval Impax is eligible for
180 days of generic drug exclusivity . . . ").
204 See Kurt R. Karst, Simultaneously Qualifyingfor and Forfeiting 180-Day Exclusivity Eligibility
for Failure to Obtain Timely Tentative Approval (Apr. 12, 2011).

205 Pub. L. No. 112-144, 126 Stat. 993 § 1133 (2012).
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date of the filing of the amendment ("rather than the date of the original ANDA
submission") is the start of the 30-month forfeiture period. Moreover, FDA's
recently proposed rule follows this approach for all ANDA amendments. Under the
proposed rule, the date of submission for purposes of starting the 30-month clock is
the same as the date of submission for purposes of determining first applicant status.
In both cases, the relevant date is the date on which the amendment containing the
certification was submitted.2 06 If the applicant delays in sending its paragraph IV
notice, however, the 30-month clock will begin when it actually sent notice.207
6.

On which days do the 30 months begin and end?

Short Answer. Under FDA policy, the 30 months begin the day after the date on
which the ANDA was submitted, and the deadline has been met (and no forfeiture
results) if the applicant obtains approval before or on the date that is 30 months later.
Discussion. FDA announced its policy in 2015 in a matter concerning generic
applications referencing Nexium@ Delayed Release Capsules (esomeprazole
magnesium). Ranbaxy was the first to file an ANDA with a paragraph IV
certification. It submitted its ANDA on August 5, 2005, and obtained tentative
approval on February 5, 2008. Sandoz, a subsequent filer, submitted a citizen
petition in June 2012 arguing that Ranbaxy had obtained tentative approval "a day
too late" and had therefore forfeited exclusivity. 208 The company argued that the
plain meaning of "within 30 months" is "inside" the 30-month period. Further, the
company argued, a calendar month for purposes of counting passage of time is the
period terminating with the numerically corresponding day of the following monththat is, August 4, September 4, and so forth. Thus, the company argued, February 4,
2008, was the last day on which Ranbaxy could obtain tentative approval without
forfeiture of its exclusivity. In a footnote, Sandoz added that its argument "applies
with equal force to the same factual scenario as found for generic versions of
Prandin@ (repaglinide) Tablets," suggesting that Sandoz had there too found itself
blocked by a company whose tentative approval issued "a day too late" by its
reckoning. 209

FDA denied the petition on January 26, 2015.210 Although the petition had been
mooted by subsequent events, the agency responded to Sandoz's arguments about
computation of the 30-month period. 21 1 The 30-month period "begins the day after
206 80 Fed. Reg. at 6835 ("For purposes of determining an
ANDA applicant's eligibility for 180-day
exclusivity and the date from which a first ANDA applicant's compliance with section 505(j)(5)(D)(i)(IV)
[failure to obtain tentative approval within 30 months forfeiture event] of the [FDCA] is assessed, the date
of the submission of the paragraph IV certification is the date on which the amendment [containing the
certification] was submitted.").
207 As already noted, in this situation the notice date is also the relevant date for
determining first
filer status in the first instance. See supra subsection 0. See 80 Fed. Reg. at 6840-41 ("We note that this
proposed administrative consequence would not reduce the 30-month timeframe set forth in sections
505(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(aa)(BB) and (j)(5)(D)(i)(IV) of the FD&C Act in the forfeiture calculus for a first
applicant; rather, the 30-month period would begin on the revised date of submission.").
208 Sandoz Inc., Citizen Petition, Docket No. FDA-2012-P-0661
(Jun. 19, 2012).
209 Id. at 20 n.17.

210 Letter from Janet Woodcock, Director, M.D., CDER, to Stephen R. Auten,
Vice-President, Head
of Intellectual Property, North America, Sandoz, Inc., Docket No. FDA-2012-P-0661 (Jan. 26, 2015).
211 FDA rescinded the tentative approval in 2014 after determining it had been granted
in error; this
is discussed further in subsection 0.
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the date on which the ANDA is filed, not on the date of filing." In other words, the
30 months do not include the date the ANDA was filed. Thus, "the last day of the
30-month period lands on the 30-month anniversary date." Ranbaxy's 30 month
period therefore began on August 6, 2005, and the last day of the period was
February 5, 2008. The agency cited instances in which it had found forfeiture,
calculating the 30-month period in this fashion.212 FDA also noted that the federal
district court considering Ranbaxy's forfeiture of exclusivity with respect to generic
valsartan (see subsection II.C.8) had in dictum noted the 30-month forfeiture date
using the same calculation method.213
7.

Does the first applicantforfeit exclusivity, if the agency
rescinds tentative approvalthat was grantedwithin the
deadline?

Short answer. Yes, at least if the rescission is attributed to agency error. A federal
district court recently affirmed FDA's decision to deem Ranbaxy's exclusivity
forfeited after the agency rescinded two tentative approvals that had met the
deadline, citing error.
Discussion. This issue arose in connection with the ANDA discussed in the
preceding subsection-Ranbaxy's ANDA referencing Nexium-as well as another
ANDA submitted by Ranbaxy. As noted, FDA granted Ranbaxy tentative approval
of its ANDA referencing Nexium on February 5, 2008, within 30 months of its filing
date.2 14 Ranbaxy was also the first to file a paragraph IV certification to a patent
claiming Valcyte@ (valganciclovir hydrochloride). FDA tentatively approved
Ranbaxy's generic valganciclovir within 30 months of the ANDA's filing date, on
June 20, 2008. Thus, both received tentative approval within the statutory 30-month
deadline.
In 2006 and 2008, FDA issued three warning letters asserting that Ranbaxy had
failed to follow current good manufacturing practices at two of its manufacturing
facilities.21 5 Each warning letter indicated that the Office of Compliance would
Watson forfeited exclusivity for generic irinotecan hydrochloride injection, and Caraco forfeited
exclusivity for cetirizine hydrochloride chewable tablets, under these computational rules. Id. at 5-6.
Indeed, the agency had applied this interpretation in July 2013 when it approved Caraco's generic
repaglinide tablets and awarded Caraco 180-day exclusivity, implicitly rejecting the Sandoz petition,
which had mentioned the product in a footnote. See Sandoz Inc., Citizen Petition, Docket No. FDA-2012P-0661 (June 19, 2012), at 20 n. 17 ("Although this petition is specific to 180-day exclusivity in
connection with generic versions of NEXIUM@ Delayed Release Capsules, the relief sought is based on
the plain language of the FDC Act and applies with equal force to the same factual scenario as found for
generic versions of PRANDIN@ (repaglinide) Tablets."). Sandoz had noted many instances in which the
agency had calculated in this fashion but argued that these did not represent "full vetting" of the topic and
that there had been no public comment on the issue. Id. at 10-11 and n.1 1.
213 Letter from Janet Woodcock, Director, CDER, to Stephen R. Auten, Vice-President, Head of
Intellectual Property, North America, Sandoz, Inc.,, Docket No. FDA-2012-P-0661 (Jan. 26, 2015), at 6,
citing Mylan Labs. Ltd v. FDA, 910 F. Supp. 2d 299, 302-03 (D.D.C. 2012) (noting that for ANDA
received on December 28, 2004, 30-month forfeiture date was June 28, 2007).
214 See generally Ranbaxy Labs., Ltd., v. Burwell, Civ. A. No. 1:14-cv-01923 (BAH) (D.D.C. Nov.
212

11, 2014) (Complaint).
215 Letter from Nicholas Buhay, Acting Director, Division of Manufacturing and Product Quality,
CDER, FDA, to Ramesh Parekh, Vice President, Manufacturing, Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited, Warning
Letter 320-06-03 (June 15, 2006); Letter from Richard L. Freidman, Director, Division of Manufacturing
and Product Quality, CDER, FDA, to Malvinder Singh, CEO and Managing Director, Ranbaxy
Laboratories Limited, Warning Letter 320-08-02 (Sept. 16, 2008); Letter from Richard L. Freidman,
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recommend withholding approval of any new applications listing the facilities in
question as the manufacturing location for finished drug products. In January 2012,
Ranbaxy entered into a Consent Decree and Permanent Injunction that resolved
certain claims-relating to the two facilities in question-brought by DOJ against
the company.2 16 The consent decree handled Ranbaxy's various pending ANDAs
differently. For instance, Ranbaxy agreed to relinquish any claim to 180-day
exclusivity for certain ANDAs; as to other ANDAs, the provision was slightly more
complicated, specifying relinquishment if certain deadlines were not met. The
ANDAs for generic esomeprazole magnesium and generic valganciclovir were
categorized as "Excepted Applications." 217 They would be ineligible for exclusivity
if FDA determined that they were not substantially complete at the time of filing. 218
They would also be ineligible if a data integrity audit revealed that they contained
"any untrue statements of material fact" or "a pattern or practice of data irregularities
affecting approval." 21 9 The agency later found that these ANDAs were substantially
complete at the time of submission and that neither contained an untrue statement of
material fact or a pattern or practice of data irregularities.220
In November 2014, FDA rescinded the tentative approval of both ANDAs and
announced that Ranbaxy had forfeited exclusivity for generic valganciclovir for
failure to obtain tentative approval within 30 months of submission. 221 It later
reached the same conclusion with respect to the generic esomeprazole.222 The agency
explained that its prior decisions granting tentative approval were erroneous, because
the compliance status of the facilities referenced in the applications was unacceptable
to support tentative approval.22 3 The prior decisions had been a "mistake."224 The
company had therefore "failed to obtain tentative approval" within 30 months of the
ANDA submission dates, leading to forfeiture.
Ranbaxy brought suit against FDA ten days later, arguing among other things that
the earlier decisions were not "mistakes" as to which new facts had been brought to
Director, Division of Manufacturing and Product Quality, CDER, FDA, to Malvinder Singh, CEO and
Managing Director, Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited, Warning Letter 320-08-03 (Sept. 16, 2008).
216 United States v. Ranbaxy Labs. Ltd, C.A. No. 1:12-cv-00250-JFM (D.
Md. Jan. 25, 2012)
(Consent Decree of Permanent Injunction).
217 See Ranbaxy Labs., Inc. v. Burwell, C.A. No. 1:14-cv-01923-BAH (D.D.C.
Nov. 14, 2014)
(Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and
Expedited Preliminary Injunction) at 11 (explaining which paragraphs applied to these ANDAs).
218 United States v. Ranbaxy Labs., Inc., Consent Decree, supra note
216, ¶ XIV.
2 19
id. T XV.
220 United States v.. Ranbaxy Labs., Inc., Memorandum of Points and Authorities,
supra note 217, at
18-20.
221 Letter from Kathleen Uhl, M.D., Acting Director, OGD, CDER, FDA, to Sameer
Manan, U.S.
Agent for Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited regarding ANDA 077830 & ANDA 078078 (Nov. 4, 2014)
[hereinafter Uhl Letter to Ranbaxy].
222 See Ranbaxy forfeits 180 days exclusivity for generic Nexium, BUSiNESS STANDARD
(Jan. 27,
2015).
223 "Tentative approval," the agency explained, is appropriate when the application
cannot receive
final effective approval for specific statutory reasons, such as patent-based exclusivity or a 30-month
stay. It is not appropriate when the application is unapprovable for other reasons. Tentative approval thus
requires the applicant be able to demonstrate compliance with current good manufacturing practices. See
Uhl Letter to Ranbaxy, supra note 221, at 3-4.
224 Id. at 12.
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light requiring their correction; instead, the agency had been aware of the compliance
225
situation at the facilities when it issued those decisions. The company also argued
that forfeiture would be inconsistent with the plain language of the forfeiture
provision; the company had, in fact, received tentative approval within the
deadline.226 The district court denied the company's motion for a temporary
227
restraining order and later granted FDA's motion for summary judgment. Among
other things, the court concluded that the approval process had been "slipshod" and
22
that the agency had clearly erred when it tentatively approved the ANDAs. 8
Further, after concluding that FDA was reasonable in interpreting the statute to
permit rescission of erroneously issued tentative approvals, the court found FDA's
interpretation of the forfeiture trigger reasonable.229
The forfeiture trigger, the court wrote, is "ambiguous." Specifically, an applicant
forfeits exclusivity if it fails to "obtain tentative approval" within 30 months.
Tentative approval, in turn, is defined as "notification to an applicant by the
Secretary that an application under this subsection meets the requirements" of
section 505(j)(2)(A) but "cannot receive effective approval because of blocking
patents or exclusivity." 230 The statute "does not say anything about whether a
'notification,' once given, may never be withdrawn" or whether-more
importantly-"rescission of tentative approval nullifies a previous notification and
231
Statutory silence "weighs
causes a retroactive forfeiture of 180-day exclusivity."
strong" in favor of "finding that a statute is ambiguous," and FDA's interpretationthat forfeiture "is avoided only when a tentative approval is valid"-was
reasonable.232 Allowing the retroactive forfeiture of exclusivity if tentative approval
is later rescinded is "entirely in keeping with" the "Hatch-Waxman goal of
streamlining generic drug approvals" to allow them to reach the market sooner.
Ranbaxy's approach-disallowing retroactive forfeiture-"would create a perverse
incentive to pharmaceutical companies to conceal any deficiencies in an ANDA until
tentative approval is granted, relying on the often lengthy time period between
233
tentative approval and final approval to fix any problems."

225

United States v. Ranbaxy Labs., Inc., Memorandum of Points and Authorities, supranote 217, at

23.
226 Id. at 33-34.

227 See generally Ranbaxy Labs., Ltd., v. Burwell, 82 F. Supp. 3d 159 (D.D.C. 2015).
228
229

Id. at 191-92.
Id at 196-97.

230 Id. at 197 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355()(5)(B)(iv)(11)(dd)(AA)).
231 Id.
232 Id

233 Id. at 198. Sun Pharma acquired Ranbaxy in March 2015 and withdrew the appeal that had been
filed. See Sun Pharm. Indus. Ltd. v. Burwell, No. 15-5063 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 7, 2015) (Order); see also Eric
Palmer, Sun Kills Lawsuit Ranbaxy FiledAgainst FDA for Pulling its Nexium Generic, FIERCEPHARMA
(Oct. 9, 2015) ("Ranbaxy is now owned by Sun Pharmaceutical, which sees no upside to fighting with the
agency, and so it has dropped the litigation").
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Will amendments to an ANDA to conform to changes in the
reference listed drug "excuse "failure to obtain tentative

approval within 30 months?
Short Answer. If the agency requires the first applicant to make changes to its
ANDA, failure to obtain tentative approval within 30 months will not lead to
forfeiture.
Discussion. Subparagraph (D)(i)(IV) excuses the first applicant from failure to
obtain tentative approval by the statutory deadline, where the failure to obtain
tentative approval "is caused by a change in or a review of the requirements for
approval of the application imposed after the date on which the application is
filed."234 Citing this provision, the agency has excused first applicants whom it
requiredto make changes to their pending applications.
One notable dispute arose in connection with Cobrek's application referencing
Genzyme's Hectorol, discussed in subsection II.C.3. As noted, FDA had allowed
Cobrek to recertify to Genzyme's patent without deeming the recertification a
disqualifying amendment or withdrawal of the original certification. The underlying
facts involved a formulation change. Specifically, after Cobrek filed its ANDA for
doxercalciferol in an ampule presentation, qualifying for exclusivity, Genzyme
developed and introduced a new injectable formulation in a vial presentation. It also
decided to stop marketing the ampule presentation. FDA informed Cobrek that the
agency could not approve the original ANDA because the ampule formulation was
not quantitatively and qualitatively the same as the new vial drug product, and it
recommended Cobrek reformulate. Cobrek did so, but as a result it failed to obtain
tentative approval by the 30-month deadline. Sandoz's citizen petition-which had
argued that recertification to a Genzyme patent disqualified Cobrek for exclusivityalso argued that the formulation change did not excuse failure to obtain tentative
approval.23 5 Specifically, Sandoz argued that there was no change in or review of the
requirements for approval of a generic ampule (for which Cobrek had submitted its
original ANDA) or for approval of a generic vial (for which Cobrek was now
seeking approval). "[I]f anything," according to Sandoz, "Cobrek's delay in
receiving tentative approval is attributed to its voluntary decision to seek approval
for a generic vial version of Hectorol@ Injection."236
The agency denied the Sandoz petition, essentially by explaining that Cobrek's
decision was not voluntary. This matter involved an injectable drug and therefore a
requirement that a generic formulation be qualitatively and quantitatively the same as
the reference listed drug. FDA explained that once Genzyme withdrew the old
formulation, any applicant with a pending ANDA was required to either (1)
reformulate or (2) obtain a determination that the old formulation was not withdrawn
for safety reasons and a corresponding waiver. Either way, the agency concluded,
there had been a "change in or review of the requirements for approval" of the
ANDA in question. 237 Cobrek therefore had not forfeited exclusivity when it failed to
obtain tentative approval within 30 months.
234 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(IV).
235

Sandoz Inc., Citizen Petition, Docket No. FDA-2010-P-0632 (Dec.
8, 2010).

236 Id. at 13 (emphasis in original).
237 Letter from Janet Woodcock, M.D., Director,
CDER, FDA, to Stephen Auten, Vice President,

Legal-Intellectual Property, Sandoz Inc., Docket No. FDA-2010-P-0632 (Sept. 20, 2011), at 9.
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The agency has similarly forgiven the failure to obtain timely tentative approval
where the first applicant made labeling amendments to conform to changes made to
the labeling of the reference listed drug or to comply with agency requests. This is
why Teva did not forfeit exclusivity in 2012 with respect to its application
referencing Pfizer's Zyvox@ (linezolid). FDA approved three changes to the labeling
238
The agency reviewed Teva's
of Zyvox while Teva's application was pending.
labeling two weeks before the 30-month forfeiture date and asked the company to
revise the labeling to conform to Pfizer's most recent labeling; FDA's subsequent
review of the labeling amendment extended one month past the deadline. The agency
then asked for additional labeling changes, and approval of the ANDA required
another review cycle. Finding that "there were changes to the requirements for
approval with respect to labeling" and that "these labeling changes were a cause of
Teva's failure to obtain tentative approval by the forfeiture date," the agency found
239
Other examples-where labeling
that Teva's exclusivity was not forfeited.
changes to the generic and
labeling
required
changes to the reference listed drug
Impax's exclusivity
approval-include
tentative
excused failure to achieve timely
24 0
Synthon's
tablets,
disintegrating
orally
with respect to generic lamotrigine
24
1 and
tablets,
dihydrochloride
levocetirizine
exclusivity with respect to generic
mg
150
in
maleate
fluvoxamine
to
generic
Anchen's exclusivity with respect
242
strength.
In other situations, FDA has released applicants from the 30-month forfeiture
clock when the delay in tentative approval is attributable to an ongoing agency
review of a pertinent generic drug approval requirement. This appears to have been
the case for two ANDAs approved in 2012, as to which the delay was attributed to a
2 43
FDA similarly
review of requirements with respect to generic drug tablet size.

238 These were changes to the Clinical Pharmacology (Pharmacokinetics and Drug-Drug
Interactions), Precautions (Drug Interactions), and Adverse Reactions (Postmarketing Experience)
sections; changes to the Clinical Pharmacology (Pharmacodynamics) section regarding a QT study; and
addition of hypoglycemia to the Warnings section and the Adverse Reactions (Postmarketing Experience)
sub-section of the package insert. Memorandum from Martin Shimer, Deputy Director, Division of Legal

and Regulatory Support, Office of Generic Drug Policy, CDER, FDA, to ANDA 200222 (May 15, 2015).
239

id

240 Memorandum from Martin Shimer, Deputy Director, Division of Legal and Regulatory Support,

Office of Generic Drug Policy, CDER, FDA, to ANDA 200828 (Oct. 29, 2014) (modification of the risk
evaluation and mitigation strategy and associated supporting documents, and five labeling changes
between June 2010 and August 2012, where ANDA had been submitted in December 2009).

241 Letter from Keith Webber, Ph.D., Deputy Director, OPS, CDER, FDA, to Shannon F. Holmes,
Ph.D., Senior Regulatory Affairs Specialist, Synthon Pharmaceuticals, Inc. approving ANDA 090229
(Nov. 26, 2010) (noting that there had been "a change in the requirements for approval of this ANDA"specifically a change in the labeling of the reference listed drug-that caused the company's failure to
obtain timely tentative approval).

242 Letter from Gregory P. Geba, M.D., M.P.H., Director, OGD, CDER, FDA, to David Quiggle,
Director, Regulatory Affairs, Anchen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. approving ANDA 091476 (Mar. 13, 2013)
(noting that Anchen's failure to obtain tentative approval of the 150-mg strength "was caused by a change
in or a review of the requirements for approval of the application imposed after the date on which the

application was filed"-specifically revisions in the labeling of the reference listed drug "that necessitated
changes in Anchen's labeling that were not resolved until" after the forfeiture date).

243 Letter from Gregory P. Geba, M.D., M.P.H., Director, OGD, CDER, FDA, to John Derstine,
Director, Regulatory Affairs, Teva Pharmaceuticals USA approving ANDA 200435 (Sept. 25, 2012)
(concluding that Teva's failure to obtain timely tentative approval of a generic amlodipine,
hydrochlorothiazide, and valsartan fixed dose combination product was "caused by a change in or a
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released Actavis from the forfeiture clock with respect to a generic clobetasol
propionate shampoo when it approved the drug in June 2011, because the agency had
been reviewing the appropriateness of vasoconstrictor bioassay studies for topical
corticosteroid drug products applied to the hirsute scalp and had asked the company
to perform comparative vasoconstrictor bioassay studies.244 Indeed, the agency
issued a draft guidance on the issue three months before approving the Actavis
product. 245
Even if the agency ends up not requiring a change, it may excuse the applicant for
failure to obtain tentative approval within 30 months. For instance, Eon Labs (which
became Sandoz) was the first to file a substantially complete ANDA for generic
metaxalone tablets, 800 mg, with paragraph IV certifications to two patents listed for
the reference listed drug, Skelaxin@ (metaxalone). Eon Labs submitted the ANDA in
November 2004 but did not obtain tentative approval within 30 months. The
agency's eventual March 2010 approval letter concluded that the delay was
attributable to review of the labeling requirements for metaxalone, which fit within
the four corners of the exception in subparagraph (D)(i)(IV).2 4 6 Further, the review
had been prompted by a citizen petition, and section 505(q) of the FDCA now tolls
the 30-month clock while a petition is pending. 24 7 Citing the tolling provision, FDA
found Teva had not forfeited exclusivity for generic methylphenidate hydrochloride)
extended release capsules,24 8 nor had Impax forfeited exclusivity for generic
doxycycline hyclate delayed-release tablets.249

review of the requirements for approval of the application imposed after the date on which the application
was filed, specifically a review of ANDA approval requirements with respect to tablet size"); Letter from
Keith Webber, Ph.D., Deputy Director, OPS, CDER, FDA, to Monique Weitz, Actavis South Atlantic
LLC approving ANDA 090869 (May 17, 2012) (concluding that Actavis's failure to obtain timely
tentative approval of generic ropinirole hydrochloride extended-release tablets was caused by the
agency's review of "ANDA approval requirements with respect to the size of certain solid oral dosage
form products").
244 Letter from Keith Webber, Ph.D., Deputy Director, OPS, CDER, FDA, to
Elizabeth Trowbridge,
R.A.C., Director, Regulatory Affairs, Actavis Mid Atlantic LLC approving ANDA 078854 (June 7, 2011).
245 FDA, Draft Guidance on ClobetasolPropionate(Feb. 2011).
246 Letter from Gary Buehler, Director, OGD, CDER, FDA, to Mary
McDonald, Director,
Regulatory Affairs, Sandoz Inc. approving ANDA 040445 (Mar. 31, 2010) ("We have determined,
however, that this was caused by a change in or a review of the requirements for approval of the
application imposed after the date on which the application was filed. Namely, Sandoz submitted its
amendment for the 800 mg strength on November 4, 2004, and during the entire time the ANDA was
under review, the agency had pending before it a citizen petition that created a review of the appropriate
labeling for generic metaxalone in light of certain patent-protected language in the labeling of the RLD.").
247 It provides that if approval of a first applicant's "ANDA
is delayed because of a petition,"
presumably a petition covered by section 505(q), "the 30-month period under such subsection is deemed
to be extended by a period of time equal to the period beginning on the date on which the Secretary
received the petition and ending on the date of final agency action on the petition (inclusive of such
beginning and ending dates), without regard to whether the Secretary grants, in whole or in part, or denies,
in whole or in part, the petition."
248 Letters from Gregory P. Geba, M.D., M.P.H., Director, OGD, CDER, FDA,
to Jean W. Zwicker,
Senior Director, Regulatory Affairs, Teva Pharmaceuticals USA approving ANDAs 077707 & 078873
(July 19, 2012) (approving ANDAs for generic methylphenidate hydrochloride extended release capsules
and explaining that Teva remained eligible for 180-day exclusivity because a citizen petition had been
submitted that required the agency to review the requirements for approval for generic drug products
referencing Metadate CD@).
249 Impax Approval Letter, supra note 202 (approving ANDA for doxycycline
hyclate delayedrelease tablets and explaining that Impax remained eligible for 180-day exclusivity because a citizen
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One issue that has been briefly litigated-and may generate more disputes-is
when, exactly, a delay is "caused" by a change in or a review of the requirements for
approval of the application. The litigated case involved the ANDA filed by Ranbaxy
(through its subsidiary Ohm Laboratories) referencing Diovan@ (valsartan). In
December 2004, Ranbaxy was the first to file an ANDA for generic valsartan tablets
with a paragraph IV certification to the reference product patents. The 30-month
deadline was June 28, 2007, but the USP published a final monograph for valsartan
tablets on May 1, 2007. Ranbaxy submitted a chemistry amendment on June 26, to
revise its drug substance specifications and test methods to comply with the
monograph. On July 2, FDA asked Ranbaxy to provide data showing that its inhouse testing methods were equivalent to those set forth in the monograph. Ranbaxy
submitted the chemistry amendment in question on July 5, and the agency issued
tentative approval in October, nearly four months after the forfeiture date. After
noting that whether publication of, or a change to, a USP monograph has "caused" a
failure to obtain timely tentative approval is a "very fact-specific question"
involving numerous factors, the agency ruled that Ranbaxy's failure was attributable
to the publication of the monograph. 250 A subsequent applicant, Mylan, challenged
the agency's reasoning. The heart of Mylan's argument was that Ranbaxy had
already been doing what the USP later required, which was evident from the agency
request that the company simply demonstrate that its methods were equivalent to the
methods specified in the monograph. 251 Relying heavily on the agency's forfeiture
memorandum, the district court dismissed the case,252 and the final approval issued
with an award of exclusivity.253
The agency's own delay, however, may not otherwise excuse a first applicant
from failure to obtain tentative approval. This is why Teva forfeited exclusivity for
its generic risedronate sodium when it missed the forfeiture clock by six months-

petition had been submitted that required FDA to review the requirements applicable to the product). In
this instance, the requirements for approval were also changed, because the reference listed drug was
approved for a second tablet configuration, and Impax was required to change to a scored tablet and
conduct additional dissolution testing. Id.
250 Memorandum from Martin Shimer, Branch Chief,
Regulatory Support Branch, OGD, CDER,
FDA, to ANDA 077492 (Sept. 28, 2012). According to FDA, the factors include: (1) whether the
monograph change is in a proposed or final monograph; (2) the timing of any publication of or change in a
monograph in relation to a particular 30-month forfeiture date; (3) whether FDA requires compliance with
the new/changed standard; (4) whether the statute itself requires compliance with the new/changed
standard; (5) the consistency of the new/changed monograph with pre-existing approval requirements; (6)
the nature and timing of the sponsor's efforts to comply with USP monographs; and (7) the nature and
timing of FDA's review of such efforts. See id. at 11; see also Mylan Labs. Ltd v. FDA, 910 F. Supp. 2d
299 (D.D.C. 2012).
251 Mylan Labs., 910 F. Supp. 2d at 309.
252 Id. ("A new, final USP monograph was published; Ranbaxy made an initial effort to comply
with
the monograph; FDA then asked for more data; Ranbaxy gave FDA more data; and because FDA had to
review Ranbaxy's amendments and the additional data to ensure that Ranbaxy's drug substance
specifications and test methods met the standards set forth in the new monograph, tentative approval was
delayed. This connection between the specific facts and FDA's conclusion is apparent from the face of the
Forfeiture Memo and is both logical and rational.")
253 Id; see Letter from Kathleen Uhl, M.D., Acting
Director, OGD, CDER, FDA, to Sameer Manan,
Senior Manager, Regulatory Affairs, Ohm Laboratories approving ANDA 077492 (June 26, 2014) ("The
applicant's effort to comply with this new requirement, and FDA's review of that effort, was a cause of
the applicant's failure to obtain tentative approval by the 30-month forfeiture date described in section
505(j)(5)(D)(i)(IV).").
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even though all FDA review disciplines had actually completed their reviews of the
ANDA one day prior to the forfeiture date. The agency explained that it had not
completed its final review of the ANDA by the forfeiture date; approval requires not
only evaluation by the relevant disciplines, but also review by management of the
Office of Generic Drugs. That review was not completed until six months later.
Further, and in any case, the agency explained, the statute does not contemplate
arguments that the applicant could have received timely approval "had the review
been conducted more quickly." Indeed, the agency pointed out, the FDASIA
amendments extending the clock to 40 months for certain ANDAs is predicated on
the understanding "both that the length of time that it takes FDA to review an ANDA
might contribute to a sponsor's failure to obtain tentative approval by the 30-month
254
forfeiture date, and that in such instances forfeiture nonetheless may occur."
Patent Expiry
A first applicant forfeits the exclusivity period if "[a]ll of the patents as to which
the applicant submitted a certification qualifying it for the 180-day exclusivity
period have expired."255 Since the 2009 article, two issues pertaining to this
forfeiture provision have emerged.
9.

If the only patent listed when thefirst paragraphIVANDA is
submitted expires before any ANDA has been acceptedfor
review, is "all" 180-day exclusivityfor the productforfeit?

Short answer. This is a matter of first impression pending before the agency.
Discussion. This issue has arisen in connection with Restasis, discussed in
subsection II.B.3. As a reminder, Allergan listed the '979 patent, which was slated to
expire on May 17, 2014. InnoPharma submitted an ANDA on January 13, 2014, with
a paragraph IV certification to the '979 patent, which was the only patent listed in
the Orange Book at the time. InnoPharma was the first to file a paragraph IV to the
'979 patent, but the patent expired on May 27, 2014, before FDA issued an
acknowledgment letter to any company that had submitted an ANDA. On January
14, Allergan listed the '111 patent. It appears from docket filings that Akom was the
first (or one of the first) to file a paragraph IV certification to the '111 patent. As
noted earlier, FDA has asked whether InnoPharma is a "first applicant" for purposes
of 180-day exclusivity.
The agency has also asked whether all 180-day exclusivity for this product was
forfeited on May 17, 2014, when the '979 patent expired, "such that no ANDA
applicant for Cyclosporine Ophthalmic Emulsion, 0.05%, is eligible for 180-day
generic drug exclusivity." Axar, which appears to be a subsequent filer, has argued
that it is forfeited: Innopharm was a first applicant, and it forfeited exclusivity when
the '979 patent expired. "In the post-MMA context," the company argues, "once that
exclusivity is forfeited, it is gone forever." Moreover, "[n]o other patents can give
rise to a separate period of exclusivity."256 InnoPharma agrees; "upon the expiration
of the 979 patent, all first applicants forfeited their 180-day exclusivity period, and,

254

Memorandum from Robert L. West, Deputy Director, OGD, CDER, FDA to ANDA 079215

(June 10, 2014).
255 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(VI).
256 Comments of Axar Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Docket No. FDA-2015-N-2713 (Aug. 27, 2015).
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as expressly provided in the FDCA, no other applicants are eligible for a 180-day
exclusivity period." 25 7 Akorn, which believes itself the first applicant (because
Innopharm does not qualify) disagrees.
10. What is the effect ofpatent expiry once a paragraphIV
certification has been submitted?
Under section 505(j)(5)(D)(i)(IV), expiry of all of the patents qualifying the first
applicant for exclusivity leads to forfeiture. Subsection II.C.1, above, discusses a
dispute regarding Teva's applications referencing Cozaar and Hyzaar. The
discussion earlier related to Merck's delisting of the '075 patent and the D.C.
Circuit's ruling that Teva had not forfeited its 180-day exclusivity due to its failure
to market in a timely fashion after the delisting in question. The court determined
that forfeiture for delisting was appropriate only if the NDA holder had brought a
patent infringement suit and then sought delisting as a result of losing on the merits
or entering an unfavorable settlement agreement. In other words, unilateral action by
the innovator to delist a patent does not result in forfeiture. As the case continued,
FDA adopted analogous reasoning and declined to find forfeiture when the patent
expired due to unilateral action-or, more precisely, inaction-on the part of the
NDA holder. Specifically, before the court of appeals issued its mandate, FDA
learned that Merck had failed to pay maintenance fees on the patent in question,
leading to its expiration as a matter of law. 25 8 FDA concluded-shortly after the
mandate issued-that Teva had not forfeited exclusivity. The reasoning of the court
of appeals with respect to delisting-that the statute was not meant to give the
innovator "a right to unilaterally vitiate a generic's exclusivity"-leads to the same
result with respect to non-payment of maintenance fees. 259 The district court rejected
a challenge brought by subsequent applicants seeking to vitiate the exclusivity
award, noting that it could not "find that the FDA was arbitrary or capricious when it
politely expressed its disagreement with a D.C. Circuit decision that had ruled

257 InnoPharma Comments,supra note
79.
258 See 35 U.S.C. § 41(b).
259 Letter from Gary Buehler, Director, OGD, CDER, FDA, to ANDA Applicants
Docket No. FDA-

2010-N-0134 (Mar. 26, 2010) ("This reasoning thus appears to preclude a forfeiture of exclusivity on the
basis of a patent expiration where the expiration is in the control of the NDA holder. Because the '075
patent expired due to Merck's failure to pay applicable fees, that expiration, consistent with the Court of
Appeals' reasoning in Teva, is not grounds for forfeiture of the first applicant's exclusivity."). The agency
made it clear that it disagreed with the decision of the court of appeals. See id. at 4-5 ('The Agency's view
is that, if it were writing on a clean slate, it would interpret the statute so that patent expiration for any
reason is a patent expiration forfeiture event. FDA believes that interpretation is most consistent with the
plain meaning of the words of the statute and with a workable and appropriate approach to administration
of the statute."); id. at 6 ("Thus, permitting the first applicant to retain exclusivity as to an expired patent
requires FDA to take an action that is not sanctioned by the words of the statute."); id at 7 ("For the
reasons described above, FDA concludes that if it were assessing this issue without reference to the Teva
decision, it would find that, under the plain language of the statute, because the '075 patent will have
expired by the time any ANDA referencing Cozaar or Hyzaar is ready for approval, any first applicant
previously eligible for 180-day exclusivity as to the "075 patent forfeits that exclusivity. Moreover, even
if the statutory language is considered ambiguous, FDA concludes loss of exclusivity under these
circumstances is most consistent with the statute's text and goals, and provides the most reasonable way of
administering the statute."); id. at 8 ("Although FDA believes this result is inconsistent with the plain
language of the statute, as discussed above, it believes it is appropriate to apply the Court of Appeals'
reasoning to the present facts.").

374

FOOD AND DRUG LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 71

against the agency, but nonetheless applied the reasoning of the Circuit to a different
but, on these facts, closely related question."260
FDA's recent proposed rule briefly notes forfeiture under subparagraph
(D)(i)(IV), but it does not address the situation where patent expiry results from
unilateral inaction on the part of the innovator. First, in connection with amended
patent certifications, and the existing regulation that an applicant may not convert a
paragraph IV certification to a paragraph III certification if another applicant is
eligible for exclusivity, 261 the agency notes that 180-day exclusivity "does not
extend beyond patent expiry." 262 Citing the forfeiture provision, it then notes that the
applicant's exclusivity would, in any event, "terminate" upon "expiration of all of
the patents as to which the applicant submitted a paragraph IV certification
qualifying it for 180-day exclusivity." 263 The new regulations would provide that
"[a]ny applicable 180-day exclusivity period cannot extend beyond the expiration of
264
Second, and
the patent upon which the 180-day exclusivity period was based."
also in connection with amended certifications, the agency notes that the new
forfeiture provision is "consistent with FDAs longstanding position" that exclusivity
is "extinguished" with patent expiry.265 It has therefore proposed to "codify" its
"longstanding" rule that if the patent expires and the first applicant does not amend
its certification to reflect patent expiry, the agency will deem the applicant to have
266
"constructively changed its patent certification to a paragraph II certification."
The agency's "longstanding position"--that exclusivity is extinguished with
patent expiry-was discussed in the earlier articles.2 67 In one subsequent dispute
involving an old ANDA, the agency again found that exclusivity ended with patent
expiry, and this was upheld by the courts. The dispute related to generic applications
referencing Shire's Carbatrol@ (carbamazepine) 300 mg extended release capsules.
Two patents were listed in the Orange Book for Carbatrol@---U.S. Patent No.
5,912,013 (the '013 patent, slated to expire in 2016) and U.S. Patent No. 5,326,570
(the '570 patent, slated to expire on July 23, 2011). Nostrum was the first to file an
ANDA containing a paragraph IV certification to each patent, and the resulting
patent litigation settled giving it the right to launch in October 2010.268 FDA

260 Apotex v. Sebelius, 700 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D.D.C. 2010), affd, 384 F. App'x. 4 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(unpublished), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1194 (2011).
261 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12)(viii); see also 59 Fed. Reg. at 50348 ("[Tlhe protection offered by
180-day exclusivity should not be undermined by changes from paragraph IV certification ... [T]he
agency has required that a patent remain on the list after being declared invalid or unenforceable until the
end of any applicable 180-day exclusivity period . .. [W]here there is a patent that has been challenged by
a paragraph IV applicant, a subsequent applicant will not be able to file a certification that there is no
relevant patent or seek an immediately effective approval until either the patent or the 180-day exclusivity
period expires.")
262 80 Fed. Reg. at 6841.

263 id

264 Proposed21 C.F.R. § 314.107(c)(1).
265 80 Fed. Reg. at 6846.
266 80 Fed. Reg. at 6847. Although the preamble states that this position would be codified in 21
C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12)(viii)(C)(1)(i), id. at 6843, it appears that the corresponding proposed regulation
does not incorporate this change. This might be an oversight.
267 See 2009 Exclusivity Article, supranote 4, at 363.
268 Nostrum Pharms., LLC v. FDA, C.A. No. 11-3111, 2011 WL 2652147 (D.N.J. July 6,2011).
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approved the ANDA on May 20, 2011, and the company launched on that day,
triggering its exclusivity. 269 The exclusivity on the '013 patent had been triggered by
a court decision involving a subsequent filer and had long since expired, and thus
FDA determined that Nostrum would enjoy exclusivity based on only the '570
patent. This, in turn, would expire on July 23, 2011, roughly two months after
launch. 270 A district court in New Jersey rejected Nostrum's challenge, noting that
"[t]he statutory provision entitling Nostrum to exclusivity, by its terms, applies only
to paragraph IV certifications, 'which cease to exist upon patent expiration."' 27 1
General Issues Relating to Forfeiture Provisions
11. When will FDA rule on aparticularapplicant'sforfeiture?
FDA will not make a forfeiture decision when it approves the first applicant's
application unless and until there is a subsequent applicant affected by the
exclusivity or forfeiture in question. The agency explained this policy when it
awarded Teva exclusivity in connection with the company's ANDA referencing
Kytril, discussed in the paragraphs immediately preceding subsection II.C.1.
Although 30 months had lapsed since Teva submitted its ANDA, the second failureto-market trigger had not been met. In a decision letter on 180-day exclusivity, FDA
stated that when it makes an approval decision for an ANDA subject to the new
rules, the agency will inform the applicant whether it is (1) a first applicant and
entitled to exclusivity, (2) a first applicant that has forfeited its exclusivity, or (3)
eligible only for a tentative approval because one or more first applicants are eligible
for 180-day exclusivity. The agency noted that "[i]t is possible that an ANDA
applicant could be informed upon approval that it is a 'first applicant' eligible for
180-day exclusivity ...

but later forfeit that exclusivity. . . . FDA will consider

whether there has been a forfeiture of 180-day exclusivity when approval of a
subsequent ANDA may be blocked by a first applicant's exclusivity." 272
The agency made the same comment when faced with possible forfeiture under
subparagraph (D)(i)(IV) (failure to obtain tentative approval). Sandoz was the first
ANDA applicant to submit a substantially complete ANDA for generic metoprolol
succinate extended-release tablets with a paragraph IV certification to the four
patents listed by AstraZeneca for the reference listed drug, Toprol-XL@. When FDA
approved Sandoz's generic in July 2006, it noted that Sandoz had failed to obtain
tentative approval of the ANDA within 30 months after the date on which the ANDA

269 Letter from Keith 0. Webber, Ph.D., Deputy Director, OPS, CDER,
FDA, to Shashank Upadhye,
Esq., Vice President, Global Intellectual Property, Apotex, Inc. regarding ANDAs 078986, 076697, and
078159 (May 20, 2011) [hereinafter Webber Letter to Apotex]; Letter from Zoia Ploscaru, Regulatory
Agent for NPLLC, Senior Director, Regulatory Affairs, Nostrum Laboratories, Inc., to Keith Webber,

Ph.D., Acting Director, OGD, CDER, FDA (May 20, 2011).
270 FDA's letter approving the Nostrum ANDA indicated the '570
patent would expire on July 5,

2011. See Letter from Keith Webber, Ph.D., Deputy Director, OPS, CDER, FDA, to Zoia Ploscarue,
Contact/Agent, Nostrum Pharmaceuticals, LLC approving ANDA 076697 (May 20, 2011). So did the
Orange Book at the time. See ORANGE BOOK (3 1st ed. 2011), at ADA 30. The district court opinion notes:

"The parties originally believed and had advised the Court that the patent expired on July 5, 2011. A
recent filing with the FDA by the patent holder provided the corrected date." Nostrum Pharms., LLC v.

FDA, 2011 WL 2652147 at *3 n.2.
271 Id. at *9 (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Leavitt, 484 F. Supp. 2d 109, 123 (D.D.C.
2007)).
272 Buehler Letter to Teva Parenteral Medicines, supra
note 142.
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was submitted. At the same time, it declined to make a formal determination of the
company's eligibility for 180-day exclusivity. It would do so only if another
applicant became "eligible for approval within 180 days after Sandoz begins
commercial marketing" of its product.273
12. What is the effect of aforfeiture of 180-day exclusivity by a
first applicant if another otherfirst applicant remains eligible
for exclusivity?
Short answer. As a practical matter, if a first applicant forfeits exclusivity but
others still hold exclusivity, the effect will be negligible. The first applicant may still
obtain approval of its application immediately; it is not blocked by the exclusivity of
the remaining first applicants. And its commercial launch will still trigger the
exclusivity period.
Discussion. This question was addressed in a matter involving generic
applications referencing Starlix@ (nateglinide) tablets. Several companies submitted
ANDAs with paragraph IV certifications on the same first day, each with paragraph
274
IV certifications to four of the patents listed for Starlix in the Orange Book. Dr.
Reddy's forfeited its 180-day exclusivity period, when it failed to obtain tentative
275
When FDA granted final
approval within 30 months of ANDA submission.
approval to the Dr. Reddy's ANDA-without exclusivity-it noted that at least one
first applicant remained eligible, and it noted that the exclusivity in question would
commence on the date of commercial marketing by any first applicant. Par's
276
as
approval letter, issued on the same day, indicates that it retained exclusivity,
27 7
Two days later, in a general letter to ANDA
does Teva's approval letter.
applicants referencing Starlix@, the agency explained the situation. "Certain
applicants remain eligible for 180-day exclusivity," it wrote, "while at least one
applicant has forfeited 180-day exclusivity . .. because it has failed to obtain
tentative approval for its ANDA within 30 months of submission and there has been
278
no change in or review of the approval requirements for these applications." FDA
noted that while the statute contemplates forfeiture by a first applicant-and provides
that if all first applicants forfeit exclusivity, approval of any ANDA may be made
effective immediately and no applicant will be eligible for 180-day exclusivity"[t]he statute does not . .. specifically address the effect of forfeiture of exclusivity

273 Letter from Gary Buehler, Director, OGD, CDER, FDA, to Dietrich Bartel, B.S., Director,
Regulatory Affairs, Sandoz Inc. approving ANDA 76-969 (July 31, 2006).
274 FDA subsequently listed another patent at the request of the NDA holder, Novartis, and all
ANDA applicants submitted paragraph IV certifications to this patent.
275 Letter from Gary Buehler, Director, OGD, CDER, FDA, to Kumara Sekar, Ph.D., Director,
Global Regulatory Affairs, Dr. Reddy's Laboratories, Inc. approving ANDA 77-461 (Sept. 9, 2009) ("The
Agency has determined, however, that DRL has forfeited its 180 day exclusivity period because it failed
to obtain tentative approval of this ANDA within 30 months after the date on which the ANDA was
filed.").
276 Letter from Gary Buehler, Director, OGD, CDER, FDA, to Michelle Bonomi-Huvala, Vice
President, Regulatory Affairs, Par Pharmaceuticals, Inc. approving ANDA 77-463 (Sept. 9, 2009).
277 Letter from Gary Buehler, Director, OGD, CDER, FDA, to Philip Erickson, R.Ph., Senior
Director, Regulatory Affairs, Teva Pharmaceuticals USA approving ANDA 77-467 (Sept. 9, 2009).
278 Letter from Gary Buehler, Director, OGD, CDER, FDA, to Applicant (Sept. 11, 2009)
[hereinafter Starlix Letter].
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by fewer than all of the first applicants."279 In particular, the statute does not address
two questions: when the forfeiting applicant's ANDA may be approved, and whether
its commercial marketing affects the exclusivity held by others.
As to the first question, the agency noted that the statute differentiates between a
"first applicant," as defined in section 505(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(bb), and "an applicant
other than a first applicant" (i.e., a subsequent applicant) as referred to in sections
505(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(aa) and 505(j)(5)(D)(iii). The timing of approval of an ANDA
turns on whether the applicant is a first applicant or a subsequent applicant.
Moreover, the statute does not state that a first applicant who forfeits exclusivity
becomes a subsequent applicant; it states only that "the 180-day exclusivity
period ... shall be forfeited by a first applicant if a forfeiture event occurs with
respect to that first applicant." 280 The agency reasoned that a first applicant forfeiting
exclusivity does not become a subsequent applicant and consequently does not have
to wait until expiry of the exclusivity enjoyed by first applicants. Instead, its ANDA,
like those of first applicants who remain eligible for exclusivity, may be approved
immediately (assuming any applicable 30-month stay has expired and the
application is otherwise ready for approval). As to the second question, the agency
noted that "[s]ection 505(j)(5)(B)(iv), which governs the running of exclusivity, does
not distinguish among first applicants, providing instead that a subsequent
applicant's ANDA may be approved 180 days after the date of first commercial
marketing by any first applicant." Thus commercial marketing by any first
applicant-including a first applicant who has forfeited exclusivity-will trigger the
180-day exclusivity period. As a result, "when fewer than all first applicants forfeit
exclusivity, the practical effects of that forfeiture on the timing of approval of
ANDAs will be negligible."28 1
Other Ways To Lose Exclusivity
13. Is it possible to lose a "portion" of the exclusivity period?
Yes, it is possible to effectively forfeit a portion of the 180-day exclusivity period
through failure to comply with FDA's regulations governing notice of commercial
marketing. Specifically, under agency regulations, if an applicant does not promptly
notify FDA of its date of first commercial marketing, the agency will deem
commercial marketing to have begun on the date of approval.2 82 If, in fact, the
applicant delayed launch, this rule will shorten the exclusivity period in practice.
FDA's recent proposed rule retains this approach: in the case of a first applicant that
fails to notify FDA within 30 days of first commercial marketing, the date of product
approval will be deemed the date of first commercial marketing. 283

279

Id.

280 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(ii).
281 Starlix Letter, supranote 278.

282 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(c)(4).
283 Proposed21 C.F.R. § 314.107(c)(2).
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14. Is an ANDA holder with a paragraphIV certification still
eligiblefor 180-day exclusivity if its parent company acquires
the NDA andpatent holder?
Short Answer. This is an area of uncertainty. In the one dispute litigated to date,
the agency permitted the first applicant to market with exclusivity. But it is not clear
what will happen in the future.
Discussion. This litigated dispute related to generic applications, subject to old
rules, referencing Provigil@ (modafinil). Cephalon holds the NDA for Provigil,
which FDA approved in 1998. U.S. Patent No. RE37,516 (the '516 patent) was
slated to expire in 2014. Four manufacturers-Mylan, Teva USA, Ranbaxy, and
Barr-were the first to file (on the same day) ANDAs with paragraph IV
certifications to the '516 patent. Cephalon reached a patent settlement with all four,
permitting them to launch on April 6, 2012. In December 2007, however, Cephalon
submitted another patent for listing in the Orange Book: U.S. Patent No. 7,297,346
(the '346 patent), which expires in 2024. Two companies-Teva USA and Watsonamended their pending ANDAs on the first day with paragraph IV certifications.
Teva USA had been one of the original first applicants; it was now the only company
that was first to file as to both patents. Cephalon did not sue.
In 2011, Teva USA's parent company, Israel-based Teva Pharmaceuticals
2 4
Industries Ltd. (Teva Ltd.) acquired Cephalon. 8 Thus, both the NDA holder and the
first applicant were subsidiaries of the same parent company. On March 30, 2012,
Teva USA-which did not have approval of its ANDA-began commercial
marketing of an authorized generic under Cephalon's NDA. Teva also sought
assurances from FDA that it alone held the 180-exclusivity rights. FDA responded
on April 4, 2012, confirming that Teva USA was the sole holder of 180-day
exclusivity and indicating that this exclusivity had been triggered by its launch of an
authorized generic on March 30, 2012.285 It also noted that Teva had not been
pursuing its own ANDA and mentioned that a first applicant might not maintain its
286
The
eligibility for exclusivity if it is not actively seeking approval of its ANDA.
agency may have meant that Teva could lose the exclusivity it was enjoying while
marketing the authorized generic, if it did not continue to pursue the pending ANDA.
The next day, Mylan-which had an ANDA otherwise approvable and had a
287
Mylan alleged that
settlement permitting it to launch in April 2012-filed suit.
Teva USA had failed to maintain a valid paragraph IV certification, because the
acquisition of Cephalon by its parent company meant that Teva USA could no longer
be adverse to Cephalon; put another way, Teva USA could not infringe its own
patent (or a patent that it "owns indirectly through a controlled corporate affiliate")

284 See Teva to Acquire Cephalon in $6.8 Billion Transaction,Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd.
(May 2, 2011), http://www.tevapharm.com/news/teva to acquire cephalonin6 8_billion transaction

05_1 1.aspx.
285 See Letter from Keith 0. Webber, Ph.D., Deputy Director, OPS, CDER, FDA, to Marc Goshko,
Vice President, Product and Patent Strategy, Legal Affairs, Teva Pharmaceuticals - Americas regarding

ANDA 076596 (Apr. 4, 2012) [hereinafter Provigil Letter Decision]. The agency's shared exclusivity
policy did not apply because Teva was the only first applicant as to both listed patents. Id. at 7.
2

16Id. at 7 n.21.

2 87

Mylon Pharm., Inc. v. Sebelius, C.A. No. 12-524 (ESH) (D.D.C. Apr. 5, 2012) (Complaint), at 2,

7.

2016

FOOD AND DRUG LAW JOURNAL

379

with a paragraph IV certification.288 Moreover, Mylan argued, a federal court could
not entertain the patent infringement case, because the parties would not have
adverse legal interests. The statute, Mylan added, requires the NDA-holder/patent
holder and the paragraph IV filer to remain independent and adverse from the time of
the paragraph IV certification until exclusivity is awarded. Ultimately, permitting
Teva to keep its exclusivity-that is, permitting NDA holders to themselves hold
first applicant exclusivity with respect to generic versions of their own productswould "frustrate the purpose and intent of the Hatch-Waxman statute, which was
designed to encourage generic competition, not to erect artificial barriers to such
competition." 289
The court denied Mylan's motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that
although Mylan's position might be sound as a policy matter, the statute did not
address the issue and the appropriate remedy for the situation lay with Congress, not
the court. 290 Mylan voluntarily dismissed its appeal before the D.C. Circuit could
address the issue, presumably because it had reached an agreement with Teva that
allowed it to enter the market during the 180-day exclusivity period. 29 1 In July 2012,
the FTC issued a decision and order concluding its investigation of Teva Ltd's
acquisition of Cephalon.292 The Director of the Bureau of Competition explained that
its concerns about the delay in generic modafinil entry had been addressed. Teva had
agreed that it would not challenge FDA's determination that the 180-day exclusivity
period began to run when it launched an authorized generic and would therefore end
in September 2012. Also, Teva entered into a licensing agreement with subsequent
filer Mylan, allowing Mylan to launch in August 2012, 45 days before the
exclusivity term would expire. 293
The impact of this dispute on future mergers and acquisitions remains uncertain.
The FDA decision letter in the Provigil matter contains a comment that the agency
"considered" finding that Teva's marketing of the reference drug itself, i.e., Provigil,
upon its acquisition of Cephalon triggered its 180-day exclusivity. It added that it
believed "there is a strong argument for finding so." It refrained from adopting that
interpretation "in this case" because this would have meant Teva's exclusivity would
expire on April 11, 2012, and Teva had no notice. But, the agency noted, "[b]ecause
of the potential for collusion between NDA holders and captive first generics, and
the subversion of the statutory scheme that could result, the agency may in the future
provide guidance on the effect of such a relationship between NDA holder and first
applicant upon any claim for 180-day exclusivity." 294

288

Id

289

Id at 8.

290 Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Sebelius, 856 F. Supp. 2d 196, 218 (D.D.C.
2012).
291 Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12-5135 (D.C. Cir.). Mylan voluntarily dismissed
its appeal
on June 6, and it issued a press release about the settlement on June 8. See FTC, "Statement of Bureau of
Competition Director Richard Feinstein on the Commission's Final Consent Order in In the Matter of
Teva PharmaceuticalIndustries Ltd. and Cephalon, Inc., File No. 1110166, Docket No. C-4335" (July 2,

2012) at n.3.
292 See Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Sebelius, Decision and Order, Docket No. C-4335
(F.T.C. July 2,

2012).
293 FTC Statement, supra note 291.
294 Provigil Decision Letter, supranote 285, at
7 n.18.
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D. TriggeringExclusivity
The old scheme contained two exclusivity triggers: commercial marketing of the
generic drug product by the first applicant, and a court decision declaring the patent
invalid or not infringed. Under the new rules, exclusivity begins with commercial
marketing; a court decision does not by itself start the 180 days. A court decision
may trigger the clock for forfeiture, however, and thereby indirectly start the 180
days (by forcing the first applicant to launch). Most of the issues that follow relate to
the court decision trigger. With one exception (private label sales) the commercial
295
marketing trigger has not generated significant controversy.

1.

What kind of court decision triggers 180-day exclusivity?

Short answer. As discussed in the earlier articles, the old ANDA scheme requires
a decision that on its face evidences a holding on the merits of patent noninfringement, invalidity, or unenforceability. In 2003, Congress eliminated the court
decision trigger for exclusivity for new ANDAs.
Discussion. The court decision trigger for old ANDAs referred to a "decision of a
court . . . holding the patent which is the subject of the certification to be invalid or
not infringed." 296 FDA's interpretation of this provision emerged after litigation
involving ANDAs that referenced Pravachol@ (pravastatin sodium) and earlier
2 97
Apotex, a
litigations involving generic ticlopidine and ondansetron hydrochloride.
declaratory
for
a
suit
brought
Pravachol@,
subsequent applicant that referenced
judgment that the patents in question were invalid or not infringed by its product.
The court dismissed the case with a stipulation and order-signed by both partiesthat the innovator (Bristol-Myers Squibb) had "no intention to bring suit against
Apotex for infringement." Apparently thinking that the court decision in the
ticlopidine matter298 required it to treat any dismissal of a declaratory judgment
action as a "court decision" triggering exclusivity, FDA agreed with Apotex that this
dismissal triggered the first applicant's exclusivity. When the first applicant, Teva,
299
brought suit, the D.C. Circuit rejected FDA's reading of the ticlopidine decision.
The agency "mistakenly thought itself bound," the court concluded, which rendered
the decision "arbitrary and capricious." The statute might "preclude treating
voluntary dismissals .. . as triggering events," but the court took no view; it was "up
to the agency to ... make a reasonable policy choice." The response was a policy
articulated in an April 2006 letter to an ANDA applicant: "FDA interprets the court

295 FDA defines "commercial marketing" as "introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate
commerce outside the control of the manufacturer of a drug product," except for investigational use under
part 312 of this chapter. It does not include transfer of the drug product for reasons other than sale within
the control of the manufacturer or application holder. 21 C.F.R. § 314.107(c). FDA's proposed rule would

move this to section 314.3 of the regulations but not meaningfully change its substance: "Commercial
marketing is the introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce of a drug product
described in an approved ANDA, outside the control of the ANDA holder, except for investigational use
under part 312 of this chapter, but does not include transfer of the drug product for reasons other than sale

to parties identified in the approved ANDA." Proposed21 C.F.R. § 314.3(b).
296 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (1984).
297 See 2009 Exclusivity Article, supra note 4, at 352-55.

298 Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. FDA, C.A. No. 99-67(CKK), 1999 WL 1042743 (D.D.C. Aug. 19,
1999), aff'd, 254 F.3d 316 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
299 Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. FDA, 441 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

2016

FOOD AND DRUG LAW JOURNAL

381

decision trigger provision to require a decision of a court that on its face evidences a
holding on the merits of patent non-infringement, invalidity, or unenforceability."300
After the 2009 article, Apotex, which is a Canadian company, sought review by a
NAFTA tribunal. 301 Apotex argued that the agency and courts committed legal error
when failing to find that dismissal of its case against Bristol-Myers Squibb qualified
as a triggering court decision. This asserted error included: (1) adopting and applying
an interpretation of the statute that conflicts with congressional intent, the purpose of
the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, and controlling federal court precedent,
specifically the ticlopidine decision; (2) adopting and upholding an interpretation
that runs counter to FDA's own regulations implementing the statute in a "nontextual
manner" by permitting a court decision of unenforceability to qualify as a court
decision trigger; (3) construing the statute in a manner that nullifies and renders
inoperable the declaratory judgment mechanism under Hatch-Waxman; and (4)
failing to treat the dismissal in a similar manner to court decisions entered in certain
other cases.302 The tribunal dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction on June 14,
2013.303
Also since the last article, a federal district court rejected a challenge to FDA's
application of its April 2006 policy. The dispute involved a generic application
referencing Carbatrol (carbamazepine), discussed also in Section II.C.9 above. As
previously discussed, Shire listed two patents in the Orange Book: the '013 patent
and the '570 patent. Nostrum was the first to submit an ANDA containing a
paragraph IV certification to both, thereby qualifying for exclusivity. Exclusivity
under the old ANDA scheme was patent-by-patent, meaning that Nostrum had
earned two exclusivity terms. The term arising from the '013 patent is relevant here.
Shire and Nostrum settled their patent infringement litigation in March 2010, and the
settlement gave Nostrum a license to market the product beginning in October 2010.
FDA approved Nostrum's product in May 2011, at which point the company
launched the product. The agency denied Nostrum exclusivity in connection with the
'013 patent, however, reasoning that a July 2009 decision involving another generic
applicant had triggered the exclusivity relating to that patent, and that the exclusivity
had therefore already concluded.304
The triggering decision in question was a five-page "Judgment and Order of
Permanent Injunction," which mentioned only in passing an earlier grant of summary

300 Letter from Gary Buehler, Director, OGD, CDER, FDA, to Pravastatin ANDA
Applicant (Apr.

11,2006).
30 1

Apotex Inc. v. United States of America, NAFTA Arbitral Tribunal, Notice of Arbitration, (June

4, 2009).
302 This included the Granutec case, in which the Fourth Circuit-in
an unpublished opinion-

found that the statute does not require the first filer to successfully defend against a patent infringement
suit. Granutec, Inc. v. Shalala, 139 F.3d 889 (4th Cir. 1998) (unpublished). In that matter, FDA took the
position that Genpharm's exclusivity was triggered by a court decision involving another generic
applicant-a partial summary judgment grounded in the patentee's concession of non-infringement. See
Glaxo, Inc. v. BoehringerIngelheim Corp., 954 F.Supp. 469 (D.Conn. 1996), judgment entered by 962 F.
Supp. 295 (D.Conn. 1997), aff'd, No. 97-1283, 1997 WL 355339 (Fed. Cir. June 4, 1997).
303 See Apotex Inc. v. United States of America, NAFTA Arbitral Tribunal, Award on Jurisdiction
and Admissibility (June 14, 2013).
304 Letter from Webber to Apotex, supranote 269.
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judgment of noninfringement of the '013 patent. 305 The earlier grant of summary
judgment, in turn, had been grounded in estoppel after Shire adopted irreconcilably
inconsistent positions on the infringement question; the court in question had written
that "[b]ecause Shire has been judicially estopped from contesting infringement of
the '013 patent, Corepharma's motion for summary judgment is unopposed."
Accordingly, "Corepharma is entitled to judgment of noninfringement of the 013
patent as a matter of law." 306 Nostrum challenged FDA's decision that the resulting
judgment and order of permanent injunction had triggered its exclusivity. Noting that
FDA's policy requires a decision "that on its face evidences a holding on the merits,"
Nostrum argued that the ruling in question was not a ruling on the merits; it was
"more akin to a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction than a decision on the merits of
infringement." 307 The district court rejected Nostrum's request for preliminary relief
FDA, the court wrote, "has never interpreted the court decision trigger provision to
require a court to compare the claims of the asserted patents to the accused generic
product." Instead, FDA looks for "resolution of the issues of validity, infringement
and enforceability 'on the merits. "308
Recent student notes have considered the question whether an invalidity decision
in an inter partes review (IPR) proceeding, affirmed on appeal by the Federal
Circuit, would qualify as a court decision for purposes of failure-to-market
310
is an
forfeiture. 309 IPR, made possible by 2011 amendments to the Patent Act,

adversarial proceeding before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) within the
PTO. The IPR mechanism allows a third party, including a subsequent generic
applicant, to mount an invalidity challenge on specific and limited grounds."' When
considering invalidity, the PTAB applies a "preponderance of the evidence"
standard, which is lower than the "clear and convincing evidence" standard that
would apply in a district court invalidity challenge.312 The statute permits any party
313
to the proceeding to appeal the final written decision to the Federal Circuit. If a

305 Shire Labs., Inc. v. CorepharmaLLC, C.A. No. 06-CV-02266 (SRC) (MAS) (D.N.J. July 14,
2009) (Judgment and Order of Permanent Injunction).

306 Shire Labs. Inc. v. Corepharma LLC, C.A. No. 06-CV-02266 (SRC) (D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2008)
(Opinion).
307 Nostrum Pharms. LLC

v. FDA, C.A. No. 11-311, 2011 WL 2652147, at *6 (D.N.J.)

(unpublished).
308 Id. The district court denied Nostrum's request for an interim injunction pending appeal, and the
Third Circuit denied the company's request for an injunction pending appeal.
309 See, e.g., Jaimin Shah, Comment, Pulling the "Trigger" on the Hatch-Waxman Act's 180-Day
Exclusivity Using Inter PartesReview, 14 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 453 (2015) (arguing that a
final inter partes review decision should qualify as a policy matter); Brian T. Apel, Note, An
Administrative Meter Maid: Using Inter Partes Review and Post-Grant Review to Curb Exclusivity
Parking Via the "Failureto Market" Provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act, 114 MICH. L. REV. 106, 107
(2015) (concluding that inter partes review is unlikely to qualify).

310 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 126 Stat. 375 (2011).
311 35 U.S.C. § 311 (limiting the grounds to "a ground that could be raised under section 102
[novelty] or 103 [obviousness] and only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed

publications").
312 Id.

§ 316(e).

There are also significant differences between an IPR proceeding and a district
court infringement case, including with respect to permissible discovery.
313 Id. § 319. There may, however, be constitutional impediments to standing in some cases. E.g.,

Consumer Watchdog v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, 753 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding

2016

FOOD AND DRUG LAW JOURNAL

383

court of appeals ruling affirming a PTAB written decision of invalidity qualified as a
"court decision" for forfeiture purposes, the inter partes review mechanism might
become an attractive option for subsequent applicants seeking to trigger forfeiture of
the first applicant's exclusivity. It is possible that a court would conclude that this
court ruling did not qualify, because.the forfeiture provision refers to a final decision
"in an infringement action" or a "declaratory judgment action." 314
If the patentee did not appeal the written decision, an alternative might be for the
successful petitioner (the subsequent applicant) to seek a summary judgment of
invalidity in district court on the basis of the written decision cancelling the relevant
claims. This might be accomplished in any ongoing patent infringement litigation
brought against that subsequent applicant (whether or not the court stayed the
litigation pending the outcome of the IPR), or it might be accomplished through a
suit for declaratory judgment, if the district court would accept jurisdiction despite
the cancellation of the claims. The subsequent applicant would then argue to FDA
that a district court judgment of invalidity due to cancellation of the claims qualifies
as a court decision under the forfeiture provisions.
2.

Under what circumstancesmay a subsequent applicant bring a
declaratoryjudgment suit against the innovatororpatent
holder in order to trigger thefirst applicant'sexclusivity?

Short answer. The court decision trigger for exclusivity under the old ANDA
provisions was interpreted to permit a subsequent ANDA applicant to trigger the first
ANDA applicant's 180-day exclusivity by prevailing in its own court case, clearing
the way to market after expiry of the exclusivity. Where the innovator had not sued
the subsequent applicant for patent infringement on at least one of the patents for
which a paragraph IV certification was submitted, that applicant sometimes sought
the triggering court decision through a declaratory judgment suit against the
innovator. And although there is no court decision trigger under the new provisions,
there is a court decision trigger for forfeiture, which has led subsequent ANDA
applicants similarly to seek declaratory judgment to cause forfeiture of exclusivity
that is blocking them from the market.
Discussion. Prior to January 2007, courts determining whether there was
jurisdiction to hear a declaratory judgment action concerning a patent applied the
Federal Circuit's "reasonable apprehension of suit" test to determine whether a
declaratory judgment plaintiff satisfied the case or controversy requirement. This test
required that a party seeking declaratory relief establish an explicit threat or other
action by the patentee, creating a reasonable apprehension on the part of the
declaratory judgment plaintiff that it would face an infringement suit. 31 5 Applying
that petitioner, a "not-for-profit public charity" that did not allege any involvement in the relevant
research or development field and that did not claim to be an actual or prospective competitor of the
patentee, lacked sufficient "injury in fact" to establish standing in federal court under Article III of the
U.S. Constitution).
314 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I).
315 E.g., Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2007),
rehear'gdenied and rehear'gen banc denied, No. 06-1181, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 16048 (Fed. Cir. June
20, 2007). The requirement for a reasonable apprehension of suit was part of a two-prong test formulated
by the Federal Circuit to determine if an actual controversy existed in declaratory judgment actions. The
other prong required present activity which could constitute infringement or concrete steps taken with the
intent to conduct such activity. Id.
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this test, courts generally took the position that in the absence of some overt action
demonstrating a willingness on the part of the patent owner to enforce its patent, an
ANDA applicant had no reasonable apprehension of suit, and, consequently, could
not bring a declaratory judgment action.316
In the MedImmune case in January 2007, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that a
plaintiff seeking a declaratory judgment must satisfy Article III's case or controversy
requirement, and in doing so, it criticized the reasonable apprehension of suit test.
The Court directed courts to determine "whether the facts alleged, under all
circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having
adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of
a declaratory judgment." The 2009 article noted that the Federal Circuit had decided
five cases under the new standard, and that in two of the five the declaratory
judgment suit was permitted to proceed. The other three cases were dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction. On closer review, it appears the count should have been two and
two prior to the 2009 article.318 Two of the four cases discussed in the 2009 article
Caraco PharmaceuticalLaboratoriesLtd. v. ForestLaboratoriesInc. and Janssen
Pharmaceutica, N. V. v. Apotex, Inc.- have proven to be the guideposts in
subsequent cases.
Caraco v. Forest Labs involved generic applications referencing the
antidepressant drug, Lexapro@ (escitalopram oxalate). Forest Labs listed two patents
with FDA: U.S. Patent No. RE34,712 (the '712 patent) and U.S. Patent No.
6,916,941 (the '941 patent). The '712 patent expired in 2012, and the '941 patent is
listed as expiring in 2023. Ivax was the first applicant to file paragraph IV
certifications to both patents and was therefore entitled to 180-day exclusivity.
Forest Labs sued Ivax on the '712 patent, resulting in a ruling that the patent was
valid and infringed and an injunction until 2012.319 Caraco was a subsequent filer,
blocked from entering the market by Ivax's 180-day exclusivity. This exclusivity
would not be triggered until Ivax launched, unless (1) another company obtained a
judgment invalidating the '712 patent, allowing FDA to approve Ivax's ANDA and
allowing Ivax to launch, triggering Ivax's exclusivity, or (2) another company
obtained a judgment finding both patents invalid or not infringed, triggering Ivax's
exclusivity immediately.
Forest Labs sued Caraco on the '712 patent but not the '941 patent. Caraco then
sought a declaratory judgment that its generic product did not infringe the '941
patent. Forest Labs unilaterally granted Caraco a covenant not to sue for

316 See, e.g., Dr. Reddy's Labs., Ltd. v. Pfizer Inc., No. 03-cv-726, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24351, at
*14-15 (D.N.J. July 8, 2003) ("The objective actions of the patentee must rise 'to a level sufficient to
indicate an intent to enforce its patent', i.e., to initiate an infringement action.") (citation omitted)
(unpublished).
3 17

MedInmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
318 For cases finding jurisdiction, see Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 482 F.3d
1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Caraco Pharmn. Labs., Ltd. v. ForestLabs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2008),
petition for rehearg and rehear'g en banc denied, No. 2007-1404, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 15741 (Fed.
Cir. June 24, 2008), cert. denied, No. 08-624, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 1482 (Feb. 23, 2009). For cases
dismissing suits for lack of jurisdiction, see Merck & Co., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 292 F. App'x 38 (Fed. Cir.
2008); Janssen Pharmaceutica,N.V. v. Apotex, Inc., 540 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008), rehear'g denied and
rehear'g en banc denied, No. 2008-1062, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 25387 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 29, 2008), cert.
denied, No. 08-959, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 2021 (Mar. 23, 2009).
319 Forest Labs., Inc. v. Ivax Pharms. Inc., 501 F.3d 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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infringement of the '941 patent and then moved to dismiss the declaratory judgment
action on the ground that the action did not meet the "case or controversy" standard
of Article III of the U.S. Constitution. The Federal Circuit found jurisdiction, relying
on a "three-part framework" for justiciability: the plaintiff must have standing, the
issues must be ripe for review, and the case may not be moot. 320 Of most relevance

here, the court concluded that Caraco had standing. The company had alleged an
injury in fact: its exclusion from the market with an (allegedly) non-infringing good.
This injury resulted from actions taken by Forest Labs-specifically listing of the
patents, "but for" which Caraco's application could have been approved. 321 Further,
the injury was redressable by a favorable judgment, through the court decision
trigger. The covenant not to sue was irrelevant, because "regardless of a covenant not
to sue, a generic drug manufacturer cannot enter the market without FDA
approval."322 Under the circumstances, the court wrote, "even after a covenant not to
sue has been granted, the dispute as to infringement or invalidity of the relevant
Orange-Book-listed patents constitutes 'a substantial controversy, between parties
having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the
issuance of a declaratory judgment,"' within the meaning of Medlmmune. 323
The injury alleged in the Janssen case, by way of contrast, did not give rise to a
justiciable controversy, largely because the subsequent ANDA applicant had
stipulated to the validity and infringement of the patent that was delaying the first
applicant's market entry. Janssen had listed three patents in connection with
Risperdal@ (risperidone) Oral Solution. The first applicant, Teva, challenged two
patents-U.S. Patent Nos. 5,453,425 (the '425 patent) and 5,616,587 (the '587
patent)-but filed a paragraph III certification to U.S. Patent No. 4,804,663 (the '663
patent). Janssen did not sue Teva, which meant that Teva was entitled to enter the
market upon expiry of the '663 patent. Apotex, a subsequent applicant, sought a
declaratory judgment of non-infringement with respect to the '425 and '587 patents
but stipulated to the validity and its infringement of the '663 patent.
The court of appeals noted that in the Caraco case, Caraco had asserted noninfringement of both patents. If Caraco's non-infringement claim regarding the '712
patent was not adjudicated and another applicant established the patent's invalidity,
the first applicant's exclusivity would be triggered, and Caraco would be blockeddespite having an (allegedly) non-infringing product. The harm to Caraco was that
its non-infringing product was blocked by a potentially invalid patent. In that
dispute, a declaratory judgment of non-infringement would trigger the first
applicant's exclusivity and end the blockade. The key difference in Janssen, the
court reasoned, was that Apotex stipulated to validity and infringement of one of the
patents. Consequently, even if it obtained a declaratory judgment of invalidity of the
remaining two patents, it could not obtain approval until expiry of the third patentand the subsequent 180-day exclusivity term of the first applicant. Its harm was, in a
sense, precisely the delay that the Hatch-Waxman Amendments contemplated.324
320 527 F.3d at 1291.
321 Id. at 1292 ("where the first Paragraph IV ANDA filer has failed to trigger its own 180-day
exclusivity period, the NDA holder's listing of Orange-Book patents delays a subsequent Paragraph
IV ANDA filer from entering the marketplace indefinitely").

322 Id at 1296.
323 Id at 1296-97.

324 540 F.3d at 1361.
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There have been three relevant Federal Circuit rulings since the 2009 article, all
finding the subsequent ANDA applicant's case justiciable.325 The court found a
justiciable controversies in Dey Pharma v. Sunovion Pharmaceuticals despite a
covenant not to sue, 326 Apotex v. DaiichiSankyo despite statutory disclaimer of the
patent, 327 and Teva v. Eisai despite both a covenant not to sue and statutory
disclaimers.32 8 The analyses relating to covenants not to sue rely heavily on the
court's earlier ruling and analysis in the Caraco case. The statutory disclaimer
reasoning proceeds along similar lines. For instance, in Apotex v. Daiichi Sankyo,
although Daiichi formally disclaimed the patent and asked FDA to remove it from
the Orange Book, FDA declined to do so, 329 and the patent continued to support the
first applicant's exclusivity. As a result, Apotex's inability to market its product
resulted from Daiichi's actions (listing the patent) and was redressable by a favorable
court judgment through the court decision trigger. 330
3.

What level of court decision triggers 180-day exclusivity?

For old ANDAs, exclusivity begins when a decision is rendered by "the court
from which no appeal (other than a petition of the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari) has been or can be taken." 331 There is no court decision trigger for
exclusivity for new ANDAs, but a similar rule applies to the court-decision
forfeiture event. There have been no meaningful developments since the 2009
article.332
4.

Will marketing by the first generic of the pioneer'sproduct
under a private generic label satisfy the commercial marketing
trigger?

Yes. As noted in the 2009 article, FDA decided in 2001 that private label sales
could constitute commercial marketing, and this was upheld by a federal court in

325 We have not discussed district court rulings, although they are divided, with most finding
justiciability and citing Caraco, but a few declining to exercise jurisdiction and citing Janssen. See Pfizer,
Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., C.A. No. 08-cv-7231 (N.D. Ill. June 30, 2010) (Memorandum Opinion and Order)
(finding jurisdiction and relying heavily on Caraco); Glenmark Generics Ltd v. Ferring B. V., No.
3:14CV422-HEH, 2014 WL 5162097, at *4 (E.D. Va. Oct. 14, 2014) (relying on Caraco and finding
jurisdiction to hear a declaratory judgment action brought by a subsequent applicant because continued
listing of disclaimed patent caused injury by obstructing FDA approval of subsequent applicant's ANDA);
Apotex Inc. v. Eisai Inc., No. 09-cv-00477-JAB-LPA (D.N.C. Aug. 27, 2010) (Memorandum Opinion)
(dismissing the case after applying Janssen).
32

6 Dey PharmaLP. v. Sunovion Pharms. Inc., 677 F.3d 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
327 Apotex, Inc. v. DaiichiSankyo, Inc., 781 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
328 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Eisai Co., Ltd., 620 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
329

See supra subsection 0.

33 0

Apotex, 781 F.3d at 1364.

331 The courts-reversing FDA-interpreted the original 1984 language as referring to the decision

of a federal district court. Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Shalala, 81 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000). Congress
overruled this in 2003, providing that exclusivity for old ANDAs begins when a decision is rendered by
"the court from which no appeal (other than a petition of the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari) has
been or can be taken." Pub. L. No. 108-173 § 1 102(b)(3).
332 See 2009 Exclusivity Article, supra note 4, at 355-56.
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West Virginia. 333 Congress confirmed this in 2003 for new ANDAs with the addition
of the words "including the commercial marketing of the listed drug" in the sentence
334
describing the commercial marketing trigger.

E. Use ofExclusivity andEffect of Exclusivity
This subsection briefly addresses three issues as to which there have been no
meaningful developments since 2009 and one new issue that has arisen since 2009.

1.

Does an ANDA applicant's180-day exclusivity preclude the

innovatorfrom distributingan "authorizedgeneric" version of
its drug?
No. As explained in the 2007 article, FDA concluded and two courts of appeal
confirmed that the statute does not prohibit an NDA holder from marketing an
unbranded version of its product-known as an "authorized generic"-during the
180-day exclusivity period.335 Section 505(t) of the FDCA requires the agency to
publish and update quarterly a complete list on its website of all authorized generic
drugs included in the annual reports filed by NDA holders. FDA regulations that
took effect in 2010 define an "authorized generic" for this purpose and explain the
annual reporting obligation. 337

2. Do 180-day exclusivity andpediatricexclusivity run
concurrentlyor consecutively?
Section 505A(m) of the FDCA, added in 2002, clarifies that if an innovator earns
six months of pediatric exclusivity, the first generic applicant's ANDA is approved
effective the first day after conclusion of that exclusivity, and the 180 days begin to
333 Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 207 F. Supp. 2d 476 (N.D. W.Va. 2001); 2009 Exclusivity
Article, supranote 4, at 358-59.

334 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I) (a subsequent applicant's application "shall be made effective on
the date that is 180 days after the date of the first commercial marketing of the drug (including the
commercial marketing of the listed drug) by any first applicant").
335 See Letter from William K. Hubbard, Associate Commissioner for Policy and Planning, FDA, to
Stuart A. Williams, Chief Legal Officer, Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. and James N. Czaban, Heller
Ehrman White & McAuliffe LLP, Docket Nos. 2004P-0075 and 2004P-0261 (July 2, 2004) (stating that
"FDA does not regulate drug prices and has no legal basis on which to prevent an innovator company
from marketing its approved NDA product at a price that is competitive with that charged by a first
generic applicant to the market"); Teva Pharm. Indus. v. Crawford, 410 F.3d 51 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting
that the statute "clearly does not prohibit the holder of an approved NDA from marketing, during the 180day exclusivity period, its own 'brand-generic' version of its drug"); Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 454
F.3d 270 (4th Cir. 2006) (affirming that FDA lacks the power to prohibit the marketing of authorized
generics during the 180-day exclusivity period).

336 21 U.S.C. § 355(t); see FDA, FDA Listing of Authorized Generics, http://www.fda.gov/About
FDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ucmI 26391.htm.
3 74 Fed. Reg. 37163 (July 28, 2009). Section 314.3 defines an authorized generic as a listed drug
(as defined in the same section) "that has been approved under section 505(c) of the act and is marketed,
sold, or distributed directly or indirectly to retail class of trade with labeling, packaging (other than
repackaging as the listed drug in blister packs, unit doses, or similar packaging for use in institutions),
product code, labeler code, trade name, or trademark that differs from that of the listed drug." Id. at
37164.Under 21 C.F.R. § 314.81, an NDA holder's annual report must indicate every authorized generic
(and the corresponding brand name) that entered the market, or ceased being distributed, during the
reporting year. Each dosage form and strength is considered a separate authorized generic drug and should
be listed separately.
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run at that point.338 More precisely, if the two overlap, the 180-day exclusivity
period is extended by the number of days of overlap. This means, as a practical
matter, the terms are consecutive. This obviated an issue that had arisen under the old
ANDA scheme, where subsequent filers were theoretically able to trigger the first
applicant's exclusivity (with a court decision) while the first applicant was blocked
by pediatric exclusivity. 339
Although Congress eliminated the court decision trigger for exclusivity in 2003,
there is now a court decision trigger for forfeiture, raising the question whether a
subsequent filer may trigger the forfeiture clock while the first applicant is blocked
from the market by pediatric exclusivity. There have been no rulings directly on
point, but in another forfeiture situation, a federal district court declined to toll the
relevant forfeiture clock during pediatric exclusivity. 34 0 In that case, the failure-tomarket forfeiture clock was triggered by a combination of (1) the passage of 30
months since submission of the ANDA, and (2) delisting of the relevant patents from
the Orange Book. The generic applicant was legally unable to launch, due to
pediatric exclusivity on the remaining patent, and it argued that the forfeiture clock
was tolled pursuant to section 505A(m). FDA found-and the court agreed-that the
provision did not apply. Instead, it applies only where pediatric exclusivity and the
180-day exclusivity "overlap," which is impossible under the new scheme-because
exclusivity commences with commercial marketing. 34 1

3.

Does 180-day exclusivity, if triggeredby commercial
marketing at risk, continue to run if the innovator obtains a

preliminaryinjunctionprohibitingfurther commercial
marketing?
Short answer. Although neither the agency nor a court has answered this question
with respect to the new statutory langage, the 180-day exclusivity probably
continues to run.
Discussion. The issue arose once under the old ANDA scheme, in a dispute
concerning a generic application that referenced Plavix@ (clopidogrel bisulfate).
Apotex was the first to file an ANDA with a paragraph IV certification and was
therefore eligible for 180-day exclusivity. The NDA holder, Sanofi-Synthelabo,
brought suit, and once the 30-month stay expired, FDA approved the ANDA.
Although the patent infringement litigation was ongoing, Apotex launched at risk in
August 2006, triggering its exclusivity. Several weeks later a district court
preliminarily enjoined the company from further marketing pending a final decision
on the merits of the patent infringement case.342 Eventually the district court entered
343
a permanent injunction,
and the Federal Circuit affirmed validity of the patent at

338 Pub. L. No. 107-109 (2002); see 21 U.S.C. § 355a(m).
339 See FDA Request for Comments, 66 Fed. Reg. 27983 (May 21, 2001) (requesting comment on
whether the two are concurrent or consecutive); see 2009 Exclusivity Article, supra note 4, at 361-62.

340 Hi-Tech PharmacalCo., Inc. v. FDA, 587 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C.
2008).
341 Id. at 21-22.
342 Sanofi-synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 317, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2006),
af'd, 470 F.3d
1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
343 Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 353, 356, 397 (S.D.N.Y.
2007).
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issue.344 In January 2008 FDA granted final approval to a subsequent generic
applicant who had included a paragraph IV certification to the patent in question.
Apotex petitioned the agency, asking it to stay the effective date of the approved
ANDA and any other pending ANDAs with paragraph IV certifications. It argued
that FDA could toll its exclusivity during the injunction, because the statute provided
that a subsequent applicant's ANDA should be made effective "not earlier than one
hundred eighty days after" the first applicant's commercial marketing. The agency
could, therefore, delay approval of the subsequent filers, in order to give Apotex the
benefit of its exclusivity after the injunction expired. Although Apotex subsequently
brought suit against the agency, its petitions for panel and en banc rehearing in the
patent infringement litigation were denied. Once it lost the patent challenge, it lost
eligibility for 180-day exclusivity. The lawsuit against FDA was, consequently,
dismissed.34 5
Whatever the merits of Apotex's argument regarding old ANDAs, its statutory
argument appears inapplicable to new ANDAs. The new statutory language provides
that a subsequent application "shall be made effective on the date that is 180 days
after the date of the first commercial marketing" of the first generic product. Thus it
seems that once triggered, exclusivity runs, even if the holder of the exclusivity is
enjoined from marketing its product.

4.

Could a subsequent ANDA applicantsubmit a section viii
statement to a patent with both method-of-use andproduct
claims, as to which the first applicanthas submitted a split
certification, and thereby cut ahead of other applicants who
must waitfor expiry of the first applicant's 180-day

exclusivity?
Short Answer. No. A subsequent ANDA applicant cannot avoid 180-day
exclusivity by filing a section viii statement to a patent as to which the first applicant
had submitted a split certification.
Discussion. As discussed earlier, an ANDA applicant must file a patent
certification with respect to every patent that claims the listed drug or claims a use
for the listed drug for which the applicant is seeking approval.34 6 It may, however,
file a section viii statement with respect to a method-of-use patent that does not
347
Where a patent contains both drug
claim a use for which it is seeking approval.
product claims and method-of-use claims, FDA's longstanding practice is to permit
a "split certification" to the patent. That is, the applicant may submit a paragraph IV
certification to the drug product claim and method of use for which the applicant
seeks approval and a section viii statement for a method of use the applicant seeks to

344 Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F.3d 1075 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
345 Apotex Inc. v. Johnson, No. 08-cv-00693 (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2009) (Notice of Voluntary
Dismissal Without Prejudice). In 2012, FDA denied the underlying citizen petition. Letter from Janet

Woodcock, M.D., Director, CDER, FDA, to Bert W. Rein, Esq., et al., Wiley Rein LLP and Robert B.
Breisblatt, Esq., Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, Docket No. FDA-2008-P-01 17 (May 17, 2012).
346 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV); 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12)(i)(A)(4).
347 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii); 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12)(iii).
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carve out from its labeling.3 48 FDA recently confirmed that an applicant must address
all claims in the patent one way or the other and that a section viii statement is
permitted only with respect to method-of-use claims.
The matter involved Actos (pioglitazone) tablets, discussed in subsection II.B.6.
Three patents were at issue: the '777, the '584, and the '404. The '777 patent was
slated to expire in January 2011. FDA listed the latter two with "use" codes, and
because the listings predate August 2003, the Orange Book does not otherwise
characterize the claims of the patent. 349 Sandoz, who was not a first applicant, filed a
citizen petition when it appeared that two generic applicants were attempting to "cut
to the front of the line" by filing section viii statements.350 Specifically, Sandoz filed
an ANDA with a paragraph III certification to the '777 patent and "split"
certifications to the '584 and '404 patents--consisting of a section viii statement to
the method-of-use claims and paragraph IV certifications to the drug product
claims. Sandoz noted that three other companies---Mylan, Ranbaxy, and Watsonappeared to have submitted acceptable ANDAs with paragraph IV certifications
earlier and were eligible to share 180-day exclusivity rights. Sandoz presumably
would be next in the queue, approved after the exclusivity expired.
According to Sandoz, Alphapharm and Teva had submitted only section viii
statements. In other words, they submitted paragraph III certifications to the '777
patent and section viii statements regarding the entire '584 and '404 patents. Because
180-day exclusivity precludes approval only of subsequent ANDAs with paragraph
IV certifications,this approach meant these applications would not be affected by the
180-day exclusivity rights of the first applicants. In other words, Alphapharm and
Teva would be able to receive final approval and launch in the first wave, January
2011, when the '777 patent expired. In its petition to FDA, Sandoz argued that
Alphapharm and Teva sought to "cut to the front of the line," to the detriment of
Sandoz and the remaining generic applicants who submitted paragraph IV
certifications as well as section viii statements to the '584 and '505 patents. The
NDA-holder, Takeda, filed comments confirming that the patents contained both
drug product and method-of-use claims (and that its original patent submissions had
said so).35 1 FDA granted the petition in March 2010, noting that an ANDA applicant
"must address all claims for which the patent was submitted."352
FDA's response in the Actos matter cited its consolidated response to two earlier
citizen petitions involving Caraco's application referencing Prandin. That matter did
not relate to use of section viii to circumvent exclusivity, but it did relate in part to
split certifications. Among other things, FDA's decision on Prandin explained the

348 See, e.g., Letter from Janet Woodcock, Director, CDER, FDA, to Stephen
R. Auten, VicePresident, Legal-Intellectual Property, Sandoz, Inc., Docket No. FDA-2009-P-0411 (Mar. 15, 2010)
[hereinafter Woodock Letter to Sandoz].
349 When FDA revised its patent listing regulations in the summer of 2003, it also increased the

technological capabilities of the Orange Book database. For patents submitted after August 18, 2003, the
Orange Book displays the multiple types of claims (drug product, drug substance, and/or method of use)

for which the patent had been submitted. The agency did not revisit listings for patents submitted before
that time. Id. at 2.

350 Sandoz Inc., Citizen Petition, Docket No. FDA-2009-P-0411 (Aug. 25, 2009).
351 See Woodcock Letter to Sandoz, supra note 348. FDA confirmed that
Takeda's original. patent

declarations included both types of claims.
352 FDA Response, Citizen Petition FDA-2009-P-0411 (Mar. 15,
2010).
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agency's practice of allowing split certifications, agreed that a section viii statement
is inappropriate for drug substance and product claims, and concluded that an ANDA
applicant submitting a section viii statement for a method-of-use claim must also
submit a paragraph IV certification for any other claims in the patent that are not
FDA's February 2015 proposed regulations take the same
method-of-use claims.
approach, requiring an ANDA applicant to submit a paragraph IV certification (in
addition to any section viii statements) to a patent that contains both drug substance
354
The agency also noted that the first
or product claims and method-of-use claims.
to do so would be eligible for 180-day exclusivity, if the other relevant requirements
were met.35 5

III. CONCLUSION
Section II of this article discusses twenty-eight discrete interpretive issues relating
to the 180-day exclusivity scheme, arranged in five categories: which rules apply,
earning exclusivity, forfeiture of exclusivity, commencing the exclusivity term, and
enjoyment (use) of the exclusivity term. Over the years, however, stakeholders,
courts, and policymakers have identified and grappled with a variety of broader
policy issues relating to the 180-day exclusivity scheme. This section discusses one
broad policy issue-the impact of the scheme on subsequent generic applicationsand some of the scholarship, antitrust litigation, and legislative proposals that relate,
directly or indirectly, to these applications.

A.

Subsequent Applicants

Since at least the mid 1990s, FDA, the courts, and policymakers have struggled to
find the right balance between the benefit that they perceive results from
encouraging first applicants via the 180-day exclusivity period, on the one hand, and
the harm that they perceive results from delay of subsequent applications that also
contain paragraph IV certifications to patents for the same reference listed drug due
to that exclusivity period, on the other hand. For instance, the agency pointed to the
delay in approval of subsequent applications when justifying its original proposal
356
that a first applicant would be entitled to exclusivity only if it had been sued. The
court in Inwood Laboratories v. Young, rejecting this approach, agreed that the
statute as drafted might "have the effect of delaying the entry into the market of
subsequent generic drugs," and suggested the problem "warrants consideration by
35 8
Notwithstanding the
Congress." 357 Another court made the same comment.

353 Letter from Janet Woodcock, M.D., Director, CDER, to Rosemarie R. Wilk-Orescan, Senior
Counsel, Novo Nordisk Inc. and James F. Hurst, Winston & Strawn LLP, Docket Nos. FDA-2008-P0343 and FDA-2008-P-041 1 (Dec. 8, 2008).
354 Proposed21 C.F.R. §§ 314.53(c)(2)(i)(0)(3), (ii)(P)(4).
355 80 Fed. Reg. at 6819.
356 See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Young, 723 F. Supp. 1523, 1527 ("FDA states that acceptance of the
statute as written will lead to the 'absurd' result that in some cases the delay of approval of subsequent

ANDAs will never end.").
35 Id.
358

358 Granutec, Inc. v. Shalala, 139 F.3d 889, *9 n.3 (4th Cir. 1998) (unpublished) ("As long as the
pioneer prevents its captured generic from going to market and at the same time does not file an
infringement suit against any generic manufacturer (captured or non-captured), the captured generic's
exclusivity period would never begin to run, and no generic could begin to sell pursuant to a Paragraph IV
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Inwood decision, FDA finalized its proposal limiting a first applicant's entitlement to
exclusivity and in fact turned it into a "successful defense" requirement-which it
implemented by approving subsequent applications that were ready, unless and until
the first applicant perfected its exclusivity with a successful defense. In these
circumstance, the subsequent applications would remain approved. Thus, for
instance, FDA approved Mylan's ANDA referencing Micronase@ (micronized
glyburide) even though Mova had been the first to file an ANDA with a paragraph
IV certification.3 59 The agency defended its approach in court by pointing out that,
without a successful defense requirement, the first applicant "could in theory wait
indefinitely to begin selling its product and thereby block all sales by later
applicants." 360

Although the D.C. Circuit rejected the successful defense requirement as
inconsistent with the statute, it devoted considerable attention to the concern
articulated by FDA. According to the court, for instance, Mylan's briefs offered "a
compelling argument" for the successful defense requirement: the possibility that the
first applicant might have an infringing product while the subsequent applicant has a
non-infringing product. In this case, Mylan had argued, the subsequent applicant
might not be sued while the first applicant's litigation might continue or even
settle. 36' Teva suggested that this subsequent applicant could trigger the first
applicant's exclusivity with a declaratory judgment action, and the court raised the
question whether such a subsequent applicant could establish a case or controversy
sufficient for federal court jurisdiction.362 Even if the subsequent applicant could
establish jurisdiction, the court noted that the first applicant would still receive its
exclusivity. "It seems odd," the court wrote, "to reward the first applicant if some
later applicant was the party that actually prevailed in the patent-infringement
case." 363
After invalidation of the successful defense requirement, FDA issued guidance
stating that it expected first applicants to launch promptly upon ANDA approval.364

certification. The 'successful defense' requirement would solve this problem, were it valid. But this
problem, like many others, arises from the manner in which Congress drafted the exclusivity mechanism,
and, as such, the remedy lies with Congress.").
359 This decision led to Mova v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1998), and invalidation of the
successful defense requirement.
360

Id. at 1067.

Id. at 1072 ("What if the first applicant does a poor job of designing its product to
avoid
infringing the patent-holder's patent, and the second applicant does a much better job? The first applicant
would then be sued for infringement by the patent-holder, but the second applicant would not.. . . In such
a situation, a literal reading of the statute admittedly produces a strange result. The second applicant, even
though it has designed its product well and avoided suit, is barred from selling its product until the first
applicant's lawsuit finishes (maybe years later).").
362 See id. at 1073 ("To employ Teva's declaratory-judgment device, a party would
therefore need to
demonstrate a 'reasonable apprehension of facing a lawsuit.' . . . An ANDA applicant seeking to bring a
declaratory judgment action might have difficult in meeting this test, especially if the patent-holder
disclaims any intention of bringing suit.")
363 Id. at 1073.
364 FDA, Guidance for Industry, 180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity Under the Hatch-Waxman
361

Amendments to the FederalFood, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (June 1998) at 5 (indicating that first applicant
approval letters will state, "The Agency expects that you will begin commercial marketing of your product
promptly upon approval").
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The following year, the agency proposed regulations that would have compelled this
launch through a kind of regulatory forfeiture. Under the proposed regulations, once
a subsequent applicant received tentative approval for its generic drug-such that the
first applicant's expected exclusivity was the only impediment to its own final
approval-and assuming the 30-month stay of approval of the first applicant's
ANDA had ended, a forfeiture period would begin to run: the first applicant's
exclusivity period would need to start within 180 days. Put another way, within 180
days the first applicant would need to either obtain a favorable court decision
regarding the patent it had challenged, or start marketing. If neither happened within
180 days, the first applicant would lose its exclusivity. The first applicant could,
however, transfer its exclusivity to another company. Thus, a subsequent applicant
with tentative approval would benefit from both a forfeiture clock and-possiblyexclusivity itself. The agency specifically noted that transfer might be useful if the
subsequent applicant prevailed in its litigation. Although FDA abandoned this
proposal, the failure-to-market forfeiture provision in the 2003 statute is somewhat
similar at a conceptual level.
The day after President Bush signed the MMA, Senator Hatch expressed concerns
about the incentives for subsequent applicants under the new scheme. He argued that
it was "unfair and ill-advised" to deny exclusivity to a subsequent applicant that
prevails on a patent invalidity challenge. 365 He also argued that, at the very least, a
court decision of invalidity or non-infringement involving a subsequent applicant
should lead to immediateforfeiture-ratherthan simply triggering a 75-day window
366
Indeed, he stated that conferee
for the first filer to launch and enjoy exclusivity.

staff had thought the provision as drafted, and signed into law, would have precisely
that effect-that a subsequent filer's successful invalidity challenge would lead to
immediate forfeiture of the first filer's exclusivity.367 With a closer read, he realized
that "the successful subsequent challenger not only does not get the 180-day benefit,
368
He thus
but actually receives a 180-day penalty for invalidating the patent."
369
concluded that "the law should be changed" on this point.
In the summer of 2003, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) prepared, at
Senator Hatch's request, an analysis of the changes to the Hatch-Waxman
370
Amendments that ultimately appeared in the enacted legislation. In CBO's view,
the "failure to market" provisions did not "fully address" every situation in which
180-day exclusivity could be "parked." The forfeiture clock requires two triggering
events. The first relates to the passage of time since ANDA submission or approval.
The second relates to the patents that qualified the first applicant for exclusivity. At
least one of the following must occur with respect to each patent: (1) a final court
decision that the patent is invalid or not infringed, (2) a settlement order or consent
365 149 Cong. Rec. 32267 (2003).
366 Id. He pointed out that although the successful challenger "does not get the 180-day head start, at
least under this reading, the subsequent successful challenger is not penalized with respect to market
entry." Id
367 Id.
368 Id
369 Id.
370 Congressional Budget Office, Analysis of Changes to the Hatch-Waxman Act As containedin S.
1, the PrescriptionDrug and Medicare ModernizationImprovement Act of 2003, as Passed by the Senate
on June 27, 2003 (Aug. 27, 2003).
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decree finding that the patent is invalid or not infringed, or (3) withdrawal of the
patent from the Orange Book by the NDA holder. Thus, if the relevant court decision
or settlement omits a finding of invalidity or non-infringement, the forfeiture clock
will not start-no matter how much earlier the ANDA was submitted and approved.
FDA noted this in its 2008 decision in the generic granisetron hydrochloride
controversy, 37 1 writing that "[i]nherent in the structure of the 'failure to market'
forfeiture provisions is the possibility that a first applicant would be able to enter into
a settlement agreement with the NDA holder or patent owner in which a court does
not enter a final judgment of invalidity or non-infringement ... and that subsequent
applicants would be unable to initiate a forfeiture with a declaratory judgment
action." 37 2 The agency further stated that "[t]his inability to force a forfeiture of 180day exclusivity could result in delays in the approval of otherwise approvable
ANDAs owned by applicants that would market their generic drugs if they could but
obtain approval."37 3
Subsequent ANDA filers have argued that if they are willing to litigate to a
successful conclusion, they should be permitted to market despite the first
applicant's settlement. 374 They can, of course, achieve a court decision on their own,
but this simply triggers a forfeiture clock-precisely the result that concerned
Senator Hatch in 2003. Moreover, the court decision must be one that is neither
appealed nor subject to further appeal, thus requiring a significant investment of time
and resources. Senator Hatch criticized the adoption of an appellate court trigger for
the forfeiture clock, as well, suggesting that lower court rulings for generic
applicants are "almost always" affirmed on appeal.375 And while patent settlements
with first applicants sometimes contain acceleration clauses so that the first applicant
may launch if a subsequent challenger prevails in litigation, provided the first
applicant launches within 75 days, the subsequent applicant is still subject to the first
applicant's 180-day exclusivity. In other words, a second applicant could invest in
and prevail in lengthy litigation through the appellate level and then still be forced to
wait 254 days for product launch (74 days plus 180 days of exclusivity), after which
it is no better situated than other subsequent entrants who did not invest in the court
decision.
Senator Hatch commented on December 9, 2003 that it would be "exceedingly
difficult to reopen [the] provisions[,]" but nevertheless urged the Senate to consider
changes and offered a "discussion draft" for consideration.376 There has been some
academic interest in the issue since the 2009 article. For instance, in 2011 Professors
Hemphill and Lemley proposed a variation of the agency's original successful
defense requirement. 377 Under their "earned exclusivity" proposal, which they argue
371 Buehler Letter to Teva Parenteral Medicines, supra note
142. See supra section 0.

372 Id
373 Id.
374 E.g., Apotex, Patent Settlements Between Brand and Generic Pharmaceutical Companies: Parked

Exclusivity & Lack of Incentive for Subsequent Generic Filers to Fight On Are the Problems, Not
"Reverse Payments," on file with author.

375 Id.
376 149 Cong. Rec. 32292 (2003).
377 C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug Incentives and the
Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 947 (2011); see id. at 968 ("Our inspiration is the successful

defense regime initially maintained by the FDA.").
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could be accomplished without statutory amendment, the first applicant should
receive 180-day exclusivity only if it: (1) "successfully defeats" the patent owner,
for instance by proving invalidity or non-infringement, (2) "obtains a settlement that
permits entry without delay," or (3) "can enter the market without delay because the
378
patent holder does not sue for infringement."
B. Patent Settlements
There has also been continuing academic discussion of, and Congressional interest
in, the relationship between 180-day exclusivity and patent settlement agreements
more generally, as well as broader interest in the competitive impact of those
settlements.37 9 Several antitrust challenges to settlement agreements were winding
through the courts at the time this article was written. If the FTC or any court finds
an agreement to violate the antitrust laws, the result may be forfeiture of exclusivity
under section 505(j)(5)(D)(i)(V).
As was noted in the 2009 article, one criticism relates to settlements in which the
innovator provided something of value to the generic applicant. The 2009 article
discussed a number of court decisions upholding those agreements, legislation
introduced in the 109th and 110th Congresses to address this scenario, and two thenpending FTC complaints, including a lawsuit in the United States District Court for
the Central District of California, challenging agreements by Watson
Pharmaceuticals, Par Pharmaceuticals Companies, and Paddock Laboratories "to
delay until 2015 the sale of low-cost generic versions of AndroGel, a widely
prescribed branded testosterone replacement drugs, in exchange for substantial
payments from Solvay."380 The 2009 article also noted that the FTC had signaled that
it was trying to create a split in the circuit courts and increase chances of review of
381
the issue by the Supreme Court.
The Androgel complaint did, indeed, lead to a circuit split and review of the issue
by the Supreme Court. In FTC v. Actavis, the Court ruled that an agreement in which
the innovator paid cash, and generic applicants agreed not to enter the market for a
portion of the remaining patent term, was neither lawful under the "scope of the

378 Id. at 949.

&

379 For articles addressing 180-day exclusivity from an antitrust perspective, see Kent Bernard,
Hatch-Waxman Patent Case Settlements-The Supreme Court Churns the Swamp, 15 MINN. J.L. Sc.
TECH. 123, 133 (2014) (recommending that the first applicant be required to pursue litigation case to
conclusion or settle in a way that does not block later filers); C. Scott Hemphill, Collusive and Exclusive
Settlements of Intellectual Property Litigation, 2010 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 685 (2010) (arguing, prior to
Actavis, that first applicants should forfeit exclusivity upon settling); C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for
Delay: PharmaceuticalPatent Settlements as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553
(2006) (arguing that the 180-day exclusivity "bounty" makes "allocatively harmful settlements" feasible
and also that its use in this manner is likely inconsistent with the innovation policy of the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments); Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlement of
Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1752 (2003) (arguing that three features of the
Hatch-Waxman scheme-patent listing, the 30-month stay, and 180-day exclusivity-present
"opportunities for either unilateral anticompetitive behavior on the part of the pioneer or pioneer/generic
collusion in the form off anticompetitive settlements"). For a discussion of legislative proposals
concerning reverse payment settlements, see infra section 0.
380 FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., No. 09-cv-598, at 2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2009) (Complaint).
381 See Senators, FTC Seek to Ban "Reverse Payments" Between Brands, Generics, FDA WEEK

(Feb. 6, 2009).

396

FOOD AND DRUG LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 71

patent" test nor presumptively unlawful under the Sherman Act. 382 Instead, the Court
ruled, the FTC must prove its case under antitrust law's traditional rule of reason.
The Actavis decision was not a ruling on the antitrust question itself in the
Androgel matter, which is still pending. Whether a particular reverse paymentincluding the one at issue in that case-actually brings about anticompetitive effects
necessarily depends on a variety of factors, which must be assessed case by case.
The lower courts are now evaluating various challenged settlement agreements under
antitrust law's rule of reason. There have also been disputes over whether Actavis
applies (requiring a "rule of reason" scrutiny) or another approach (such as the
"scope of the patent" test) might apply, where patent settlement agreements do not
include cash payments. The First and Third Circuits have concluded that the rule of
reason applies.384 The First Circuit will hear another reverse payment case in 2016,
but the issue will not be which standard applies to agreements that lack cash
payments. 385

C. Authorized Generics
As explained above, FDA and the courts have concluded that the FDCA does not
preclude the holder of an approved NDA from marketing, or permitting the
marketing of, an authorized generic during the exclusivity period or at any other
time. 86 Some argue that the introduction of authorized generics is pro-competitive
because it creates price competition during the 180-day period, lowering the prices
of the (branded) reference product and the first applicant's generic product. Others
argue that authorized generics draw revenue away from the first applicant,
undermining the goal of the 180-day exclusivity incentive. If this reduces incentives
to challenge patents, they argue, generic competition may be delayed and prices for
consumers will be correspondingly higher.
Since the 2009 article, the FTC has issued an interim and final report on the
"short-term effects and long-term impact" of authorized generic drugs. 387 The report

concludes that authorized generics have a "substantial effect" on generic revenues
382 FTC v. Actavis, 133 S.Ct. 2223 (2013). The "scope of the patent test" would
shield an agreement
from antitrust scrutiny unless (1) the patent was fraudulently obtained; (2) the patent litigation was
objectively baseless; or (3) the agreement unreasonably restrains competition beyond the subject matter or
temporal scope of the patent. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust, 466 F.3d 187 (2nd Cir. 2006); FTC v.

Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F. 3d 1298 (1Ith Cir. 2012); Valley Drug v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F. 3d
1294 (11th Cir. 2003); In re CiprofloxacinHydrochlorideAntitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
383 Id at 2237 ("[The likelihood of a reverse payment bringing
about anticompetitive effects
depends upon its size, its scale in relation to the payor's anticipated future litigation costs, its
independence from other services for which it might represent payment, and the lack of any other
convincing justification. The existence and degree of any anticompetitive consequence may also vary as
among industries. These complexities lead us to conclude that the FTC must prove its case as in other
rule-of-reason cases.").

384 E.g., King Drug Co. ofFlorence, Inc. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388
(3d Cir. 2015)
(holding in a case involving generic applications referencing Lamictal@ that the rule of reason applies

even without a cash payment); In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., Nos. 14-CV-2071, 15-1250, 2016 WL
698077 (1st Cir. 2016) (holding in a case involving generic applications referencing Loestrin 24 Fe@ that
the rule of reason applies in the event of a "non-monetary reverse payment").
385 See In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 309 F.R.D. 107, 145

(D. Mass. 2015).
386 See supra section
0.
387 FTC, Authorized Generics: An Interim Report (June 2009); FTC, Authorized
Generic Drugs:
Short-Term Effects andLong-Term Impact (Aug. 2011).
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during the 180-day exclusivity period (reducing it as much as 52 percent) and that
the impact persists after exclusivity expires. The report concludes that this would be
more likely to affect the incentive to challenge patents on products with smaller
sales. That said, the FTC found "no evidence that any firm has substantially
abandoned its basic patent-challenge business strategy because of the proliferation
of authorized generics."" Indeed, it appears that companies "typically expect
authorized generic competition during the 180-day exclusivity period and often
build that assumption into their forecasts." 389 Further, despite the presence of
authorized generics, companies have continued to challenge patents, "even on
brand-name drugs with small markets."390
Although the FTC found little evidence that authorized generics affect the number
of patent challenges, it observed that many patent litigation settlements include a
provision whereby the reference product sponsor agrees not to market an authorized
generic during the 180-day exclusivity period. The FTC takes the view that
"agreements not to compete with an authorized generic have become a way for
brand-name companies to compensate generic competitors for delaying entry," and
391
it alleges that this-like reverse payment settlements-causes harm to consumers.
The 2009 article noted the repeated introduction of legislation to prohibit the
marketing of authorized generics during the 180-day exclusivity term as well as
other legislative proposals relating to the practice.392 Those have somewhat tapered
off in recent years.393

D. Legislative Proposals
Prior to the Actavis decision, various members of Congress introduced bills
addressing reverse payment settlements, in some instances declaring certain kinds of
settlements per se antitrust violations. 3 94 As a general rule, these bills did not propose

388 FTC, Authorized Generic Drugs Short-Term Effects and Long-Term Impact, supra note 387, at
Iv.

389 Id. at v.
390 Id.
391 Id. at vi. See id at vi-vii ("Moreover, as a consequence of an authorized generic's significant
negative impact on a generic's revenues, some brand-name companies have used agreements not to
launch an authorized generic as a way to compensate an independent generic in exchange for the generic's
agreement to delay its entry. The frequency of this practice and its profitability may make it an attractive
way to structure a pay-for-delay settlement, a practice that causes substantial consumer harm.").
392 64 FOOD & DRUG L. J., supra note 4, at 386.

393 No relevant legislation has been introduced in the 114th Congress, nor was relevant legislation
introduced in the 113th Congress. House and Senate bills pertaining to the marketing of authorized
generics during the 180-day exclusivity term died in committee in both the 112th and 111th Congresses.
See To Amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to Prohibit the Marketing of Authorized
Generic Drugs, H.R. 741, 112th Cong. (2011); Fair Prescription Drug Competition Act, S. 373, 112th
Cong. (2011); To Amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to Prohibit the Marketing of
Authorized Generic Drugs, H.R. 573, 111th Cong. (2009); Fair Prescription Drug Competition Act, S.
501, 111th Cong. (2009). In a January 2012 Congressional Research Service report, Professor Thomas
suggested that as an alternative to banning authorized generics, Congress could require innovators to file a
supplemental NDA or similar application to market an authorized generic and subject that application to
the first filer's 180-day exclusivity. CRS, Authorized Generic Pharmaceuticals: Effects on Innovation
(Jan. 27, 2012).
394 E.g., S. 369 (111th Cong.); H.R. 1706 (111th Cong.); S. 3677 (111th Cong.); S. 27 (112th
Cong.); H.R. 3995 (112th Cong.); H.R. 3709 (113th Cong.); S. 214 (113th Cong.).
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meaningful changes to the 180-day exclusivity provisions, apart from adding a
forfeiture provision tied to certain reverse payment settlements. For instance, H.R.
1706 in the 111th Congress would have prohibited certain settlements and required
forfeiture in the event of an order that an agreement violated the prohibition. At least
three bills in the current 114th Congress address patent settlements, but none takes
up the connection with 180-day exclusivity."' S. 2019, for instance, entitled the
"Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act," creates a new section 27 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) that presumes a drug patent settlement is
anticompetitive if: (1) the ANDA filer "receives anything of value, including an
exclusive license" and (2) the ANDA filer "agrees to limit or forego research,
development, manufacturing, marketing, or sales" of the ANDA product "for any
period of time." This presumption can be rebutted with "clear and convincing
evidence" that (1) the value in question is "compensation" for "other goods or
services" the ANDA filer promised to provide, or (2) the procompetitive benefits of
the agreement outweigh the anticompetitive effects of the agreement."' H.R. 3513
and S. 2023-companion bills entitled the "Prescription Drug Affordability Act of
2015"-would also enact a new section 27 of the FTC Act, with a similar
presumption. This version of section 27 would not address rebuttal of the
presumption, but would add that it does not prohibit settlements in which the NDA
holder provides: (1) the right to market the ANDA product prior to patent or data
exclusivity expiry, (2) a payment for reasonable litigation expenses not exceeding
$7.5 million, and/or (3) a covenant not to sue on any patent infringement claim.

397

As

noted, none of these bills addresses 180-day exclusivity.
Other legislative proposals have more directly addressed the 180-day exclusivity
provisions as they relate to subsequent applicants. In the 111th Congress, for
instance, Senator Nelson and Representative Hastings introduced the "Drug Price
Competition Act of 2009" in the Senate and House, respectively.398 Broadly
speaking, this short bill seems to have been intended to allow subsequent applicants
to share in the first applicant's exclusivity if they were not sued or if they obtained a
court decision (or settlement agreement) of invalidity or non-infringement. In the
112th, 113th, and the current 114th Congress, a significantly more complex
proposal-known as the "Fair Generics Act"-has been offered. 399 The bill has not
changed since its initial introduction by Senators Bingaman, Vitter, Brown, and
Merkley in November 2011.
The Fair Generics Act would permit a successful subsequent applicant to launch
30 days after the first applicant and thereby enjoy the balance of the 180-day
exclusivity term. A subsequent applicant would be considered a "first applicant" if
certain conditions were met. First, it must submit and lawfully maintain a paragraph
IV certification (or section viii statement) for each unexpired patent as to which the
395 S. 2019 (114th Cong.); S. 2023 (114th Cong.); H.R. 3513 (114th Cong.).
396 S. 2019 (114th Cong.). In determining whether this showing has been made, the
fact finder may
not presume that entry "would not have occurred until the expiration of the relevant patent or statutory
exclusivity," nor may it presume that the agreement's provision for generic drug entry prior to that date
"means that the agreement is procompetitive." Id.
S. 2023 (114th Cong.); H.R. 3513 (114th Cong.).
398 Drug Price Competition Act of 2009, S. 1315 and H.R. 3777 (111th
Cong.).
399 Fair And Immediate Release of Generic Drugs Act, S. 1882 (112th Cong.), S. 504 (113th Cong.),
S. 131 (114th Cong.).
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(first) first applicant submitted a paragraph IV qualifying it for exclusivity. Second,
for each such patent--(1) it must not be sued within the 45-day period after its
paragraph IV notice was received,4 00 (2) the suit must be withdrawn or dismissed
without a decision that the patent was valid and infringed, or (3) a court must decide
that the patent is invalid or not infringed.401 The (first) first applicant's exclusivity
would begin, as it does under current law, with commercial marketing. But the Fair
Generics Act would permit the subsequent applicant (now also labeled a "first
applicant") to begin marketing 30 days later. The bill would not amend the forfeiture
provisions, which suggests that a subsequent applicant could trigger the forfeiture
clock by obtaining a court decision of invalidity or non-infringement with respect to
each patent qualifying the (first) first applicant for exclusivity. A subsequent
applicant could obtain this court decision through a declaratory judgment action,
assuming it could satisfy the requirements for federal court jurisdiction. Or it could
obtain this court decision in litigation brought by the NDA holder or patent owner. It
appears that if the (first) first applicant launched at this point, the subsequent
applicant could launch 30 days later and enjoy 150 days of exclusivity. The Fair
Generics Act would therefore reward a "successful" subsequent applicant with 150
days of exclusivity.
Under the Fair Generics Act, either type of first applicant would lose its "first
applicant" status-and thus its eligibility for exclusivity-if it entered into a
"disqualifying agreement" with the NDA holder or patent owner. This would be any
agreement whereby the applicant agreed "directly or indirectly" not to seek approval
of its application or not to begin commercial marketing until after expiration of the
180-day exclusivity period awarded to another ANDA applicant. The bill also
neutralizes acceleration clauses by holding a first applicant to the latest date-for
seeking approval of its application or beginning the commercial marketing of its
drug-set forth in its agreement. The latest date in the agreement for seeking
approval or beginning marketing would also be the date used to determine whether
the agreement is a disqualifying agreement. It remains to be seen whether this bill
will move in the current Congress and whether any sponsors will introduce it in the
115th Congress.
E.

Other Contexts

The 2009 article noted that the FTC had convened a roundtable on biosimilars and
had asked participants to consider whether a patent-challenge based incentive was
warranted and whether some other type of incentive was warranted. It noted that
views were mixed and that none of the bills introduced to date had included such a

400 Another provision of the bill, amending section 271(e) of the Patent Act, is-according to the
sponsors-intended to require "pioneer companies to make a litigation decision within the 45 day window
provided for in the Hatch-Waxman Act." Bingaman-Vitter-Brown-Merkley Fair and Immediate Release
of Generic Drugs Act of 2011, originallyposted at http://bingaman.senate.gov/policy/FAIRGenerics.pdf,
now available through web.archive.org. It would amend section 27 1(e) of the Patent Act, by adding a new
paragraph (7). This provision would state that the "exclusive remedy under this section" for infringement
of a patent listed by FDA in the Orange Book "shall be an action brought under this subsection within the
45-day period" described in section 505 the FDCA-that is, the 45 day period after notice of a paragraph
IV certification has been received.
401 This would include any substantive determination that there is no cause of action for patent
infringement or invalidity, including a settlement order or consent decree signed and entered by the court
stating that the patent is invalid or not infringed.
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provision. Two bills had a similarly structured provision designed to encourage
something else-the submission of data and information demonstrating that a
proposed biological product was "interchangeable" instead of merely "biosimilar."4 02
A version of this language found its way into the Biologics Price Competition and
Innovation Act of 2009 (BPCIA).
Under the BPCIA, the first biological product found interchangeable with a
particular reference product for any condition of use receives a period of exclusivity
during which no other biological product may be deemed interchangeable to that
reference product for any condition of use.4 03 This exclusivity lasts no more than one
year, and the statute includes termination dates that operate as de facto forfeiture
provisions if the sponsor does not launch in a timely fashion. In brief, if the reference
product sponsor brings suit under the immediate patent litigation provisions, the
exclusivity will end 18 months after a court decision (or dismissal) or 42 months
after approval if the case is still pending, whichever is earlier. If the innovator does
not bring suit under the immediate litigation provisions, exclusivity will end 18
months after the interchangeable biologic was licensed. It remains to be seen whether
interchangeability determinations are valued by biosimilar sponsors; if they are, it is
not unreasonable to expect that this language will trigger as many interpretive
disputes and as much litigation as the 180-day exclusivity provisions of the HatchWaxman Amendments.

402 A biosimilar application must demonstrate that the candidate product
is highly similar to its
reference product and that there are no clinically meaningful differences between the two products. 42
U.S.C. § 262(i). An interchangeability determination also requires a demonstration that the candidate
product can be expected to produce the same clinical result as the reference product in any given patient.
If the candidate product is administered more than once to an individual, the interchangeability
determination also requires a showing that the "risk in terms of safety or diminished efficacy of alternating
or switching between use of the biological product and the reference product is not greater than the risk of
using the reference product without such alternation or switch." 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(4).
403 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(6).

